MU'ALLIM CONFIDANT ON BRAMMERTZ INQUIRY, IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 001666

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: MU'ALLIM CONFIDANT ON BRAMMERTZ INQUIRY, IRAN
POLICY, NEW THINK TANK

REF: DAMASCUS 1368

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Despite its attempts to project
confidence, the regime remains concerned about the efforts of
UNIIIC head Serge Brammertz, worrying that arrests of Syrian
suspects and the formation of an international tribunal are
on the way, according to Dr. Samir al-Taki, a confidant of FM
Mu'allim. Al-Taki also described for Polchief signs that
individuals connected to the Syrian General Intelligence
Directorate (GID) may have been involved in the assassination
of former PM Rafik Hariri, adding that Brammertz is
apparently pursuing this line of inquiry. On a separate
issue, al-Taki criticized Syria's current Iran policy, noting
the heavier influence recently of Ba'ath Party Regional
Command heavyweight Hisham Ikhtiyar. Al-Taki also detailed
his success in establishing a new foreign policy think tank.
End Summary.


2. (C) REGIME WORRIED ABOUT TRIBUNAL, ARRESTS: Dr. Samir
al-Taki, a confidant of FM Walid Mu'allim, told Polchief in
early April that the Syrian regime, despite its attempts to
appear unperturbed, remains concerned about the UNIIIC
inquiry led by Serge Brammertz (reftel). The regime is
worried not so much about the inquiry implicating the
President or his family as about the now-seemingly inevitable
formation of a tribunal and a UNIIIC demand for the arrest of
suspects such as Rustom Ghazaleh and his deputy, Jama'a
Jama'a. Ba'ath Party Deputy SYG Mohammed Saeed Bukhaytan and
Ba'ath Party Regional Command National Security Office head
Hisham Ikhtiyar have been allied with SMI chief Asif Shawkat
and VP Farouk al-Shara'a in trying to argue inside the regime
and in the MFA that the SARG should resist these
developments, asking the Russians for help. Al-Taki called
such tactics futile, noting that the Russians have told the
Syrians there is "no way" to sustain such a position, since
it will make the SARG look guilty from the outset.


3. (C) Al-Taki indicated that FM Mu'allim and his allies
(like MFA legal advisor Riad Daoudi and al-Taki himself) are
struggling to counter this view. Interestingly, President
Bashar al-Asad, who, according to al-Taki, has long stood
inside the regime on the side of cooperating with UNIIIC, has
expressed sympathy recently for this more confrontational
posture. Al-Taki expressed uncertainty about whether this
shift represented a temporary change of mood or a more
significant shift.


4. (C) Al-Taki, who has been informally involved for months
in helping put together the SARG's legal and diplomatic
response to the UNIIIC inquiry, insisted that Brammertz "has
changed everything," including the leads he is pursuing, the
way he is amassing the evidence, the way he is
cross-referencing evidence, the composition of the UNIIIC
team, "everything, except the overall theory of the case, the
motives," which, al-Taki indicated, still point to SARG
complicity.


5. (C) WAS GID INVOLVED IN KILLING HARIRI? Al-Taki noted
that Brammertz seems to be pursuing an interesting new lead
involving the activities of the Syrian "civilian" security
service, the GID, in Lebanon at the time of former PM
Hariri's death. Al-Taki acknowledged that SMI had a much
more powerful signature on the ground in Lebanon at the time,
but that GID, then under the command of Hisham Ikhtiyar,
maintained active informant networks and carried out
intelligence operations. Al-Taki said that both Ikhtiyar and
a former GID deputy, then-head of State Security Branch
Bahjat Suleyman, could find themselves targeted at the end of
this line of inquiry. Al-Taki added that it is interesting
that Asad has since removed both men from any position in
this service, but did not make clear if this move was
designed to cover their involvement or to make it easier for
Asad to eventually sacrifice them to UNIIIC, if it became
necessary. Al-Taki noted that Brammertz has asked to
interview him and a few other Syrians on the roles of the
different security services in Lebanon. (Note: Al-Taki is
the second contact who has mentioned that Brammertz wanted to
interview them for background on the Syrian security services
activities and roles in Lebanon.)


6. (C) CONSPIRATORIAL WEB OR RED HERRING: Al-Taki said he
believed that the two former GID officials, and Ikhtiyar in

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particular, may be tied to the killing of Hariri. They
worked with a small group of former left-wing activists used
by GID in both Lebanon and Syria. Two of the men were
Syrians, Hamadi Abdullah and Daher Khalid, and the third was
a Lebanese, Michael Awad. They continue to work in a
research center/think tank in Damascus set up by Ikhtiyar.
Before the assassination, they had been tasked by Ikhtiyar
with establishing contacts with Salifist Sunni
fundamentalists in the Tripoli area of Lebanon. Abdullah
told al-Taki in the weeks prior to the assassination that
Hariri needed to suffer "a terrible political blow, since he
was the only politician who could threaten Syria on the
ground in Lebanon." Al-Taki told PolChief that subsequently
he had seen Abdullah the afternoon of the assassination, and
he seemed so frightened and excited that his lips trembled
visibly, interfering with his ability to express himself
clearly. Al-Taki reported that Abdullah told him, "we did
it," dropping hints that the SARG had acted through these
Salafist elements to kill Hariri.


7. (C) SYRIA'S IRAN POLICY QUESTIONED: Regarding Syrian
policy towards Iran, al-Taki reported that it was being
shepherded by both Mohammed Nassif and more recently,
Ikhtiyar, who was having a big impact. Al-Taki criticized
the new policy orientation towards Iran, saying it was
creating real fear on the part of the Saudis and the
Egyptians. Both, but especially the Saudis, were
indispensable to Syria's ability to protect its regional
interests and play its natural regional role. Nassif's role
has lessened somewhat because "his health is not good," noted
al-Taki. As an aside, al-Taki noted that VP Shara'a
continues to interfere with FM Mua'llim, quoting Mu'allim to
the effect that Shara'a "is always sending his spies" into
the MFA.


8. (C) NEW THINK TANK DESCRIBED: On a separate subject,
al-Taki noted that he had succeeded in getting a new think
tank organized. Unofficially affiliated with the MFA, and
blessed by FM Mu'allim, the center is located in the Damascus
suburb of Mezzeh. The institute would like to establish
links with one or more U.S. think tanks. Al-Taki said he
would like to invite U.S. experts to participate in
conferences he would organize in Syria and is also interested
in tapping into any expertise or data bases they could offer.
He further noted that he is open to establishing contacts
with think tanks across the ideological spectrum in the U.S.
and would certainly welcome interest from think tanks
identified with neo-conservative points of view, mentioning
in particular The Project for the New American Century.
Al-Taki's center has a small staff of young, enthusiastic
policy people and can draw on Syrian intellectuals from
across the ideological spectrum, from secular opposition
activists on the left, to Ba'athists and Islamists.


9. (C) Al-Taki said the center is not for research but is
being used to produce "decision support papers" and counter
the anti-American positions and papers that Ikhtiyar and his
group are producing for the president. Al-Taki said he hoped
to get some "grant" money from the Syrian Chamber of
Commerce, noting that the center "does not need that much
money" at present. When told that he should pursue such
contacts on his own, al-Taki said that he would but expressed
the desire that the USG be informed about the center and his
plans for it. Al-Taki said he also counted on some input
from Israeli think tanks, like the Jaffe Center in Tel Aviv,
with which he has had good personal contact in the past. In
passing, al-Taki said that he had maintained periodic contact
with newly-elected Israeli PM Ehud Olmert.


10. (C) COMMENT: Other contacts concur that the regime is
more concerned about Brammertz now than they were when he was
first appointed, although most insist that the concern does
not reach anywhere near the levels of paranoia and worry that
were evident in the period between the releases of the first
and second Mehlis reports. Al-Taki's detailed mention of
possible GID involvement in the assassination of Hariri is
interesting and echoes more oblique references he has made to
us in the past about the possible involvement of Abdullah and
others with Lebanese Sunni fundamentalist groups that could
somehow have been connected to the killing. It should be
noted that al-Taki confers regularly with current GID head
Ali Mamluk. Only a very careful evaluation of the evidence
by Brammertz and his team can determine whether this is a
valid line of inquiry or a red herring. Regarding al-Taki's

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critical assessment of Syria's Iran policy, we have heard
identical views from several other thoughtful contacts,
insisting that the regime's Iran policy is misguided,
dangerous for Syrian interests and risky to Syria's security
if the U.S. adopts a confrontational posture towards Iran.

SECHE