SARG DIVIDED ON REACTION TO BRAMMERTZ; TILT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 002137

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SY
SUBJECT: SARG DIVIDED ON REACTION TO BRAMMERTZ; TILT
TOWARDS IRAN SEEN AS HARDENING INTERNAL POLICIES


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: While noting that President Bashar
al-Asad and others in the regime had emerged more confident
after UNIIIC chief Serge Brammertz's April 25 questioning of
the Syrian leader, MFA informal legal advisor Dr. Samir
al-Taki termed such confidence misplaced. He voiced his
suspicion that Brammertz is "hiding something." Al-Taki also
claimed that SARG opposition to the formation of a tribunal
is diminishing, with some in the regime accepting legal
advisors' arguments that a tribunal will limit Brammertz's
independence and buy the SARG time. On a separate issue,
al-Taki said the regime is cracking down on the opposition to
signal that the U.S. will not be able to pressure it through
this medium. He described Syria's intensified relationship
with Iran as both a reflection of the regime's more
conservative policies and as a factor contributing to this
growing inflexibility, which has increased the influence of
VP Farouk Shara'a and senior security officer (and Shara'a
advisor) Mohammed Nassif Khairbek. The tilt towards Iran has
caused some unease at senior levels of the MFA, he noted.
End Summary.


2. (C) Dr. Samir al-Taki, an informal MFA advisor on the
UNIIIC inquiry into the assassination of former Lebanese PM
Rafik al-Hariri, told PolChief in early May that President
Bashar al-Asad appeared to have emerged confident and
optimistic from his April 25 interview with Serge Brammertz.
The President was also satisfied that he had been able to
show the SARG as fully cooperating with the Brammertz
inquiry. According to al-Taki, many in the regime shared the
President's upbeat view.


3. (C) Al-Taki called that view mistaken and said he is
convinced that Brammertz is holding back, "hiding something"
that will likely make the June 15 report damning for Syria.
He also insisted that MFA legal advisor Riad Daoudi shares
this view and thinks that the regime should not feel any
special confidence or relief after the questioning of the
President and VP Shara'a. Al-Taki predicted that pressure is
likely to build again on the SARG in the run-up to the
release of the report.


4. (C) According to al-Taki, the SARG is not opposed to the
idea of an international tribunal. In fact, SARG officials
are beginning to see it as a tool that can be used to put
Brammertz and his inquiry team under more control, and
"institutionalize" their investigation. Formation of a
tribunal would also stretch out the legal proceedings into
several time-consuming stages. Because of these factors,
some SARG legal advisors are actually pushing for it to
happen sooner rather than later. (Comment: We have received
contradictory indications about how concerned senior regime
figures are about the establishment of the tribunal and the
dangers it might pose.)


5. (C) On a separate note, al-Taki assessed that the Syrian
regime, even if under pressure, is tremendously resilient and
able to adapt. Using a homespun analogy, he compared it to a
donkey's ear that can be pushed "this way and that but is
nearly impossible to pull off. It will do whatever it needs
to stay in place." For the SARG, that includes manipulating
the Islamic current, since that is what it perceives as
necessary right now, he added. Al-Taki noted two reasons for
the regime's crackdown on the opposition. First, "even if
you're weak, you don't want to appear weak," he noted.
Second, the regime wanted to send a signal directly to the
U.S.: "Don't think you can get to us through the opposition
and civil society here. It won't happen."


6. (C) Al-Taki said that the regime has become much more
hard-line and conservative, and was hunkered down in survival
mode. While expressing a certain degree of pessimism about
the possibility of reform in any case, al-Taki insisted that
at present there is zero chance of any reform occurring. He
described Syria's intensified relationship with Iran as both
a reflection of that hardened stance and as a factor
contributing to it. He dismissed DPM Dardari's late April
call for renewed emphasis on economic reform as a mistaken
reading of current political circumstances, "and he will pay
for that" (and for other "mistakes" that have eroded the
President's confidence in him, added al-Taki.) While he gave
Dardari high marks for his economic policy-planning skills
and his ability to maneuver and create allies inside the

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regime, al-Taki maintained that Dardari has fundamentally
misunderstood the bigger policy shift that has occurred in
his operating environment as Syria has tilted towards Iran.
That shift has "hardened everything."


7. (C) Two political players who have profited from that
shift are senior security officer Mohammed Nassif Khairbek
and VP Farouk al-Shara'a, noted al-Taki. (Comment: We have
received contradictory reports about how strongly Khairbek
tried -- and apparently failed -- to undo Asad's appointiment
of him as an advisor to Shara'a in his new capacity as Vice
President.) Khairbek has benefited, said al-Taki, largely
because two issues he has traditionally handled, Iran and
Hizballah, are being given heightened prominence as a result
of Syria's more confrontational posture. Khairbek has also
buttressed Shara'a's influence. While initially the former
FM was not viewed as someone who could maintain his influence
as a vice president, Khairbek's security service "apparatus"
and "his issues" are seen as enhancing Shara'a's influence,
assessed al-Taki. He noted that Asad had recently asked
current FM Mu'allim to "consult" with Shara'a on foreign
policy issues. Mu'allim had replied that he "could not take
orders from Shara'a" but did not explicitly refuse to
consult, al-Taki intimated.


8. (C) In an aside, al-Taki noted that there is considerable
unease at the MFA over Syria's Iran policy and the current
lack of any "Arab dimension" to Syria's foreign policy,
especially the lack of any special outreach to the Saudis,
who had helped Syria re-assert its influence in Lebanon to an
extent. Al-Taki described a May 2 evening meeting at the MFA
with senior officials where there had been serious misgivings
and "complaining" voiced about the policy. He hinted but did
not confirm that Mu'allim was at the meeting.



SECHE