TWO IMPORTANT SUNNI LEADERS ASSESS KHADDAM'S IMPACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 001692

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: TWO IMPORTANT SUNNI LEADERS ASSESS KHADDAM'S IMPACT

REF: DAM 0392

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Two Sunni leaders, XXXXXXXXXXXX,
assess that former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam is a useful tool
who has already weakened the regime. They are counseling
their friends in the opposition not to attack Khaddam
publicly, regardless of their private reservations. One of
these Sunnis XXXXXXXXXXXX, claims that Khaddam has majority
support among Sunnis in several cities in Syria. Both
insisted that the regime has lost support and legitimacy in
recent months, despite efforts to appeal to nationalism and
Islam. They also expressed deep concern about increasing
Iranian and Shiite influence in Iraq. End Summary.


2. (C) ASSESSING KHADDAM'S SUNNI SUPPORT: According to
former MP and influential behind-the-scenes Sunni opposition
figure XXXXXXXXXXXX, Abdul Halim Khaddam has the support of a
majority of Sunnis in Homs, Latakia, and Tartous, and some
support in Hama. In Damascus, it is a "wait and see"
posture. However, the support in all these locales is "very
quiet." XXXXXXXXXXXX also mentioned that former Minister of
Industry XXXXXXXXXXXX supports Khaddam and that some 50
percent of Ba'athists also support him. (Other contacts,
like XXXXXXXXXXXX, dispute this
notion of significant Ba'athist support for Khaddam.) XXXXXXXXXXXX
claimed that 90 percent of Ba'athists don't like the
President and criticize him for allowing his friends to
monopolize the economy and for bringing problems to the
country with his mistaken decisions. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX has made
clear in the past that Khaddam also has significant support
among a group of Alawite former regime insiders like XXXXXXXXXXXX
and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Reftel.)


3. (C) ADVISING OPPOSITION NOT TO ATTACK KHADDAM: XXXXXXXXXXXX
told Polchief that he had advised his friends in the Damascus
Declaration group (DD),such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, in
advance of the April 6 DD meeting, not to attack Khaddam
publicly (see septel). Instead they should just say "we are
the internal opposition" and leave Khaddam to speak for
himself and weaken regime in his own way. He had also told
them that Khaddam is "not our enemy now; it is the regime
that is imprisoning people, not Khaddam." XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was
fearful of possible splits in DD/opposition and of their
efforts to form a steering committee or organizational
structure to accompany their statement of principles. He
called such a move inevitably divisive. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he
supports but did not sign the DD, claiming that it did not
represent well the interests of the "conservatives" in Syria,
meaning the Muslim population. In his view, the DD effort to
reach out to Muslims through the Muslim Brotherhood was not
completely successful and could not disguise the fact that
the driving forces behind the DD were secular activists.


4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX FRIEND CONCURS: Sunni tribal leader and
former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, who was
visiting his friend XXXXXXXXXXXX, also called Khaddam a useful
tool. When asked what role Khaddam could play in the
opposition, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he could create strife and discord
among the regime forces arrayed against the opposition.
XXXXXXXXXXXX concurred with XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Damascus Declaration
group should avoid attacking Khaddam.


5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX


6. (C) STRENGTH OF REGIME ASSESSED: XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the
regime is weakening "this time," unlike in the 2000-2001
period when others had mistakenly predicted that the regime
was weakening and might fall. The Brammertz investigation is
definitely contributing to the uncertainty the regime is
experiencing, as are economic problems, and falling support
among officers and advisors inside the regime. The draining
away of the regime's legitimacy is also having an impact,
especially because it is a minority regime. He assessed that
the regime has only 15-20 percent support among the people.
XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is not clear if people "are ready to go into

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the streets to protest against the regime." (Comment: Most
contacts tell us they are not ready.) It they do, he
asserted, any SARG military and security forces reaction
could be unpredictable. Although for example, the Republican
Guard is 90 percent Alawite, the rest of the military is 70
percent Sunni and non-Alawite minorities. Consequently the
regime might find it difficult to use the armed forces to
repress any street demonstrations. Because of the lack of
internal support, an invasion, as was done in Iraq, is not
necessary to topple the regime, but "a gesture of support" at
the right time might be needed, he added, without specifying
exactly what he had in mind.


7. (C) REGIME USE OF ISLAM DISMISSED: XXXXXXXXXXXX rejected the
notion that Syrians had been persuaded by President Asad's
recent appeals to nationalism and to Islam, calling such
appeals "hand-me-down clothes" that had fooled no one. Like
XXXXXXXXXXXX, he said the regime had lost its legitimacy and noted
that as a minority regime it would have increasing difficulty
ruling the country under those circumstances. He requested
that the U.S. keep up the verbal pressure on the regime,
criticizing it for corruption, lack of democracy, and absence
of any reforms. On that same note, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed
appreciation for the recent USG message on human rights,
which he said was good, but that a more specific statement on
Kamal Labwani was needed. (Comment: Some human rights
activists take issue with this view and believe that the USG
should not name individuals but keep its statements of
support for human rights general. More on this issue and
Labwani's condition will be reported septel.)


8. (C) COUNSELING ISLAMIC LEADERS: XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he had
begun counseling certain Islamic leaders to be careful about
their support for the regime, telling them it could be
problematic for their future credibility. He had also
conveyed the importance of teaching a message of tolerance,
justice, and respect for non-Muslims ("the other") in an
initial effort to stop an intolerant strain of mosque
preaching that was spreading. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he maintained
good relations with all the major religious leaders in
Damascus and in other major cities.


9. (C) CONCERN OVER SHIITE, IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN IRAQ: Both
men expressed concern about the signs of rising Iranian
influence in Iraq. XXXXXXXXXXXX called the influence dangerous and
said it is everywhere in Iraq. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the
Iranians are spending hundreds of millions of dollars in Iraq
to spread their influence, and that the Saudis and the
Kuwaitis are now pouring in money to the Sunnis to try to
balance that influence. He called the rising Shiite
influence in the country frightening for the region. XXXXXXXXXXXX
reported that the Iranian cultural attache from Damascus had
visited him recently XXXXXXXXXXXX and invited him to Tehran
for a visit, hinting it was an invitation he did not plan to
accept. XXXXXXXXXXXX insisted that he is not sectarian but noted
that the situation in Iraq and the region lends itself to
calls for "sectarian balancing." He claimed the SARG is
giving signals to the imams XXXXXXXXXXXX
to criticize the U.S. for its responsibility for the
situation in Iraq.


10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief that he met recently with Iraqi
tribal leader XXXXXXXXXXXX underlining to him
that the American forces occupying Iraq were there
temporarily but that Iranian influence would be permanent.
He told XXXXXXXXXXXX, as he tells other Iraqi Sunni leaders that
he meets with, that the Sunnis in Iraq are making a
fundamental miscalculation in supporting the insurgency
against U.S. forces. XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX also
told XXXXXXXXXXXX he had the sense that the Syrians were exerting
great efforts to keep Iraq unstable.


11. (C) COMMENT: It should be noted that views about
Khaddam's level of support among Sunnis, or Syrians in
general, vary widely. The majority view among most of our
contacts is that his impact, thus far, has been limited,
although some of these contacts seem to be passing along a
SARG-manufactured talking point to downplay his significance.
XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX are extremely plugged in to the Sunni
communities in Syria and are offering a minority view but one
that we do not dismiss. Their view that the regime is
weakening is also hotly disputed. Most contacts agree that

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the regime has seen some of its legitimacy drain away and
that it is moving somewhat unpredictably in different
directions to shore up that legitimacy. Most contacts assert
that in the short and intermediate term, the regime is and
will remain strong, but over the longer term, especially if
Brammertz weighs in with damning accusations, the regime
could face problems.
SECHE