ASAD MEETS BRAMMERTZ IN DAMASCUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 001909

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KMCR SY IZ LE
SUBJECT: ASAD MEETS BRAMMERTZ IN DAMASCUS


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (SBU) Summary: Syrian President Bashar al-Asad met with
UNIIIC chief Serge Brammertz in Damascus April 25. The
official Syria News Agency SANA issued a terse statement
confirming the visit after Brammertz departed Damascus with
his team. Media contacts acknowledged that very few details
about the visit were known. End Summary.


2. (SBU) President Bashar al-Asad met yesterday morning
(April 25) with the head of UNIIIC, Serge Brammertz, and his
accompanying team of investigators. Brammertz met separately
with FM Farouk al-Shara'a, according to the brief statement
released by the official Syrian Press Association, SANA.
Present at the meetings on the Syrian side were the Foreign
Ministry's legal advisor and point man for the UNIIIC
investigation Riad Daoudi, and Assistant Foreign Minister
Ahmad Arnous, according to SANA. Reuters quoted Syrian law
professor Ibrahim al-Daraji, a spokesman for the Syrian team
investigating the Hariri assassination, saying "the fact that
Brammertz is here shows that Syria has no problem in seeking
the truth about the Hariri killing and cooperating with the
inquiry." Human rights contact Anwar al-Bunni expressed
satisfaction with the visit, telling Poloff that it was an
accomplishment just to force Asad and Shara'a to accept being
questioned.


3. (C) According to foreign affairs expert Dr. Imad
Shueibi, who confers regularly with senior regime officials,
Brammertz met with Asad at the President's office and not, as
some press accounts reported, at the Monterosa Hotel complex
on the outskirts of Damascus. The Syrian government
announced that the interviews had taken place only after
Brammertz returned to his base in Beirut in a convoy of
armored vehicles, according to AP. Shueibi reported that in
fact Shara'a had not met with Brammertz himself but with
members of Brammertz's team, although press accounts and the
SANA statement contradicted this assertion.


4. (C) Shueibi told Polchief that Brammertz's interview with
Asad on April 25 was not the first such meeting, but followed
a secret meeting in Damascus held April 24. The second
meeting was designed to allow the two sides to read and sign
the transcripts of the questioning that had occurred.
(Comment: We have not been able to confirm from other
sources if Shueibi's information about two meetings is
accurate.) There will be no further meetings with Asad or
Shara'a, he noted, but added that Brammertz and his team are
likely to return to Syria for meetings with others.


5. (C) Shueibi insisted that Asad "was happy" with the way
the interview went. Asad had "answered all Brammertz's
questions" and had repeated his previous denials that he had
threatened Lebanese PM Hariri, in the period before the PM's
assassination. Shueibi predicted that there would be no
evidence found that would implicate Asad or the most senior
regime officials beneath him in the assassination of Hariri,
although some Syrians below that level would likely be
accused and tried (but not convicted) at the international
tribunal that will hear the case. In his overall assessment,
"the sword of the UNIIIC investigation" will continue to hang
over Syria, but "nothing will be done," he maintained, that
will shake the foundations of the regime.


6. (C) Assessing Syria's situation in the wake of the
Brammertz visit, Shueibi insisted that Syria is stronger now
-- despite its acknowledged military weakness -- than at any
time since the release of the first Mehlis report last
October, with valuable regional cards to play in Iraq,
Lebanon, and Palestine. Shueibi said he was puzzled about
why the U.S. had not reached out to Syria for help,
especially to address the situation in Iraq, where in his
view a civil war was breaking out. He noted that Syria is
the only regional party whose intervention Iraq's Sunnis
would accept. He expressed hope that in the wake of the
Brammertz visit, the U.S. would re-evaluate its hard-line
stance towards Syria.


7. (C) COMMENT: Apparently very nervous about the optics of
this visit, the regime succeeded in keeping the precise date
for the Asad-Brammertz meeting a secret until it was
completed, and released no details beyond acknowledging that
the meeting had taken place. The positive spin that Shueibi
puts on the meeting is already evident in the regional press
coverage of the visit and will likely continue in the coming

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SECHE