Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS4612
2006-09-21 16:31:00
SECRET
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

INITIAL EMBASSY EFFORTS TO PRESS SARG ON INCREASED

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER SY 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #4612/01 2641631
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211631Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1687
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 6289
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0215
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4114
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2687
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 7301
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1308
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 004612 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: INITIAL EMBASSY EFFORTS TO PRESS SARG ON INCREASED
SECURITY IN WAKE OF ATTACK

REF: A. DAMASCUS 4441


B. DAMASCUS 4588

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 004612

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: INITIAL EMBASSY EFFORTS TO PRESS SARG ON INCREASED
SECURITY IN WAKE OF ATTACK

REF: A. DAMASCUS 4441


B. DAMASCUS 4588

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (S) Summary: In the wake of the September 12 attack on
the Embassy, the Embassy has pressed the SARG through various
channels for increased security for USG facilities in
Damascus and for complete sharing of details of the SARG
investigation into the attack. RSO has relied on informal
contacts with a senior police commander to glean some
information about the investigation and to enhance security
at the Embassy. In the hours just after the attack, the SARG
made a concerted effort at responsiveness, but remains
unavailable at senior levels. Through his contacts, the RSO
has obtained in an ad hoc manner significant SARG security
enhancements for the Embassy (reported septel) but has
received very little information on the investigation into
the attack. End Summary.


2. (C) Following the September 12 attack on the U.S.
Embassy, Embassy has
used various channels to

-- demand heightened security for Americans and USG
facilities in Damascus including the USG-sponsored Damascus
Community School;

-- receive information on the SARG investigation into the
attack; and

-- seek to increase channels for receiving threat information
from the SARG on threats to the U.S. in Syria.


3. (S) For background, Embassy security is provided by at
least two security services: Syrian Military Intelligence
and the Ministry of Interior. DAO has an official but
limited relationship with SMI through its Foreign Liaison
Office that is charged with oversight of foreign military
attaches posted to Damascus. The RSO has a very informal
personal relationship with a senior Interior general
responsible for Embassy security. This channel continued
despite SARG efforts to direct all Embassy's official contact
with the SARG through the MFA after the recall of the
Ambassador in February 2005. In the absence of an
intelligence channel, any USG threat information desired to
be passed to the SARG is passed by the Charge to the senior

point of contact designated by the MFA for all Embassy
business after the withdrawal of the Ambassador, Director of
Protocol Dr. Smadi. This has been a one-way channel in which
the Charge has occasionally passed sensitive threat
information, which Smadi committed to passing to the relevant
security authorities. The Charge has not received
substantive response from Smadi.


4. (S) In the hours just after the attack, the SARG made a
concerted effort to demonstrate responsiveness. Charge met
with Minister of Interior Bassam Abdelmajid outside of the
Embassy immediately after the attack at the Minister's
request. He promised complete security cooperation. Charge
met the same day with Assistant Foreign Minister Arnous (the
number three in the MFA and significantly senior to the
protocol director) to request enhanced security, information
about the attack, and underlined the responsibility of the
SARG to provide threat info to the Embassy (reftel). (The
MFA subsequently provided a point of contact in the MOI, who
turned out to be junior to the RSO's informal POC.) However,
as days have passed, the SARG seems to have attempted to
return to a business-as-usual approach, rebuffing Charge's
attempts to engage officials at more senior levels on
attack-related issues.


5. (C) Through his contacts, the RSO has obtained in an ad
hoc manner some security enhancements for the Embassy. These
will be detailed septel but include the following: Five
uniformed police guarding the embassy are now armed, a change
from their pre-attack posture. Fifteen to twenty
plainclothes police are now in the area (in addition to the
normal SMI plainclothes contingents). Two motorcycle police
are now preventing cars from stopping in front of the
Embassy, in an effort to help secure al Mansour street, the
main traffic artery that the Embassy fronts. RSO has
requested extra police for the Embassy-affiliated Damascus
Community School. The Charge pressed Arnous to close the

streets that surround the Embassy but was told that the SARG
was "studying" such action but would try to increase security
measures to control traffic. The Charge has attempted to
follow up with Arnous on this issue and on the investigation
but has been told that Arnous is not available.


6. (C) On the investigation, the RSO has unofficially been
given limited information about the police investigation into
the attack, including limited bio-data on the attackers.
Charge and RSO have attempted to use RSO and other channels
to hand over a copy of footage of the attack filmed by
Embassy security cameras, in exchange for enhanced SARG
cooperation on the investigation. At Charge's behest, DATT
tried a similar approach September 21, with his contact in
the FLO office of SMI. So far, these efforts have not borne
fruit.


7. (C) COMMENT: The SARG is taking steps to enhance Embassy
security, but at the political level clearly has not made the
decision to relax the controls on the Charge or to expand
security cooperation. We will continue to press the SARG
through our working-level contacts and use a security
assessment team visit (ref B) to make a renewed push through
the MFA.


CORBIN