POST RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATEMENT ON SYRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 005290

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: POST RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATEMENT ON SYRIA


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) Summary: In response to USG queries, Syrian civil
society and human rights activists favor a U.S. statement in
support of political reform and greater respect for human
rights in Syria. There is also agreement that such a
statement should call upon the SARG to ensure the well-being
of a wide range of political prisoners. Our contacts believe
that the Syrian public would be receptive to a statement that
addresses its desire for good governance, the establishment
of the rule of law and anti-corruption measures, and economic
reforms. Timing is a critical element that will impact the
effectiveness of a statement. Possible repercussions include
retaliation against the prisoners or their families and
renewed SARG efforts to limit Post's official and unofficial
contacts in Syria. Post has discussed the inclusion of
prisoners' names with family members and lawyers, or, in
cases where access to the family and lawyers is difficult, to
their political associates. Suggested points for a statement
are included below. End Summary.


2. (C) IN SUPPORT OF A STATEMENT: In response to queries
from DRL and NEA/ELA on the need for a new USG statement on
human rights in Syria, poloffs have examined with human
rights and civil society activists possible language, as well
as the usefulness and timing of the statement. There is
consensus in favor of a statement reaffirming our commitment
to greater respect for human rights and gradual democratic
reform. There is also agreement that such a statement should
also call upon the SARG to ensure the well-being of political
prisoners, particularly in light of reports of the failing
health of Damascus Spring detainee Arif Dalila, who suffers
from a heart condition, and reports that government critic
Kamal Labwani was beaten by a fellow cellmate. Timing is
critical both for how the Syrian public receives the
statement and how the SARG factors it into its internal
calculations. Graphic images from the Beit Hanoun incident,
which have flooded the airwaves, provide the wrong backdrop
for the issuance of a statement in the next few days.
Separately, the inner circle of the SARG, which always
ascribes other motives to our actions, will likely link it to
other considerations such as Lebanon or U.S. election
results, and Washington may wish to time the statement to
have the maximum impact with the SARG.


3. (C) ADDRESSING THE SYRIAN PEOPLE: Our contacts believe
that the Syrian public would be receptive to a statement that
addresses its desire for good governance, the establishment
of the rule of law and anti-corruption measures, and economic
reforms. A USG statement would underscore with the public
our belief that long-term regional stability is intrinsically
linked to respect for human rights and gradual democratic
reforms.


4. (C) POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS: Mention of political
prisoners, names could prompt SARG actions that threaten
their well-being or that of their families, so we think that
any statement should be carefully crafted to limit the idea
that they are somehow betraying their country or the Syrian
people. The families of Damascus-Beirut Declaration
signatories Michel Kilo and Anwar Bunni, as well as Labwani,
support the inclusion of their names in a White House
statement, along the lines of the suggested points below.
Damascus Declaration group leader Riad Seif who personally
knows Dalila and Damascus-Beirut Declaration signatory
Mahmoud Issa strongly urged inclusion of their names in a
statement, stating that they deserve mention and would
welcome such a move. He also noted the importance of
including an Alawite such as Dalila. (Post went to see Seif
in the hopes that he might know when family members of Issa
and Dalila would be in the capital, but he did not.) It
should be noted that Seif has not always been constant on
this topic. In several previous meetings, he cautioned
against any USG statement, arguing that post Iraeli-Hizballah
fighting that the U.S. had no credibility to back up a
statement.


5. (C) Separately, as the SARG has sought to limit our
official and unofficial contacts, we need to be prepared for
the possibility that a statement could prompt renewed SARG
efforts to restrict Embassy activities involving contact with
political, economic and civil society interlocutors.


6. (C) Points for a possible statement could include:

-- The U.S. supports the Syrian people's desires for greater
respect by the Syrian government for human rights and freedom
of expression, a government that develops an open and free
economy and stems rising corruption, and supports the
establishment of the rule of law.

-- When President Asad came to power in June 2000, he
promised meaningful internal political reform. More than six
years later, his administration has delivered only crackdowns
on a wide range of civil society groups; increased harassment
by security services; deportations of legitimate refugees to
face persecution; political trials, arbitrary detentions, and
imprisonment even of the very ill.

-- The SARG is fundamentally responsible for the safety and
well-being of its citizens, including political prisoners
such as Aref Dalila, Michel Kilo, Anwar al-Bunni, Mahmoud
Issa, Kamal Labwani, and others. We are deeply troubled by
reports that ailing political prisoners are denied private
emergency health care and that others are held in cells with
common criminals who have committed violent crimes.

-- Steps that address the Syrian people's legitimate
concerns--including respect for human rights, greater freedom
of expression, and a more open and democratic system--are
fundamental to Syria being included in regional efforts to
foster stability and prosperity.
CORBIN