IMPACT OF KHADDAM: A SYRIAN OPPOSITION FIGURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000207

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU; STATE FOR NEA/P, NEA/PPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAO
SUBJECT: IMPACT OF KHADDAM: A SYRIAN OPPOSITION FIGURE
SPEAKS OUT


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: In a conversation held before the release
of political prisoner Riyad Seif and others, prominent Syrian
XXXXXXXXXXXX opposition figure XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief
January 16 that former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam's press
campaign had thrown the Syrian regime into crisis but would
not by itself threaten its survival. Khaddam's sharpest
criticism had been aimed directly at President Bashar
al-Asad, as a way to encourage regime pillars to calculate
that it was in their interest to distance themselves from or
possibly move against Asad, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. Khaddam's attacks had
strengthened the opposition in Syria and given it more
prominence, but we assess that the release of five of the six
Damascus spring detainees effectively short-circuits
Khaddam's plans for encouraging the Syrian opposition to
rally around him. End Summary.


2. (C) KHADDAM INFLICTED DAMAGE, BUT ...:Syrian opposition
figure XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief January 16
-- before the release of former MP Riyad Seif and other
detainees -- that former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam was in a
position to deepen severely the long-term crisis in which the
regime finds itself but not, by himself, to bring the regime
down. His primary limitation is that he has never had strong
support in the Syrian military and security services, which
are dominated by the Alawites, noted XXXXXXXXXXXX.


3. (C) ENCOURAGING REGIME FIGURES TO ABANDON ASAD? XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that Khaddam's criticism of Asad as a weak, indecisive,
dangerously inexperienced and impulsive leader highlighted a
problem that regime power brokers like SMI head Asif Shawkat
and brother Maher al-Asad were already aware of: How does an
essentially totalitarian regime function with such a vacuum
at the center? The issue is more stark now: Do regime
pillars (mostly Alawite) stand with Asad and risk possibly
losing power completely, or move against him? XXXXXXXXXXXX also
noted that Asad now found himself ensnared in a dangerous,
intractable crisis with UNIIIC over the assassination of
Hariri, with the finger of suspicion directed by Khaddam
pointing squarely at him.


4. (C) OPENING DOORS FOR THE OPPOSITION: With regard to the
opposition in Syria, Khaddam's attacks had strengthened it
significantly. Khaddam had spoken about it in a very
positive manner and adopted the opposition's program,
primarily embodied in the Damascus Declaration. This had
enhanced the opposition's standing in Syria, making it likely
that the regime would try to reach out to it in the coming
weeks. (Comment: The release of Seif and the fresh rumors
about a new political parties law indicate this effort may
already be underway.)


5. (C) In addition, Khaddam had opened a door for the
opposition to the U.S., insisted XXXXXXXXXXXX. His criticism
provided some cover for opposition figures who wanted to
criticize the regime but feared being branded as an agent of
the U.S. or as anti-Syrian. "We must take advantage of the
opening Khaddam has provided," maintained XXXXXXXXXXXX. On a
separate note, XXXXXXXXXXXX, took note of Khaddam's
opening to the Syrian Muslim Brothers (MB) and urged the U.S.
to engage with the MB leadership, dismissing the notion that
they posed a threat to future secular democratic development
in Syria. (Comment: Our contacts are divided on whether the
MB poses a potential threat. Post will provide a fuller
assessment septel.)


6. (C) Comment: Post shares XXXXXXXXXXXX assessment that
Khaddam's press interviews have created some space for the
opposition, although how much its position has been
strengthened remains to be seen. The January 18 release of
Riyad Seif and four other Damascus Spring detainees seems to
represent a regime attempt to respond to Khaddam and close
off his effort to rally the oppositon to his side. Seif is
now likely to attract all that opposition support (and to
draw much broader support in Syrian society). The SARG
release of Seif is likely to render Khaddam a less imposing
figure, with less potential for being viewed as an
alternative to the regime. Seif's prison term would have
ended in September of this year in any case, forcing the SARG
to deal with his case soon enough. The fact that it moved
now, however, as it navigates through a crisis Khaddam helped
to precipitate, gives some indication of how much Khaddam
rattled the regime's leadership. Seif, previously viewed by
the regime as a potential Mandela-type figure on the Syrian
political scene, appeared post-Khaddam as a useful
distraction and perhaps for the regime as less threatening

than Khaddam. In the long run, as he moves out of the shadow
momentarily cast by Khaddam, Seif will probably prove to be
the far more imposing opposition figure (but without access
to the weapon of "regime secrets" wielded by the former VP).
The SARG for its part will work strenuously in the coming
months to split the opposition, manipulate any political
opening resulting from a new parties law, and in short,
circumscribe to the maximum Seif's political potential.
SECHE