Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS1508
2006-04-04 12:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SYRIA FIRST QUARTER REPORT ON FREEDOM AGENDA

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KPAO KMPI AMGT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0023
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #1508/01 0941248
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY TEXT PARA#1 ADB210E7 MSI5492 569)
O 041248Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8108
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001508 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY (TEXT IN PARAGRAPH
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001508

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY (TEXT IN PARAGRAPH 1)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KPAO KMPI AMGT
SUBJECT: SYRIA FIRST QUARTER REPORT ON FREEDOM AGENDA

REF: A. STATE47911

B. 05 DAMASCUS 2534

C. DAMASCUS 1216

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: The Embassy's implementation of its 2005
Democratic Reform Strategy in the first three months of 2006
has been constrained by a hardening SARG attitude towards
reform and SARG efforts to restrict Embassy operations, both
largely prompted by the strained political atmosphere evident
in Syria in late 2005 and early 2006. Even under ideal
conditions, achievement of most of the desired outcomes and
benchmarks mentioned in the approved country strategy for
Syria, relating to the lifting of emergency law, ending
repression of dissidents, removing the licensing requirement
for NGO's, as well as passing a political parties law, would
have been difficult to achieve. Despite the constraining
factors, Post did see progress in a few areas since the
beginning of the year, including Syrian participation in four
International Visitor programs related to rule of law or NGO
management, and continuing interest in -- if not always successful
completion of -- projects supported by MEPI funding. End Summary.


2. (C) Embassy Damascus' progress in achieving its freedom
agenda objectives (Refs A and B) has been limited due to SARG
intransigence over moving forward on any political reforms.
Despite the signals it sent in the spring of 2005, in the
run-up to the June Ba'ath Party Congress, about willingness
to discuss passage of a political parties law, annulling
Article 8 of the Constitution (mandating ruling party status
for the Ba'ath Party),granting citizenship to an initial
tranche of stateless Kurds, rescinding the Emergency law, and
passing new NGO and media laws, the SARG has taken no action
on any of these issues. Consequently the baselines mentioned
in Ref B remain an accurate set of descriptors for the
situation and point to the scope of the challenges that
remain ahead for democratic development in Syria.

Encouraging rule of law and good governance, ending
repression of dissidents, helping political opposition and
civil society to develop, and identifying future democratic
leaders remain the principal objectives of the Embassy's
Democratic Reform Strategy for Syria.


3. (C) The political environment for achieving these
objectives became more complicated in the fall and winter as
then-UNIIIC chief Detlev Mehlis issued two reports on the
assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafik al-Hariri, casting
international scrutiny and suspicion on Syria. The U.S.
policy of isolating the regime and sanctioning certain regime
figures contributed to SARG uncertainty. The regime
responded by cracking down even harder on the weak political
opposition and civil society, detaining and interrogating
significant numbers of activists, subjecting some of them to
the prospect of drawn-out trials on trumped-up charges. In
an atmosphere of paranoia and defensiveness, the regime
shelved most discussion of political reform and froze any
forward movement.


4. (C) Since the beginning of the year, the SARG has taken
steps to restrict a range of Embassy activities (ref C),
slow-rolling the issuance of visas for official Americans,
restricting the Charge's MFA access to the level of Chief of
Protocol, and, in the area of Public Diplomacy, putting on
hold a high school exchange program, refusing to nominate
candidates for participation in teacher training and
professional development programs, and insisting that only
SARG-nominated candidates be eligible for Syrian Fulbright
grants. Late last year, the SARG used its security services
and their proxies to intimidate one MEPI "Democracy Small
Grants" recipient into returning his funding and prevented
the completion of a second project. In addition, the SARG
has made it almost impossible for PD officers to consult
directly with Ministries of Education and Higher Education on
programming needs, causing intolerable delays in getting
programming implemented. The SARG has begun trying to make
clear via these restrictions and others that the USG will not
be able to circumvent the SARG to fund civil society and
NGO's directly.


5. (C) Despite these constraining factors, Post did see
progress in a few areas since the beginning of the year. The
Dean and three professors at the University of Damascus Law
School attended a single country IV program on human rights.
In addition, the Dean of the Aleppo University Law School
attended a regional IV program on the rule of law, a Syrian
activist attended a regional IV program on human rights
advocacy and awareness, and the acting director of a
prominent NGO attended a regional IV program on NGO
management. Also, two alumni of the MEPI Study of the U.S.
Institutes for Student Leaders attended the alumni conference
in Abu Dhabi in February. In addition, MEPI funds have been
used for projects that are under consideration or underway,
including a program promoting environmental awareness for


6. (C) However, given the inhibiting factors mentioned
above, Post was unable to implement some of the more
ambitious programmatic initiatives mentioned in its 2005
Democratic Reform Strategy. For example, we were not able to
create a forum for people-to-people discussion of the
Emergency Law and the need for respect for human rights
across different legal systems or to hold a PD-sponsored
journalism conference on the relationship between the media
and the government.

SECHE