Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS1512
2006-04-06 13:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

A LARSEN VISIT: CONFIDENT SARG UNLIKELY TO BUDGE

Tags:  PGOV PREL SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4485
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #1512/01 0961340
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061340Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8115
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0730
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0073
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 001512 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: A LARSEN VISIT: CONFIDENT SARG UNLIKELY TO BUDGE

REF: A. DAMASCUS 1511


B. DAMASCUS 0625

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 001512

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: A LARSEN VISIT: CONFIDENT SARG UNLIKELY TO BUDGE

REF: A. DAMASCUS 1511


B. DAMASCUS 0625

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: As consideration continues of a trip by UN
special envoy for 1559 implementation Terje Roed Larsen to
Damascus, the prospects for success seem dubious from our
perspective, primarily because of SARG confidence about its
prospects in Lebanon and its overall regional position. That
confidence will color how the Syrians respond to a Larsen
request to visit Damascus and how they address the
substantive issues he is likely to raise, including border
demarcation, removal of President Lahoud, and establishing
diplomatic relations. End Summary.


2. (C) RESURGENCE OF SYRIAN INFLUENCE IN LEBANON: At
present, the SARG feels emboldened by a resurgence of its
influence in Lebanon and heartened by the way its allies
there have taken the offensive against PM Siniora and his
March 14 allies. The recent hostile tone evident in the
Syrian press, directed at Siniora and attacking his
nationalist credentials by questioning his position on "the
resistance," as well as reports of a Syrian subpoena issued
for Walid Jumblatt, Marwan Hamadeh, and journalist Fares
Khashan (ref A),also point to a more intransigent Syria that
senses its Lebanese opponents are on the defensive and
weakening by the day.


3. (C) AN EMBOLDENED SYRIA IN THE REGION: This SARG
confidence in Lebanon has been shored up by a sense that
regional developments are furthering its interests across the
board. Its burgeoning relations with Iran, the marked
decrease in pressure from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Hamas'
taking power in the Palestinian territories, ongoing violence
in Iraq, an internal crackdown that has an anemic opposition
completely cowed, and a sense, albeit diminished, that
new-UNIIIC chief Brammertz poses less of a threat than
Mehlis, all these factors have emboldened the regime (ref B).
Hard-liners who advocated hanging tough and offering no
concessions feel vindicated. None of these developments is
likely to provide the SARG with any long-term shelter from
its international isolation, but for the next month or two

(until the release of the mid-June Brammertz report),and
certainly during the time-frame for any Larsen visit, the
SARG is likely to remain intoxicated by its current sense of
triumph and is unlikely to show any flexibility.


4. (C) REGIME'S CALCULATIONS ABOUT RECEIVING LARSEN: In
this frame of mind, the regime is unlikely to give Larsen
anything that might be seen as a benefit for Siniora and the
despised March 14 group. However, the SARG will consider
very carefully its tactics, including whether to agree to a
Larsen visit, whether to allow a meeting with Asad, and to
what degree it should try to shape the agenda in advance. We
conclude that the SARG will receive him if he asks to come,
if only to avoid any subsequent claim that Damascus has
refused to fully comply with its obligations under 1559.


5. (C) On the other hand, the SARG may calculate that
although Larsen will likely come with a tough message, it
will remain private for the most part, and they will be free
to spin the visit in the media as evidence that Syria is not
isolated and that it is the key regional player in Lebanon,
whose views must be taken into account. The SARG will also
carefully calculate potential fallout at the UNSC over
Larsen's report, likely wagering that a new, harsh resolution
is unlikely (given Russian opposition),but that a weaker one
or a PRST is possible, neither of which could be used to
pressure Syria as UNSCR 1559 was used. Finally, overall
regime calculations are colored by SARG desires not to
respond prematurely but to use the Lebanon card as part of
its strategic hand, to pressure the U.S. to re-engage on
terms more favorable to Syrian interests.


6. (C) BORDER DEMARCATION SEEN AS TRAP FOR HIZBALLAH: On
the substance, the SARG is not likely to show any real
flexibility, although it may try to stall and avoid the
appearance of outright intransigence. It will view any
Larsen demand that it agree to demarcate the border with
Lebanon as a transparent trap designed to corner its
strategic ally Hizballah into disarming. While it may agree
to time-consuming, dead-end preparatory measures such as
referring the issue to a joint committee (the Lebanon-Syria
Higher Council has already been examining the issue in

DAMASCUS 00001512 002 OF 002


desultory fashion for months, according to our contacts
here),it will not allow itself to be boxed in on the
demarcation issue. To counter Larsen, SARG officials will
point to the occupied status of Sheba'a farms, insisting that
the area is impossible to demarcate as long as it remains
that way. If Larsen tries to use the recently held National
Dialogue as an argument for Syrian movement (in tandem with
the international consensus that border issues should be
treated bilaterally),SARG officials are likely to point to
the late-developing Hizballah-Aoun position that the issue
should be referred to the UN rather than be treated
bilaterally. The SARG would have to be under intense
international pressure to move on this issue, since it would
also fear that making border adjustments might impact on any
future negotiations (and border adjustments) with Israel, and
evidence does not point to that level of pressure at present.


7. (C) STILL BACKING LAHOUD: Regarding the removal of
Lahoud, the SARG is also likely to be intransigent, although
it could package that view as a willingness to consider
alternatives but insist on a veto, essentially arrogating to
itself the right to name Lebanon's new president. It would
then reject any of Larsen's potential candidates and put
forward a few unacceptable figures viewed as transparent
shills for Damascus, such as former FM Jean Obeid. Given the
regime's current confidence level, it is doubtful Asad would
agree in the end to dump Lahoud, seeing it as unnecessary and
as a dangerous signal of abandonment and weakness to its
proxies there and to its allies and rivals in the region.



8. (C) NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS LIKELY: The SARG is also
highly unlikely to agree to establish diplomatic relations
with Lebanon. This issue is generally viewed as a
non-starter here, inside the regime, as well as among elites
and on even the street, where the regime has succeeded in the
past year in whipping up powerful anti-Lebanon sentiments,
using issues like mistreatment of Syrian workers and the
"insulting" lack of appreciation by the Lebanese for the
"sacrifices" Syria made to stabilize Lebanon. Except among
the small secular opposition, there is little appreciation
for the fact that Syria occupied and essentially despoiled
Lebanon for three decades. The regime has also succeeded in
portraying this issue as one of outside interference, where
the West and Israel are seen as attempting to wrest Lebanon
away from its natural Syrian orbit and force it under the
domination of powers hostile to Syria. Moving on this issue,
as on the others, would be seen as offering a present to
Siniora and his allies at a time the SARG feels no compulsion
or desire to do so, and when its perceived interests point in
the opposite direction, towards finding additional ways to
punish and pressure the recalcitrants opposing Syrian
influence in Lebanon. The regime is almost certain to rebuff
any Larsen effort to raise the issue of arms shipments to
Hizballah or the Palestinians, denying any involvement.


9. (C) COMMENT: A Larsen visit to Damascus offers the
possibility of limited benefits, principal among them the
prospect (somewhat slim in our judgment) that Larsen while in
Damascus will publicly accuse the SARG of failing to meet
its obligations under 1559. Conversely, it also may offer
the SARG a momentary opportunity to demonstrate that its
isolation has eased and allow it to spin the visit to show
that its role as the dominant regional player in Lebanon is
being acknowledged. Given current SARG calculations,
however, such a visit offers little promise of movement on
the substantive issues.


SECHE