Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS394
2006-02-02 15:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

RIAD SEIF COMMENTS ON PRESS CONFERENCE, DISCUSSES

Tags:  PGOV PHUM SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #0394/01 0331547
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021547Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6845
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0610
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000394 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: RIAD SEIF COMMENTS ON PRESS CONFERENCE, DISCUSSES
PLANS FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTE

REF: DAMASCUS 254

Classified By: CDA Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b)/(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000394

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: RIAD SEIF COMMENTS ON PRESS CONFERENCE, DISCUSSES
PLANS FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTE

REF: DAMASCUS 254

Classified By: CDA Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b)/(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a February 1 conversation with PolOff,
prominent opposition figure Riad Seif discussed the SARG's
prevention of the released Damascus Spring detainees' January
31 press conference and explained some of his requests for
U.S. support in greater depth. In a later meeting, he
discussed his proposal for the establishment of an institute
for the study of corruption in Syria and advancement of
transparency with visiting International Republican Institute
program officer Hallem Ferguson and Poloff. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) A tired but upbeat Riad Seif met with Poloff on the
night of February 1, joining a conversation between Poloff
and his daughter, Joumana. Seif commented that the train of
visitors had been continuing, with a 60-person delegation of
political figures from Suweida, a predominantly Druze area in
southern Syria, arriving on January 31 to pay their respects,
as well as a mixture of Syrian civil-society figures,
including Sunni Muslim leader Saleh Kuftaro. (NOTE: Human
rights activist and Muslim Brotherhood sympathizer Nehad
Nahas, who has in past offered to serve as an intermediary
between the MB and Post, immediately preceded Poloff's
meeting with Seif; in the closing minutes of their meeting,
during which Poloff was present, Nahas and Seif discussed the
possibility of Seif doing a European lecture circuit,
although it was unclear who the target audience would be. END
NOTE.)


3. (C) SEIF DETAILS SARG,S MEASURES AGAINST PRESS
CONFERENCE: Seif also detailed the events of January 31, when
SARG security officials prevented a press conference by the
five released Damascus Spring detainees at the office of
Haithem Maleh. According to Seif, the press conference was
to formally launch the campaign for the release of Arif
Dalilah, Kamal Labwani, and other political prisoners. After
arriving at 10:10 PM near Maleh's office, Seif saw
approximately 200 police and secret police officers
surrounding Maleh's office. Seif engaged in a "hot
discussion" with the police, with the police officers

physically pushing Seif from Maleh's office door to the main
street 100 meters away. Seif stated that at one point he
fell to the ground and pointed out a small bruise on his
wrist resulting from the incident. He joked that it was "a
pity there was no camera there" to capture the incident, but
noted that there had been plenty of eye witnesses.


4. (C) Seif noted that he currently found most of his
discussions with Syrian interlocutors centering around the
issue of how the opposition should best deal with the West.
He argued that the problems of the Syrian people had resulted
from two strategic mistakes: first, the lack of democracy and
free markets; second, the spread of an anti-Western culture
in the country. He also noted that the problems with Israel
could have been solved had Syria spoken as a democracy. He
reiterated his point from a previous meeting that the U.S.
does not attack other democracies, and praised the U.S.
reaction to the Hamas victory in Palestinian parliamentary
elections as yet another example of this.


5. (C) CONCERNS ABOUT SAFETY, REQUEST FOR DIPLOMATIC
PRESSURE ON SARG: Seif then discussed what foreign
governments should be doing to help his cause. He noted that
the SARG now understands that he is the biggest threat to its
power and fears that he could unite all opposition figures.
While Seif asserted that "I refuse to be afraid," he repeated
his concern about being re-arrested or being assassinated.
He asked that the US, Canadian, EU, Australian, and the
Japanese governments must give the SARG a strong warning on
Seif,s behalf. He said that the foreign governments should
state that they expect, at a minimum, that Seif and his
followers be granted the freedom of expression.


6. (C) Seif also repeated his request (reftel) that the USG
provide documents that would help to discredit the SARG.
Such documents would help undercut the SARG,s claim to moral
authority with the population at large and would include
information on the positive treatment of "Muslims in the U.S.
before September 11th", on SARG massacres and human rights
violations, and "secret agreements" signed in 1974 by Hafez
al-Asad and Henry Kissinger.


7. (C) AVERAGE SYRIANS STARTING TO SEE CRACKS IN SARG
SYSTEM: Seif noted that Syrians were slowly becoming aware
of the SARG's fundamental problems, and that the recent gas
and cement price hikes were being felt by the average Syrian,
and predicted that diesel prices would increase next. "The

SARG is going bankrupt," which Seif attributed to officials
skimming off a growing percentage of oil profits. Seif was
skeptical that Iran could help the SARG much as they "have
their own problems." Seif also noted that the Parliament's
reaction to former Vice President Abdulhalim Khaddam,s
statements had opened the eyes of many average Syrians to the
corruption of the system.


8. (C) SEIF PITCHES ANTI-CORRUPTION THINK TANK: Seif then
went on to outline his plans to establish an institute that
would, in effect, serve as his party,s think tank and would
work to "uncover the truth about the SARG." The institute
would need support from abroad, and Seif identified this to
Poloff and visiting IDI representative Hal Ferguson as one
area where the U.S. could assist. A military option against
the SARG is unrealistic, said Seif; instead, the SARG can
only be destroyed if Syrian society is enlightened about the
real situation. Seif told Ferguson that training and
capacity building for the three to four institute managers
who will be selected shortly would be necessary, particularly
in NGO management and research techniques. The institute
would "help political activity" and would publish reports
revealing corruption in Syrian society.

SECHE