THE VIEW FROM THE SYRIAN HINTERLAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 005328

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: THE VIEW FROM THE SYRIAN HINTERLAND


CLASSIFIED BY: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES MICHAEL CORBIN, PER 1.4 B,D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: A/DCM, ACCOMPANIED BY A/ARMA, VISITED DEIR
AZOUR, NOVEMBER 13-14, MEETING TWICE WITH THE HEADS OF TWO
LARGE BEDOUIN TRIBES THERE. THE TWO EXTREMELY URBANIZED
SUNNI TRIBAL LEADERS WERE FOCUSED ON U.S. POLICY IN THE
REGION AND ASKED REPEATEDLY ABOUT WHETHER THE US. HAD MADE OR
INTENDED TO MAKE A DEAL WITH THE SYRIAN REGIME. THEY WERE
SUPPORTERS OF POLITICAL REFORM IN SYRIA BUT EXPRESSED
SKEPTICISM THAT THERE COULD BE PROGRESS UNDER THE BASHAR
AL-ASAD REGIME. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) QUESTIONS ABOUT IRAQ AND "A DEAL": A/DCM,
ACCOMPANIED BY A/ARMA, VISITED DEIR AZOUR, LOCATED IN
NORTHEASTERN SYRIA ON THE BANKS OF THE EUPHRATES RIVER, NEAR
THE BORDER WITH IRAQ, NOVEMBER 13-14, MEETING TWICE WITH
BEDOUIN LEADERS, SHEIKH MOHAMMED AL-JALAT, HEAD OF THE LARGE
BAGARRA TRIBE, AND SHEIKH EL-WANY (NFI),HEAD OF THE SOOKNA
TRIBE. THE TWO MEN WERE FOCUSED ON U.S. POLICY IN THE
REGION, ASKING REPEATEDLY ABOUT USG INTENTIONS FOR SYRIA,
IRAQ, AND THE PALESTINIANS. BOTH WERE REASONABLY
WELL-INFORMED ABOUT THE RECENTLY HELD U.S. MID-TERM ELECTIONS
AND ASKED IF THE OUTCOME PRESAGED SOME KIND OF DEAL WITH
SYRIA INVOLVING IRAQ, INTERNAL REFORM, AND LEBANON.


3. (C) SHEIKH MOHAMMED IN PARTICULAR EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT
THE USG WOULD STOP SUPPORTING DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICAL
REFORM IN SYRIA IN EXCHANGE FOR SARG HELP IN STABILIZING
IRAQ. A/DCM MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO DEAL BETWEEN SYRIA
AND THE U.S. AND THAT U.S. POLICY TOWARD SYRIA HAD NOT
CHANGED. THE MEN ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT WHETHER THE
U.S. HAD "A VISION" FOR IRAQ AND DESCRIBED U.S. POLICY IN
IRAQ "A FAILED EXPERIMENT."


4. (C) PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL REFORM: ON THE BROADER TOPIC
OF THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN SYRIA,
SHEIKH MOHAMMED EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT ANY PROGRESS WAS
POSSIBLE WITH THE CURRENT REGIME IN POWER. HE TERMED IT A
"POLICE STATE-MUKHABBARAT" REGIME THAT HAD SUPPRESSED ANY
SERIOUS PRACTICE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN SYRIA FOR SOME 40
YEARS. THE RESULT WAS THAT SYRIANS LACKED EVEN RUDIMENTARY
POLITICAL EXPERIENCE.


5. (C) HE AND A DEIR AZOUR ATTORNEY FRIEND, TARIK (NFI) WHO
ATTENDED ONE OF THE MEETINGS, POINTED TO THE HAPLESSNESS OF
THE DAMASCUS DECLARATION GROUP AS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS LACK OF
POLITICAL SAVVY. THEY DESCRIBED THE DD INITIATIVE, LAUNCHED
ONE YEAR AGO TO PRESS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICAL
REFORM IN SYRIA, AS LARGELY STILL-BORN. BOTH MEN EXPRESSED
VARYING DEGREES OF SUPPORT FOR -- AND RESERVATIONS ABOUT --
THE DECLARATION. SHEIKH MOHAMMED DESCRIBED IT AS OVERLY
THEORETICAL AND INTELLECTUAL RATHER THAN BASED IN REAL
POLITICS. HE NOTED THAT MOST SYRIANS, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN
THE PROVINCES, WERE POOR, STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE ECONOMICALLY,
AND MORE FOCUSED ON JOBS THAN ON POLITICAL CHANGE.


6. (C) CRITICIZING AMERICAN POLICY: SHEIKH MOHAMMED (AND
THE OTHERS AT SUBSEQUENT POINTS IN THE CONVERSATIONS)
CRITICIZED AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS THE PALESTINIANS, TELLING
EMBOFFS THAT THE U.S. WAS BIASED TOWARDS ISRAEL AND NEEDED A
MORE FLEXIBLE, NUANCED POLICY. HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD
ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF SAUDI ARABIA, FOR EXAMPLE, TO HELP
SUPPORT HAMAS FINANCIALLY AND WEAN THE GROUP AWAY FROM
IRANIAN INFLUENCE. SHEIKH MOHAMMED ALSO MAINTAINED THAT THE
U.S. SHOULD STOP INSISTING THAT HAMAS FULFILL WHAT HE TERMED
"IMPOSSIBLE" POLITICAL CONDITIONS. A/DCM NOTED THAT THE
QUARTET LEADERS HAD MADE CLEAR WHAT HAMAS AND THE
PALESTINIANS NEEDED TO DO TO BE RECOGNIZED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.


7. (C) COMMENT: THE FACT THAT TWO SYRIAN SUNNI TRIBAL
LEADERS WERE SO FOCUSED ON POLITICAL REFORM MAY REFLECT
PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS IN DAMASCUS. SHEIKH
MOHAMMED IN PARTICULAR IS POLITICALLY ALLIED WITH
DAMASCUS-BASED PRO-POLITICAL REFORM BUSINESS LEADER (AND
FORMER MP),A LONG-TIME EMBASSY CONTACT. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD
EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT OCCASIONALLY FROM A FEW OTHER
SIMILARLY URBANIZED TRIBAL LEADERS, ALTHOUGH IN GENERAL IT
REMAINS UNCLEAR TO US HOW WIDELY SUCH ISSUES OF POLITICAL
REFORM AND DEMOCRATIZATION ARE SHARED AT TRIBAL GRASS ROOTS
LEVELS, BEYOND THIS ELITE CIRCLE. FOR THAT REASON IT IS ALSO
UNCLEAR WHAT THESE SENTIMENTS MIGHT MEAN FOR THE ASAD REGIME
AND FOR BA'ATH PARTY POLITICAL CALCULATIONS.


8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: ELEMENTS OF AT LEAST TWO
DIFFERENT SECURITY SERVICES FOLLOWED EMBOFFS ALL OVER DEIR
AZOUR, PICKING THEM UP AS SOON AS THEY CHECKED INTO THE
HOTEL. A/DCM, WHO HAD MET SHEIKH MOHAMMED ONCE IN DAMASCUS
(HE IS A FORMER MP),WARNED HIM BY PHONE THAT SYRIAN SECURITY
SERVICES WERE FOLLOWING THEM CLOSELY AND WOULD BECOME AWARE
OF ANY MEETING. AL-JALAT DID NOT SEEM SURPRISED OR BOTHERED
BY THIS NEWS AND ASSURED A/DCM HE SHOULD PROCEED WITH THE
MEETING. ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY SERVICES WAITED OUTSIDE
WHILE EMBOFFS MET AT THE SHEIKHS LARGE DEIR AZOUR HOUSE.
SUBSEQUENTLY SOME OF THEM TOLD EMBOFFS THEY WERE THEMSELVES
FROM THE BAGARRA TRIBE, A PIECE OF INFORMATION THE SHEIKH
FOUND AMUSING WHEN INFORMED OF IT THE NEXT DAY. A WEEK AFTER
THE DEIR AZOUR MEETING, THE SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE (FLO) INFORMED DATT THAT THE SARG WAS
EXTREMELY DISPLEASED THAT A/ARMA (AND A/DCM) HAD MET WITH THE
SHEIKHS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE SARG WAS ANGRY WITH THE
SHEIKHS AND HAD "ARRESTED" AT LEAST ONE OF THE SHEIKHS.
A/DCM CHECKED WITH OTHER CONTACTS WHO ASSURED HIM THERE HAD
BEEN NO ARRESTS.





CORBIN