NEWLY RELEASED SYRIA DECLARATION ENCOUNTERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 002938

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV SY
SUBJECT: NEWLY RELEASED SYRIA DECLARATION ENCOUNTERS
SKEPTICISM, SUSPICION FROM CIVIL SOCIETY

REF: (A) 05 DAMASCUS 005833 (B) DAMASCUS 02688 (C)

DAMASCUS 02517

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b)/(d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: While the recently published "Syria
Declaration" calling for improvements in human rights policy
and the passage of laws guaranteeing a range of civil
liberties has gained international attention following its
release on June 14, many civil society members are either
unaware of the document or have dismissed it, referring to
its signatory organizations as "illusory." The majority of
the Declaration's signatory organizations are, in fact,
one-man shops with overlapping leaders, a number of whom have
featured prominently in recent SARG-backed actions aimed at
discrediting the opposition. Contacts are divided as to
whether the Declaration is simply a publicity stunt by these
small organizations, or if the SARG may have allowed or even
encouraged the Declaration's release. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) SYRIA DECLARATION CALLS FOR IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS
RECORD, EXPANDED CIVIL LIBERTIES AND SECULAR APPROACH: A
group of ten Syrian human rights and civil society
organizations released the "Syria Declaration" on June 14,
calling on the SARG to "follow peaceful and gradual
democratic steps, taking it from a security state to a civil
state." The Declaration calls for the SARG to implement
eighteen measures, including freeing political prisoners;
ending the Emergency Law; passing new laws allowing for
freedom of expression, association, and party formation;
ending the politicization of the armed services and the court
system; committing itself to work on the return of the Golan
Heights; working in harmony with the international community
and its different organizations; and setting up a
market-based economy. The signatories describe their project
as using the secular approach of cultural liberalism,
combining political action with "the slogan of democratic
liberalism and human rights." According to post contacts,
the document is in essence the same document that Aktham
Naisse had been developing since November as an alternative
to the Damascus Declaration (ref A).


3. (C) TEN SIGNATORY ORGANIZATIONS ACTUALLY ONLY A HANDFUL
OF PEOPLE: While a joint public statement by ten Syrian
civil society organizations may look good on paper, the
document proves not to be especially representative of civil
society upon closer inspection. Of the ten signatory
organizations, five (CDF, the Cham Center, the Committee for
Arrestees' Rights, the Program for Supporting Victims of
Violence) are all run by human rights activist Aktham Naisse
and have very few, if any, other members. (NOTE: A UPI
article about the declaration incorrectly asserted that
jailed human rights lawyer Anwar al-Bunni had signed the
document, confusing Naisse,s Cham Center with another group,
the Damascus Center for the Study of Human Rights, where
Bunni is an advisor. Representatives of that center have
confirmed to Post that they are not involved with this
Declaration.) The signatory Syrian Human Rights
Organization/SWASIAH is in fact a one-person splinter group
run by Abdulkarim Rihawi, who split off from the larger
SWASIAH in autumn 2005. Rihawi and Naisse (who have long
been rumored to be active SARG collaborators) have been
linked recently to SARG-backed actions aimed at discrediting
or splitting the opposition in the post-Damascus-Beirut
Declaration (DBD) environment, including the public
denunciation of a human rights lawyer (ref B) and Rihawi's
signature of a SARG-sponsored anti-DBD statement (ref C).


4. (C) The other signatories are equally small-scale.
According to post contacts, two other groups, the Liberal
Democratic Secular Gathering ('ADL) and the Oriental Center
for Liberal Studies and Minority Rights, are run by political
gadfly Nabil Fayyad and his "disciple" Elias Helyani and have
few additional members. Another group, the Syriac-Syrian
Movement, is a one-person splinter group from the much larger
Assyrian Democratic Organization. Finally, the Third
Alliance is a two-week old, U.S.-based group led by Marah
Bukai, who post contacts say is the ex-wife of U.S.-based
Syrian opposition politician Mohammed al-Jbaili.


5. (C) STATEMENT OFFERS ALTERNATIVE TO DAMASCUS
DECLARATION, DOESN'T CROSS ANY REDLINES, SAYS SIGNATORY:
Rihawi told Poloff on June 18 that the group decided to
release the document now as an alternative to the Damascus
Declaration (DD),as the DD has apparently failed and has not

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gained broad support. In addition, the Syria Declaration is
"more acceptable to the Syrian opposition" now, as Muslim
Brotherhood leader Ali Sadreddin al-Bayanouni has, from the
Syria Declaration group's perspective, left the DD for former
Vice-President Abdulhalim Khaddam's National Salvation Front.
Rihawi emphasized that the Syria Declaration is a work in
progress and that other internal organizations and political
parties are welcome to discuss its contents and join the
group.


6. (C) When asked if the Syria Declaration signatories had
faced any problems from the SARG since the document's
release, given the current atmosphere of fear following the
Damascus-Beirut Declaration, Rihawi answered that the SD does
not cross any SARG redlines, adding that he had "recently
learned" that the SARG has "no problem with us" as long as it
does not cross the redline of contacting foreign governments
or NGOs. "Any project created within Syria will be
discussed, and potentially accepted, by the SARG," said
Rihawi. When asked why the U.S.-based Third Alliance is
acceptable to the SARG, Rihawi noted that its founding
statement spoke out against external interference and
invasion, and that a number of Syria-based activists
(including Syria Declaration signatory Helyani) serve on
Third Alliance's board. Rihawi claimed he had only been
contacted twice by security service agents regarding the
Syria Declaration, who took issue with a few minor phrases.


7. (C) CIVIL SOCIETY PLAYS DOWN DECLARATION'S SIGNIFICANCE:
According to post contacts, the Syria Declaration has not
been widely disseminated among Syrian civil society. Those
who are aware of it have largely dismissed it based on the
organizations which signed it, calling them "illusory
organizations" and "merely names rather than real bodies."
Post contacts note that a variety of secular alternatives to
the Damascus Declaration had been floated since October and
that the Syria Declaration is simply a latecomer publicity
stunt by its organizers. Kurdish lawyer and Yekiti Party
activist Faisal Badr told Poloff on June 14 that his party
had worked with Naisse on an earlier draft and that he was
surprised at the document's "sudden" release, as Naisse had
told them that dialogue would continue about the
declaration's contents. Badr dismissed the document as a
personal project of Naisse's to gain attention.


8. (C) COMMENT: One explanation for the timing of the
Syria Declaration would be that the leaders of these small
organizations are using the document to promote themselves
and gain press attention while more prominent activists are
distracted by the aftermath of the May post-DBD crackdown.
Other activists speculate that the SARG manipulated the Syria
Declaration signatories. That Naisse and Rihawi have managed
to release a document calling for democratic reform in the
midst of the harsh crackdown has raised speculation that the
SARG may have at least signed off on, if not directly
encouraged, the statement's release, as a way to split the
opposition further.

SECHE