Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS363
2006-02-01 15:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

CHARGE INFORMS DFM MU'ALLIM THAT AMBASSADOR WILL

Tags:  PGOV PREL SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0021
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #0363/01 0321542
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011542Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6811
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0605
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000363 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: CHARGE INFORMS DFM MU'ALLIM THAT AMBASSADOR WILL
NOT RETURN

REF: STATE 14488

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000363

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: CHARGE INFORMS DFM MU'ALLIM THAT AMBASSADOR WILL
NOT RETURN

REF: STATE 14488

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Using reftel points, Charge informed SARG
DFM Walid Mu'allim February 1 that Ambassador Scobey would
not be returning to post. Mu'allim called the decision a
mistake. The DFM also took issue with the points raised on
Iraq, Palestinian rejectionist groups, Lebanon, and the need
to respect human rights in Syria, and also rejected the
Charge's criticism of the Ahmadinejad visit to Damascus. On
Iraq, Mu'allim urged the U.S., for its own interests, to
allow Iraqi officials to engage with Syria, noting that the
SARG is willing to establish full diplomatic relations and
cooperate in all fields. Mu'allim described as misguided the
U.S. Treasury designation of SMI head Asif Shawkat, saying
Shawkat is "a real partner" for the USG. End Summary.



2. (C) AMBASSADOR NOT COMING BACK: In a February 1 meeting
at the MFA, Charge informed DFM Mu'allim that Ambassador
Scobey will not be returning to post and that she will not be
replaced at this time. Charge made clear that the reason for
this action was SARG failure to take action on key issues of
concern, including foreign-fighter networks in Syria, SARG
interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon, Palestinian
rejectionist groups resident in Damascus, and continued
repression of its own citizens. The Charge also noted that
the recent visit to Syria of Iranian President Ahmadinejad
had served to reinforce in Washington the impression that
Damascus continued to be a destabilizing force in the region.



3. (C) DFM CALLS IT A MISTAKE: While acknowledging that the
decision on the Ambassador was for the U.S. to make, Mu'allim
termed it "a real mistake," making a pitch for robust
diplomatic relations as an instrument for effective foreign
relations and for facilitating dialogue. The DFM said he
found the decision to be symptomatic of U.S. policy towards
Syria, which relied on "demands" rather than on efforts to
find common ground. In Mu'allim's view, the U.S. also needed
an ambassador in Damascus because the U.S. "is losing
momentum in the region."



4. (C) IRAN: Responding to the broader concerns that Charge
raised, Mu'allim ticked off the SARG view, taking as his
starting point the concern raised by the Iranian president's
visit. In his view, the joint communique the two sides
issued during that visit contained "cautious" and
"responsible" language on a range of issues, including Iran's
nuclear program and Iraq. Regarding the nuclear issue,
Mu'allim questioned why the U.S. failed to challenge Israel's
refusal to sign the NPT and blocked Syrian diplomatic efforts
to press for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. In his
view the U.S. maintained a blatant double-standard on the
issue. More broadly, Mu'allim said that Syria could help the
U.S. in its relations with Iran, noting that it was not in
the USG's interest to have political or economic
confrontation with Iran.


5. (C) IRAQ: Regarding the issue of Iraq, Mu'allim insisted
that Syria and Iran had emphasized publicly their support for
the stability and unity of Iraq, and for the political
process there. Responding to the Charge's point about the
failure of Syrian actions to match up with this positive
rhetoric, Mu'allim insisted that Syria had taken measures to
enhance border security, action which he said had been
acknowledged by the U.S. military in Iraq.


6. (C) SARG DESIRE TO ENGAGE WITH IRAQIS: Mu'allim also
insisted that the U.S. did not really want to cooperate with
Syria on Iraq issues, despite the fact that Syria is "a
factor for stability in Iraq" and can provide a corrective to
Iranian influence, especially because of its influence with
various Sunni groups. Mu'allim subsequently returned to this
issue, asking why the U.S. blocked attempts by Iraqi
officials to engage with their Syrian counterparts. "Let the
Iraqis move to engage with us. We are ready to move with
them in all fields," said Mu'allim, pointing to SARG
readiness to establish full diplomatic relations and work
with the new Iraqi government, establish better joint border
security cooperation, and enhance economic cooperation. "The
end results will benefit the U.S.," said Mu'allim. This SARG
readiness to deal with Iraq is not part of any proposed deal
or quid pro quo with the U.S., but represents an area of
common U.S.-Syrian interest. (Note: Mu'allim stated twice
in this context that the SARG intended to cooperate with

UNIIIC and did not expect any concessions on this cooperation
in exchange for engaging with the Iraqi government.)


7. (C) HAMAS'S VICTORY: Addressing the victory of Hamas in
the Palestinian legislative elections, Mu'allim noted that
"everyone was surprised, except us." In addition to
representing a vote against PA corruption and other internal
issues, the vote had to be seen as a Palestinian rejection of
U.S. policies, said Mu'allim. He criticized the U.S. for
pushing the Palestinians into extremism with its policies and
stated that in his view the U.S. is wrong to put conditions
on any aid to the Palestinians. The Charge noted the U.S.
was by no means alone in insisting that Hamas recognize
Israel's right to exist if it wanted the support of the
international community.


8. (C) LEBANON; SHAWKAT DESIGNATION: On other issues,
Mu'allim rejected the charge that Syria is interfering in the
affairs of Lebanon, maintaining instead that it is the
American Ambassador in Lebanon who is intervening in
Lebanon's internal affairs. Mu'allim described the USG
decision to designate SMI chief Asif Shawkat for sanctions as
"another serious mistake." He described Shawkat as "a real
partner" for the U.S. and disputed the Charge's contention
that Shawkat was instrumental in the decision to break off
security cooperation with the U.S.


9. (C) HARASSING CIVIL SOCIETY: Charge raised the issue of
SARG harassment of Syrian civil society, noting for example
that on January 31 the security services had intervened to
prevent Riad Seif and other recently released Damascus Spring
detainees from holding a press conference. Charge asked when
the SARG would stop blaming its failure to implement any
serious political or economic reforms on foreign pressure.
"When the pressure stops," said Mu'allim, noting that it
would take time for the SARG to make serious progress even
after the pressure eased.

SECHE