Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS4614
2006-09-22 08:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

REACTIONS TO ATTACK ON EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS

Tags:  PGOV PTER SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6882
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #4614/01 2650856
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220856Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1691
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0219
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0169
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 004614 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER SY
SUBJECT: REACTIONS TO ATTACK ON EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 004614

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER SY
SUBJECT: REACTIONS TO ATTACK ON EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Syrian contacts have expressed relief that
no Americans were killed or injured in the September 12
attack on the Embassy. Partly due to the almost complete
lack of official information from the SARG on the attack,
many contacts, echoing widespread street views, are
speculating that the attack was somehow "staged" by the
Syrian security services to send the message that the SARG
also faces a terrorist threat and can cooperate with the U.S.
on this challenge. A second view dismissed these conspiracy
theories as unpersuasive, given the enormous risks such a
staged attack posed to the SARG if it went badly and given
the dangerous signs of loss of control by security services
such an attack would send. Most contacts are convinced that
the attack will not be repeated. The SARG refusal to release
any information about the results of its investigation into
the incident has left people with nothing but speculation and
conspiracy theories by way of explanation. Syrians'
understandable, if unreliable, conviction that their
police-state security services are all-powerful and
all-knowing, also contributes to this insistence that no such
security trespass could occur without those services'
knowledge and blessing. Syrians' fears about instability and
potential chaos also make it comforting to rely on the
assumption that any major security breaches here are merely
illusory. End Summary.


2. (C) EXPRESSIONS OF RELIEF MINGLED WITH SCHADENFREUDE:
Syrians have reacted with a range of emotions and theories to
the September 12 attack on the Embassy in Damascus. On the
emotional level, many expressed relief that no Americans were
killed or injured. Some of course followed up such
expressions with criticisms of U.S. policies in the region,
which were meant to communicate the view that the anger that
provoked the attack is real and understandable. While
careful about expressing it openly, some Syrians -- still
angry and embittered about the destructive war in Lebanon
that they believe the U.S. "green-lighted" and allowed to
continue -- are convinced that the U.S. "got what it

deserved."

3. (C) CONSPIRACY THEORIES ABOUND: Most Syrians who
responded to the event are consumed with the issue of whether
or not the attack was "staged" in some way by Syrian
authorities. As is predictable in the hothouse world of
Middle East conspiracy politics, a situation where the SARG
tightly control all information and has refused almost to
release any official information about the attack, the
majority are speculating that the attack was "pre-fabricated"
by Syrian security services. The purpose of "faking" such an
attack on the U.S. Embassy was to persuade the Americans --
and Syrians -- that Syria faces a real Islamic terrorist
threat and that if the U.S. pressures the regime until it
collapses, the Islamists would "take over." As one proponent
put it to A/DCM, the regime felt that the "message of the
terrorist attacks on the U.N. building in Mezzeh in the
spring of 2004 and on the Radio and TV HQ's in June of 2006
had been insufficiently "understood by the Americans," so the
SARG delivered a more blunt message.


4. (C) Some more thoughtful contacts, like al-Hayat
correspondent Ibrahim Hamidi and former Deputy Minister of
Planning Riad Abrash, spun out such theories to A/DCM while
admitting it was impossible to know if they were true. They
pointed to the reactions of the security services at the
scene to support the claim that the event was known about in
advance and "under control." Hamidi, for example, said he
understood that after the event, which took place in an area
where many senior government officials lived and worked --
including the President -- there was no additional security
presence visible afterwards. For him, this was a sign that
the SARG was not concerned at all about what -- if it was
real -- would normally be viewed as an extremely serious,
threatening security incident. These contacts speculated
that the SARG did not have to actually hatch this plot but
merely could have allowed it to develop on its own and
monitored it with informants to ensure it was contained in
advance.


5. (C) Others like Sunni religious leader Salah Kuftaro
argued that the quick, heavily armed reaction of the Syrian
security forces also demonstrated that the security services
had advanced knowledge of the attack. Opposition figures
also espoused this conspiracy view, with Walid al-Bunni for
example, claiming that unlike with previous terrorist

DAMASCUS 00004614 002 OF 003


attacks, SARG security forces have not made mass arrests of
family members and associates in the hometown of attackers.
(Note: A Canadian diplomat told Poloff on September 20 that
such arrests had since begun.)


6. (C) REALISTS SEE A SERIOUS SECURITY LAPSE: The minority
view among the limited sounding we took with contacts was
that the attack was real and indicated a serious security
lapse. One contact described the attack as designed to
embarrass the regime and demonstrate that it could not
provide security or even protect foreign diplomats.
Proponents of this view argue that the regime would never
have allowed a violent incident of this nature to unfold in
such a sensitive area, so close to the President. Security
chiefs would fear the signal of instability and lack of
control that such an incident would send.


7. (C) Dr. Samir al-Taqi, an advisor to the MFA with close
ties to GID chief Ali Mamluk, told A/DCM that staging such an
attack would pose enormous risks for the SARG, in the event
something went wrong or if its involvement was discovered.
In al-Taqi's view, the cell that staged the attack likely had
shadowy connections to far-flung al-Qaida branches, so any
revelation of SARG involvement would expose the SARG to
damaging accusations of consorting with al-Qaida. If there
was any SARG staging, it was handled by a very restricted
group in a single security force, with other services "kept
in the dark," since most of the security forces are sincerely
and obviously troubled and galvanized into action by the
attack, judging by their reactions, claimed al-Taqi.
Al-Taqi hinted at several points about the Saudi connections
of the attackers but did not state explicitly that there
could have been external influence shaping the attack.



8. (C) FOCUS ON "AMATEURISHNESS" OF ATTACK: Many contacts
focused on the "amateurish" nature of the attack, including
both conspiracy proponents and those who thought the attack
was real. Both sides insisted that the amateurishness
supported the view that this attack was a one-off and would
not be repeated. For conspiracy proponents, one amateurish
attack is all that was needed to send the message. For the
realists, such as Reuters bureau chief Khalid Oweis, the
amateurish nature of the attack showed that the really
serious terrorists, such as those aligned with al-Qaida in
Iraq, had been co-opted by the security services and
channeled by Syrian policy for "terrorism export only." They
would not mount such an attack for fear of jeopardizing their
"base" in Syria. Taking the opposite view, al-Taqi predicted
that there would be subsequent attacks.


9. (C) DIPLOMATIC REACTION: Diplomatic contacts have
expressed sympathy as well as concern about the attack and
have followed closely Embassy decisions about personnel in
the wake of the attack. The British seem to have been the
most concerned, closing their Embassy immediately after the
attack, as we did, for the rest of the week. The British
military attache told DATT that embassy personnel have been
meeting regularly since the attack to determine short- and
longer-term options for responding to ensure the safety of
their personnel. The Italians, with an embassy located
across the street from the back of our embassy, have also
expressed concern and have met with the MFA and senior
Damascus police officials to request that the shared side
street be closed to traffic.


10. (C) COMMENT: The tendency in the Middle East to fall
back almost immediately on conspiracy theories is certainly
evident in Syrians' reactions to the attack on the Embassy.
The complete lack of official information or any transparency
by the SARG regarding its investigation into the incident has
left people with nothing but speculation and conspiracy
theories by way of explanation. Syrians' understandable, if
unreliable, conviction -- after more than 40 years of
Ba'athist police state rule -- that their security services
are all-powerful and all-knowing, also contributes to this
insistence that no such security trespass could occur without
those services' knowledge and blessing. Given Syrians' fears
about instability and potential chaos, in view of the war
next door in Iraq, they likely find it comforting to assume
that everything is under control here in Syria and that any
major security breaches are merely illusory. It is still a
bit early to tell what effect this attack will have on the
political landscape here and how it might impact on Syrians'
perceptions about stability and order.

DAMASCUS 00004614 003 OF 003








CORBIN