Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS2320
2006-05-17 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

WALK THE LINE: BETWEEN SYRIA'S SECURITY SERVICES

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR PINS SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8044
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #2320/01 1371420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171420Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9058
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0062
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0107
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 002320 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS SY
SUBJECT: WALK THE LINE: BETWEEN SYRIA'S SECURITY SERVICES
AND THE OPPOSITION

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 002320

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS SY
SUBJECT: WALK THE LINE: BETWEEN SYRIA'S SECURITY SERVICES
AND THE OPPOSITION

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Conversations with political contacts,
including those in the opposition, point to the variety of
techniques used by SARG security services to co-opt or
intimidate Syrians. It is often in the middle range, between
enticements at one end and threats and coercion at the other,
that the security services are at their most effective in
curbing dissent and obliging cooperation. One such contact,
civil society activist Bassam Ishak, described for Polchief
his attempts over the past few years to walk the fine line
between cooperating with the security services and
maintaining some independence. A useful case study because
of the variety of ways in which he has attracted the
attention of the security services, Ishak pointed to the
different pressure points the services exploit, ranging from
routine requests for a permit to run a bookshop to appeals
tied to personal ambition, vanity, and patriotism. Ishak
also recounts his encounters with senior security officers,
including the head of the General Intelligence Directorate,
Ali Mamluk. Like other contacts, Ishak noted the expanding
list of redlines the government is enforcing against
opposition figures as it intensifies its crackdown, leading
many to dramatically lower their profiles and avoid actions
that will invite even greater security services' demands for
cooperation or put activists in danger of facing retribution
rather than co-optation. End Summary.


2. (C) TO CO-OPT OR INTIMIDATE?: Recurring conversations
with political contacts, mostly in the form of asides
appended to remarks on other topics, point to the range of
techniques used by SARG security services to co-opt or
intimidate Syrians. These techniques, at the most
accommodating end of the spectrum, include offers of
remunerative, prestigious positions and other rewards. At
the opposite end they routinely involve coercive measures
such as travel bans, surveillance and harassment of both
individuals and family members, the threat of detention

(without charge),interrogation, and imprisonment after
lengthy trials. It is often in the middle range, between
enticements and threats, that the Syrian security services
are at their most effective, curbing dissent, obliging people
to report on their friends and colleagues, and convincing
them sometimes to present regime arguments justifying
policies or decisions.


3. (C) Also of note is the way the security services are
able to establish relationships, even relatively
collaborative ones, with people in the opposition or those on
its margins who are trying to maintain some independence from
the regime. One prominent human-rights activist has reported
that he maintains ties with "his people" in the security
services as the price for finding room to operate -- and be
effective -- in such a repressive society. A very prominent
dissident intellectual criticizes the regime publicly but
mentioned privately to Charge that he respects one newly
appointed senior security official and meets with him
occasionally. A former deputy minister acknowledged that he
meets regularly with hard-line senior intelligence official
Hisham Ikhtiyar, although he sees himself as pro-American and
part of the Sunni silent majority opposing the regime. While
a few seem to be hoping for eventual high-level appointment
or other reward, most, especially in the opposition, seem to
be seeking necessary alliances for protection against
retribution and to give themselves space to operate. The
only Syrians who seem impervious to some level of co-optation
or coercion are a handful of the most senior political
dissidents who have spent 15-20 years imprisoned in Syrian
jails and no longer care much what anyone in the regime
thinks about them or their activities.


4. (C) A CASE STUDY IN WALKING THE THIN LINE: One contact,
civil-society activist and aspiring politician Bassam Ishak,
spoke with Polchief about some of these techniques and the
ways in which the regime had used them with him. As with
many contacts who speak on this topic, Ishak spoke in a
strangely matter-of-fact tone that blends pragmatism and
discomfort, as well as self-justification and a sense that he
alone had worked out a special accommodation with the
security services that allowed him to cooperate with them to
a certain extent, while maintaining his independence and
principles.


5. (C) INITIAL CONTACTS FOR "EVERYDAY" MATTER: Ishak fell

DAMASCUS 00002320 002 OF 003


afoul of the security services initially in the course of
trying to obtain a government permit, in this case to open a
small bookshop. In the late 1990's, he was summoned
initially by the security services and told he had to obtain
a license to run such a business. After being threatened
with punishment and closure, Ishak, the son of Said Ishak, a
prominent Christian politician from the northeastern province
of Hassake who had served as a deputy speaker of Parliament
in the 1950's, said that he managed to "win the officer
over." The officer helped him obtain the license and has
since become one of his "protectors," said Ishak.


6. (C) HELP AFTER VIOLATING A "REG" STRENGTHENS THE BOND:
Two years later, Ishak was summoned again for selling
"illegal publications," in this case the banned writings of
anti-Islamist intellectual Nabil Fayyad. At first, "it was
very intimidating. I was afraid and said all kinds of things
I did not believe. I just wanted to survive." An
acquaintance of Ishak, a businessman who was dating his civil
society activist niece, subsequently mentioned to Ishak that
he had good contacts in the security services and could put
him in touch with "people" who could get the security
services off his back. He advised Ishak, "Don't be
idealistic. You need to deal with these people." After
investigation, his contacts in the General Intelligence
Directorate (GID) told Ishak they were satisfied and agreed
not to pursue the matter.


7. (C) GETTING INTO POLITICS: In 2003, Ishak ran as an
independent for Parliament in Hassake province, again
attracting the attention of the security services. He was
summoned to the Presidential Palace after a series of
meetings with supporters in Hassake, a predominantly Kurdish
area in northeastern Syria. At the meeting, the
interrogating general asked Ishak about his level of Kurdish
political support and whether he was willing to "play a
middle role" between the government and the Kurds. According
to Ishak, the man did not follow up and Ishak let the matter
drop. Eventually he lost the election, although he claims
the SARG fixed the results.


8. (C) CHATTING WITH MAMLUK: Since then, Ishak has
maintained ties to the security services, eventually meeting
GID chief General Ali Mamluk on several occasions. For
example, when he planned a recent trip to the northeast to
sound out potential political supporters, he briefed "his
contacts" at GID ahead of time. He described them as senior
people just under the level of Mamluk. Ishak told them he
planned to urge the Kurds to support his political views,
which argued for an inclusive, secular Syrian (but not
exclusively "Arab") nationalism. He was told that the GID
leadership, including Mamluk, completely distrusted the Kurds
and believed they harbored secret separatist sentiments, but
that he was free to make the visit.


9. (C) Ishak said that he has been pressured to continue
seeing Mamluk periodically, noting that his most recent
contact was in early May. He described Mamluk as "very tough
and intimidating," not someone used to dealing with nuance or
qualified assent. Ishak told Polchief he usually reached an
impasse with Mamluk rather quickly and had to deal
subsequently with subordinates who brought Mamluk around,
persuading the GID chief to allow Ishak room to maneuver.


10. (C) A SLIDE TOWARDS CO-OPTATION: At some point in his
dealings with GID, Ishak agreed to give them the gist of what
was discussed at meetings he attended, but intimated that he
had placed some limits on how much he would say or in
revealing identities of others. Ishak was told about certain
"redlines," the most important of which was traveling abroad
to attend meetings that included Israelis. He said he was
also told it was "OK to criticize the government but not to
attack it." In late April, he had received a message "from
Mamluk" that he should not be in contact with any "foreign
opposition."


11. (C) AND A MOVE TOWARDS THE OPPOSITION: When Ishak
became the spokesperson for a human rights organization in
the past year, he was brought in for more questioning.
Mamluk was clearly furious and questioned how he could join a
human rights organization and shift to the opposition. The
meeting ended badly. In a follow-up with his GID handlers,
he was offered a position as head of a planned SARG-run human
rights organization, which he turned down. His GID contacts

DAMASCUS 00002320 003 OF 003


seemed mystified by his refusal, questioning what he wanted
if not a well-paid position. At this and other meetings,
Ishak said he tried to make clear that he saw his position
"in the middle, between the opposition and the government."


12. (C) SMI GETS IN THE ACT: In mid-April, Ishak was
summoned by a senior officer at Syrian Military Intelligence,
who questioned him about a planned trip to Hassake. Ishak
speculated that SMI chief Asif Shawkat was briefed on the
meeting because his GID contacts told Ishak that Shawkat
talked about the questioning at a subsequent inter-security
forces meeting that Mamluk attended. Mamluk was described as
angry and jealous that SMI had questioned Ishak.


13. (C) . . . AND A JEALOUS MAMLUK RETALIATES: After that
rough spot, a working-level GID officer called Ishak, saying
they just wanted to start a routine biographical folder and
needed to ask him some basic questions. After rattling off
several pedestrian inquiries, the officer asked if Ishak had
ever committed a felony. When Ishak said no, the officer
followed up, asking if he was sure. Ishak saw the call as a
reference back to the investigation for selling illegal
books, a matter he had been told was closed. It was meant as
a threat, to blackmail him, since with the accusation of a
felony against him, his political reputation would be
destroyed, along with any hopes of running for Parliament in

2007. He terminated the call and later complained to his
senior-level GID contacts who apologized and said to forget
about the questions, which were "not serious." Ishak said he
was convinced that the call had been orchestrated by Mamluk
-- still angry about his questioning by SMI -- as a
not-so-subtle reminder of the hold GID had over him.


14. (C) NO REGRETS?: While his body language betrayed a bit
of discomfort, Ishak told Polchief that he does not regret
trying to reach some kind of understanding with the security
services and the government. While he is critical of the
regime, he believes the opposition, of which he considers
himself a sincere member, does not have the sophisticated
political experience needed to alternately challenge and
engage the regime. He claimed that his closest associates in
the opposition, who know of his political ambitions, have
encouraged him to run for Parliament in 2007 so that he could
play such a balancing role. Ishak said his senior GID
contacts, just below Mamluk, have similarly encouraged him to
pursue these ambitions because of the importance of having
his secular political message heard in Syria.


15. (C) COMMENT: Civil society and the opposition in Syria
obviously receive special attention from the security
services, but groups and individuals across the board have to
find ways of dealing with their pressures. Ishak's case is
special because it highlights several of the different
pressure points the SARG security services use to ensnare
people and because he moves so fluidly, and apparently
sincerely, in the gray areas between opposition and the
regime. The weird interplay between security officers and
their targets, sometimes involving threatening, cajoling, or
offering rewards, occasionally blending in officers'
sympathy, targets' understanding, and both parties' wary
appreciation for family, class, or ethnic considerations that
might influence the encounters, is also on much fuller
display than usual here. However, the tactics and
compromises evident in Ishak's case, are replicated in the
cases of politicians, journalists, academics and a range of
other Syrians. The pressure on these groups to cooperate
with the security services is likely to increase in the
coming months as the crackdown on the opposition continues
and as the SARG -- with its hard-liners in control of foreign
and domestic policy -- continues to eliminate any middle
ground between regime supporters and the opposition.




SECHE