Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS2593
2006-06-05 11:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SYRIAN REGIME REBUILDING WALLS OF FEAR AND

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #2593/01 1561143
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051143Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9378
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0078
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0113
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 002593 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN REGIME REBUILDING WALLS OF FEAR AND
ISOLATION

REF: DAMASCUS 2517

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 002593

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN REGIME REBUILDING WALLS OF FEAR AND
ISOLATION

REF: DAMASCUS 2517

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: The crackdown on Syrian civil society and
the opposition has gotten so intense that some observers
argue that the regime of Bashar al-Asad is "rebuilding the
walls of fear" that his father once erected. Even if the ten
Damascus-Beirut Declaration activists are released, which is
doubtful, the internal environment is likely to remain
extremely repressive. Contacts note that the repression is
having a broader impact on journalists and other marginally
independent figures who fear getting caught up in it. Many
observers believe that the regime is also embracing
confrontation and willfully isolating itself from the West,
although there appear to be internal divisions about how
aggressively the SARG should pursue such policies. The June
2 gunbattle at the headquarters of Syrian Radio and
Television, as well as the impending release of UNIIIC June
15 report, are likely to embolden voices in the regime
calling for greater repression, isolation, and confrontation.
End Summary.


2. (C) A CRACKDOWN THAT WOULD MAKE HIS FATHER PROUD: The
crackdown on civil society and the opposition has reached
such proportions in Syria that people are comparing it to the
repression in the 1980's during the rule of Hafez al-Asad.
Previously, comparisons with the father nearly always pointed
to Bashar al-Asad's weaknesses: his indecisiveness, his
inability to assert his authority, his lack of experience,
and his poor decision-making.


3. (C) UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOW BAD THE REPRESSION WILL GET:
There remains some uncertainty about how far the regime plans
to take the current wave of repression. Some of the most
optimistic argue that the SARG has halted the arrests over
the Damascus-Beirut Declaration (DBD) and is instead using
threats and other forms of intimidation to avoid further
arrests (reftel). These people speculate that if the threats
and other tactics bear sufficient fruit, undermining support
for the DBD and its legitimacy, the regime may walk things

back a bit and release the ten imprisoned activists, instead
of following through on threats to detain them for five
years. Even if the DBD activists are released (which is
viewed as extremely doubtful, according to some of our
contacts who know the regime well),the overall internal
environment is likely to remain extremely repressive.


4. (C) USING PRETEXTS TO SUSTAIN BROAD-BASED CRACKDOWN:
Some activists insist that the regime is merely using the DBD
as a convenient weapon to throttle the opposition and
civil-society movement, which angered and embarrassed a less
assertive regime last fall with the release of the Damascus
Declaration (as distinct from the DBD),calling for an end to
emergency law and respect for human rights and democracy.
Now emboldened, the regime is intent on erasing the memory of
that embarrassment. Activists note that the DBD-related
arrests of Michel Kilo, Anwar al-Bunni, and others represent
only the latest wave of arrests, but that many other
prominent dissidents, like Kamal Labwani, Fatteh Jammous, and
Ali Abdullah, all of whom remain imprisoned, have been caught
up in previous cycles of arrests over the past year.


5. (C) WALLS OF FEAR GOING BACK UP: These previous waves of
arrests already had some observers quietly declaring that the
level of repression in Syria was as bad or worse than during
the days of Hafez al-Asad. Yassin Haj Saleh, one of Syria's
most prominent dissidents, told Polchief in mid-April, before
the latest crackdown over the DBD, that the regime of Bashar
al-Asad is "rebuilding the walls of fear" that his father
once erected. He described the current situation as the
middle range of a cumulative process and predicted that the
arrests would continue.


6. (C) Saleh insisted that the regime was "re-inserting" the
Syrian security services much more aggressively into the
Syrian domestic political scene. He called it a recurring
aspect of modern Syrian history: "You can invite these
security services in, giving them greater control, but you
can't get them to leave so easily after the crisis has
passed." He noted that the regime is like a patient that has
"survived a critical illness" and is now stronger than at any
time since UNSCR 1559 was passed in the fall of 2004. For
the first time since he was released from prison seven years

DAMASCUS 00002593 002 OF 003


ago, Saleh is considering leaving the country, sneaking out
since he has no passport, because of the increasingly
repressive environment. (Note: Saleh signed both the
Damascus Declaration and DBD but has not yet been arrested.)


7. (C) ONLY REGIME CHEERLEADERS NEED APPLY: Other contacts
note that the repressive environment is not merely silencing
the opposition or civil society. Even the relatively meek
independents in Parliament, some of whom, like independent MP
Basil Dahdouh, have tried to inject a limited degree of
skepticism about regime policies over the past decade, say
that the regime is not accepting any questioning of its
policies. Now the regime will only tolerate "cheerleaders,"
he said. "No real political players outside the regime are
allowed." In the current environment, people are afraid to
travel abroad to attend conferences or meetings, or to make
any contacts (either abroad or at home),"unless they get
regime blessing first," said Dahdouh. Many, like himself,
who are reluctant to seek such a blessing, have opted not to
travel and to keep a low profile. Even in the 1990's, under
the father, the situation was much more open, he added. In
the current environment, any political reforms that might
emerge, such as a new political parties law, are likely to be
worse than the status quo, said Dahdouh.


8. (C) JOURNALISTS ALSO BEING INTIMIDATED: Journalists have
also noted the increasingly repressive environment.
Damascus-based Al-Hayat bureau chief Ibrahim Hamidi told
Polchief in late May that in the days prior to the most
recent wave of arrests, he had been warned by a figure "very
close to the security services" that he should be extremely
careful about what he writes. "When you write, assume you're
writing during the period of Hafez al-Asad," he was warned.
"There is no room for mistakes." Taking the warning
seriously, Hamidi noted that he had avoided writing about the
DBD-related crackdown.


9. (C) REGIME OPTING FOR ISOLATION AND CONFRONTATION: Many
observers of the Syrian political scene believe that as the
regime rebuilds these walls of fear, it is also willfully
isolating itself from a West that it believes will not engage
with it and wants to see it fall from power. Emboldened by
its alliance with Iran, its re-assertion of influence in
Lebanon, the ongoing carnage in Iraq (a trend that it
believes signals the waning of American pressure),the
election of Hamas, and the re-establishment of close ties
with Russia, the Syrian regime believes it has the political
assets it needs to withstand the costs of a sustained rupture
with the West.


10. (C) Given that assessment, and regime sentiment that it
remains under pressure and threat, many here believe that the
walls of isolation that cut Syria off from the West are
likely to grow more impenetrable. In addition to the current
crackdown (which prompted unprecedented EU criticism),a
series of other events, including SARG complicity in the
destruction of several European embassies in February, the
closing of the EU-sponsored human rights center, pressure on
the U.S. Embassy through restrictive visa issuance and travel
policies, and efforts to wrest control of the
Embassy-sponsored Damascus Community School, indicate that
the SARG has opted for a more confrontational policy and
cares little about the isolating effect such policies could
have. The Egyptian Ambassador told the Charge recently that
Syria even seems to be distancing itself from Egypt, a key
regional ally, by indicating that it has no interest in
taking any steps that might address Egyptian concerns about
SARG policies. Concurring, analyst Samir al-Taki told
Polchief that Syria's relations with Saudi Arabia are also
shaky. "Syria has no Arab dimension to its foreign policy
right now," because it is overplaying its Iran card, he
noted.


11. (C) INTERNAL DIVISIONS ABOUT HOW FAR TO PUSH THINGS:
Some argue that the regime is divided about how far it wants
to proceed with such isolation and escalation. According to
Hamidi, there are hard-liners, including key figures in the
security services and VP Farouk Shara'a, who argue that Syria
is benefiting from an across-the-board policy of escalation
and confrontation with the West and that any costs in terms
of isolation are negligible, given the threat that the regime
faces. Others, led by FM Mu'allim are pressing for a more
nuanced policy, one that seeks limited confrontation with the
U.S. and Europe, even as it "continues to escalate," to

DAMASCUS 00002593 003 OF 003


remind these parties of the costs of their Syria policy, and
to pressure them to re-engage with Damascus, assessed Hamidi.
These forces urging "limited escalation" eventually
prevailed in the internal battle over control of the American
school (septel),forcing the more radical elements in the
Syrian regime to relinquish this issue when it became clear
that the diplomatic costs of continuing to escalate would be
high, he noted.


12. (C) COMMENT: Despite any divisions at the margins over
how far it wants to press its policy of escalation and
isolation, the overall policy is likely to continue. The
regime feels strong internally and regionally and seems to
care very little about its image in the West right now, or
about any international damage the recent crackdown may have
caused. In addition, its current allies like Russia, China,
and Iran care little or nothing about human rights and
protecting a strong civil society. The impact of the June 2
gunbattle at the headquarters of Syrian Radio and Television
on these regime calculations is not completely clear
(septel). It may cause some momentary nervousness and sense
of vulnerability, but will also likely be used to shore up
support for the regime and to persuade ordinary Syrians that
the country and its security and stability are under real
threat. Uncertainty and jitters over Brammertz's June 15
UNIIIC report are likely to exacerbate these sentiments. In
the end, however, both events are expected to embolden the
voices in the Syrian regime calling for greater repression
and for discounting the costs of a policy of isolation and
confrontation, especially if the UNIIIC report fails to
indict the regime (or at least senior officials) for the
Hariri assassination. It should be noted that although these
policies are helping the regime survive in the short term,
some Syrian observers believe they are misguided and offer no
way forward for Syria to address the political and economic
challenges the country will face in the intermediate and
longer term. End Comment.



SECHE