Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS3679
2006-07-26 13:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

ANTI-AMERICAN, PRO-HIZBALLAH THEMES PREDOMINATE IN

Tags:  PGOV PREL SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1819
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #3679/01 2071354
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261354Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0590
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0146
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0129
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 003679 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ANTI-AMERICAN, PRO-HIZBALLAH THEMES PREDOMINATE IN
SYRIA, WITH BACKBEAT OF DOUBTS, FEARS


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 003679

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ANTI-AMERICAN, PRO-HIZBALLAH THEMES PREDOMINATE IN
SYRIA, WITH BACKBEAT OF DOUBTS, FEARS


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Rising anti-American sentiment is evident
in Syria in response to the aerial bombardment Israel has
unleashed on Lebanon in the past two weeks. Many contacts,
reflecting widespread public sentiment, accuse the U.S. of
using Israel's military might to impose its own agenda on
Lebanon and the region and of failing to criticize Israel's
actions. Powerful, often very emotional, support for
Hizballah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah has also welled up,
with Syrians viewing Nasrallah as an authentic Arab
nationalist hero. Contacts report the SARG asking them not
to stage pro-Hizballah demonstrations because of fears they
will get out of control. Privately, some contacts point to a
degree of Sunni discomfort that Hizballah is being used by
Iran to make Shiite inroads in Sunni countries like Syria.
There is some criticism that the SARG has embraced Hizballah
too closely, and concern about Syria being dragged into the
conflict. Civil society activists expect increased internal
repression in the wake of the fighting. End Summary.


2. (C) POWERFUL ANTI-AMERICAN CURRENTS NOTED: Anti-American
sentiment in Syria has risen dramatically in the past two
weeks as Syrians are transfixed by daily emotional television
coverage of the human cost and widespread destruction in
Lebanon caused by the Israeli retaliation against Hizballah.
The Israeli response is viewed here overwhelmingly as
disproportionate. Contacts report that the U.S. is
perceived, for the first time, as using Israel's military
might to impose its own agenda on Lebanon and the region,
chiefly the implementation of UNSCR 1559 (and the disarming
of Hizballah),along with U.S. plans for "a new Middle East."
"It turns out that Israel is an instrument of U.S. policy
after all," and not vice versa, noted economist (and former
Deputy Minister of Planning) Riad Abrash. Others like
influential Sunni religious leader Salah Kuftaro criticized
the U.S. bitterly for its failure to utter "a word of
denunciation" about the death and destruction caused in

Lebanon. Even contacts in the Christian community, normally
more reserved and less hostage to street sentiment, reported
rapidly increasing anti-U.S. feeling. The Papal Nuncio told
the Charge that he has been struck by the vehement
anti-Israeli sentiments expressed by his Syrian bishops.
There is also powerful resentment against Arab regimes,
especially those in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which are viewed
as unsupportive of Hizballah and overly sympathetic to U.S.
designs for the region.


3. (C) NASRALLAH AS THE LATEST ARAB SAVIOR: In tandem with
these sentiments are powerful feelings of admiration for
Hizballah and its leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah and for the
"heroic" fight they have waged against Israel. Nasrallah is
seen "an Arab nationalist hero," according to Dr. Asem
Kubtan, an activist in the small pan-Arab opposition party,
the Democratic Arab Socialist Union. Abrash referred to
Nasrallah as "the most popular man in the Arab world right
now," insisting that his popularity and that of Hizballah
cuts across all sectarian, gender, age, and class lines in
Syria. People also support the resistance in Lebanon -- and
are happy to see it stand up to Israel -- because of powerful
feelings of frustration, despair, and a sense of political
humiliation in Syria and throughout the Arab world, the
product of decades of occupation and a history of
colonialism, noted former Damascus Spring detainee Habib
Issa. Human rights activist Mohanned al-Hassani insisted to
Poloff that Syrians overwhelmingly support Nasrallah because
of the powerful need for "a savior," just as Arab masses had
in the past supported Nasser and Saddam Hussein. These
contacts maintain that Syrian support for Nasrallah crosses
sectarian, gender, age, and class divisions.


4. (C) PRAYING FOR A HIZBALLAH VICTORY: Many contacts also
pointed to the heavy emotional reaction many Syrians had to
events in Lebanon. To illustrate, the avowedly secular
Abrash pointed to his wife (an upper-class Sunni like
himself),not normally focused on politics, who "is glued to
the television and is praying for a Hizballah victory each
day." A few Syrians have told Polchief they feel so strongly
that they would be willing to go to Lebanon and help out with
the "jihad" being waged by Hizballah. While there was some
quiet criticism of Nasrallah heard in the first days of the
Israeli attacks, as a few noted Hizballah's apparent gross
miscalculation of the Israeli response, that has faded away
now, with people insisting that Israel and the U.S. set a

DAMASCUS 00003679 002 OF 003


trap for Hizballah. According to this conspiratorial view, a
pretext for attacking Hizballah would have been manufactured
if Hizballah had not conveniently supplied one, to proceed
with forcibly disarming the militia.


5. (C) REGIME CONCERN ABOUT DEMONSTRATIONS GETTING OUT OF
CONTROL: These anti-U.S., pro-Hizballah sentiments are
powerful enough that the regime is concerned about it,
according to a number of contacts. While it has whipped up
some of this sentiment itself, with its state-owned media,
regional satellite T.V. has also played a role. Sheikh
Kuftaro and political activist Kubtan told Polchief
separately that government representatives have asked them
not to hold any demonstrations in support of Hizballah.
Instead the government has arranged a few of its own
carefully controlled demonstrations. Kuftaro noted that
officials in the security services insisted that he not allow
any demonstration after his Friday sermon at the Abu Noor
Institute last week, for fear it would get out of control.
For his part, to try to stay ahead of the popular anger, so
as to better control it, Kuftaro spoke emotionally in his
sermon about opening a second front on the Golan to ease the
pressure on the resistance. He told Polchief subsequently
that he knew the proposal was a non-starter with the regime
and also had little popular support, but it allowed him to
appear as understanding and sympathizing with the intense
street sentiment. Kuftaro in an aside claimed that security
officials subsequently complained to him about the Golan
remarks, saying they had made the government uncomfortable
and were not welcome.


6. (C) MINORITY VIEWS: While these anti-U.S. and
pro-Hizballah sentiments predominate at the popular level and
to a significant if lesser degree among political elites,
there are minority views and nuances evident. A few contacts
questioned the intensity of the anti-U.S. feeling and
predicted it would fade quickly, since some of it is
regime-manufactured. Others noted that beneath the surface,
and despite the powerful identification with Hizballah and
its confrontation with Israel, there remain muted Sunni
suspicions about the Shiite affiliation of the militia.
Al-Hayat bureau chief Ibrahim Hamidi pointed out that the
regime "put Sunni religious leader Mohammed al-Buti on Syrian
TV" a week ago to squelch such talk and encourage Syrians
(the vast majority of whom are Sunnis) to identify with
Hizballah's struggle. Ba'athist reformer (and prominent
Christian) Ayman Abdul Noor noted that the SARG-owned media
never refers to Hizballah's Shiite identity, and rarely
refers to Hizballah by name, preferring to call it the
Lebanese Islamic resistance.


7. (C) Other contacts observed that while Hizballah is
admired for its confrontation with Israel, support slips when
there is talk about its role in an arc of Shiite influence
that extends from Iran, through Iraq, to Lebanon. Kuftaro
noted that his private views are more anti-Hizballah than
those on the street, as are those of many in the Sunni
religious establishment in Syria. Kuftaro insisted that
Sunni religious leaders have reservations about the
leadership of the Lebanese resistance "being in the hands of
the Shiites" and added that Iran is using Hizballah to spread
Shiite influence -- and convert Sunnis -- in Syria and other
Sunni countries. Businessman and former MP Ihsan Sankar,
admitting that his anti-Hizballah view was a minority one
among his business colleages, predicted that Nasrallah's (and
Hizballah's) popularity would decline significantly, arguing
that the dimensions of its defeat and Lebanon's destruction
will eventually become evident.


8. (C) "GETTING STUCK" WITH HIZBALLAH: There is also a view
being expressed quietly, among some elite Sunnis, Christians,
and Alawites, that the regime has overly embraced Hizballah,
and "now we are stuck with them," and their disastrous
policies, reported Abdul Noor. In his view, it would be
almost impossible now for the regime to abandon Hizballah,
"even if it were offered the Golan." Abdul Noor also
criticized the SARG for "attacking" and angering its Arab
allies over the Hizballah issue. In his view, Syria needed
-- and should opt for -- support from Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf, for investment and political support, rather than a
pro-Hizballah alliance with Iran. (Note: The
SARG-orchestrated demonstrations have included insulting
chants referring to different Arab leaders perceived as not
supporting Hizballah, such as Egyptian President Mubarak.)

DAMASCUS 00003679 003 OF 003




9. (C) FEARS OF GETTING DRAGGED INTO THE CONFLICT: Many
Syrians are expressing deep concern about Syria possibly
being dragged into the conflict or being attacked by Israel,
although contacts generally discounted the notion that the
SARG would do anything to provoke Israel into widening the
conflict. Abdul Noor derided SARG military capabilities,
noting to Polchief that the army could not even mobilize its
reserves successfully because of lack of resources and poor
organization. He and others also expressed doubt that the
SARG would be reckless enough to try to re-supply Hizballah
with weapons. Nonetheless, they expressed the fear that
Israel may attack Syria, for example, if the IDF gets bogged
down in Lebanon and is unable to gain the expected military
victory over Hizballah. Such an attack would be designed to
widen the conflict and distract from IDF failure in Lebanon.


10. (C) EVEN BUSINESSMEN PRO-HIZBALLAH: The consensus in
the Syrian business community is that the SARG is committed
to remaining out of direct involvement in the present
conflict in Lebanon. A solid majority of the business elite
we've talked to in the last week are also convinced that the
SARG is ready to cut a deal that could lead to a more
comprehensive settlement of regional conflicts. As the
present conflict continues, support within the largely Sunni
business community is galvanizing behind Hizballah and the
sometimes pointed criticisms of the regime from the business
elite are becoming increasingly rare. All seem to believe
the time is now ripe for the USG to reengage the SARG in a
high-level dialogue as businessmen believe regime elements
are highly suspicious of Iran and fear that Ahmadinejad,s
willingness to pursue Iranian regional hegemony will
eventually run counter to Syrian interests.


11. (C) LOTS OF PESSIMISM AND CONCERN FOR LONGER TERM:
Many contacts, regardless of how they feel about Hizballah or
the Syrian regime, are also striking notes of pessimism and
concern about the longer term. They express concern, with
the intensity varying depending on the day's news cycle, that
Hizballah may eventually absorb a substantial military and
political blow, although no one we spoke with expected the
Shiite group to suffer a complete defeat and "be destroyed."
Civil society activists Issa and Hassani predicted increased
SARG internal repression in the wake of the conflict in
Lebanon, regardless of the outcome, as the regime sought to
suppress any notion that events there could have blowback and
cause instability in Syria. The "ceiling of fear" is already
being lowered significantly, asserted Hassani. Some contacts
assessed that despite such efforts, the regime will emerge
after the conflict in Lebanon, regardless of the specific
outcome and any Hizballah attempts to declare victory, in a
weakened and more isolated state. According to academic Amr
al-Azm, Syria is likely to face increased pressure from the
U.S. and much of the rest of the international community, as
they attempt to disarm Hizballah and choke off any
possibility of Hizballah re-armament by Syria, ensuring that
the militia transitions to an exclusively political presence
in Lebanon. In his view, if Hizballah suffers what is
perceived as a serious defeat, the Syrian regime will be less
stable.


12. (C) COMMENT: In the past 48 hours, in the wake of the
Secretary's visit to the region, and with anticipation having

SIPDIS
built up in advance of the Rome meeting, there was a spike in
speculation that the U.S. might re-engage with Syria as it
seeks to implement a sustainable cease-fire. Ordinarily such
high-level U.S. diplomatic engagement would be expected to
alleviate to a degree the anti-American sentiments that have
developed, countering perceptions here of U.S. bias towards
Israel. However, the negative press coming out of the Rome
meeting will likely mean little relief in the short term from
the prevailing view that U.S. policy is wed to Israel's
interests.







SECHE