Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS149
2006-01-09 15:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

CIVIL SOCIETY MULLS KHADDAM'S STATEMENTS, SARG'S

Tags:  PGOV PHUM SY 
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VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #0149/01 0091518
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091518Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6556
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0577
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000149 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY MULLS KHADDAM'S STATEMENTS, SARG'S
REACTION


Classified By: CDA Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 b/d

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000149

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY MULLS KHADDAM'S STATEMENTS, SARG'S
REACTION


Classified By: CDA Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C): SUMMARY: Civil-society activists continue to
discuss recent statements by former Vice-President Abdul
Halim Khaddam, particularly those related to any aspirations
for a leading role in the Syrian opposition. Most activists
acknowledge Khaddam's real ties to the opposition, noting
that some opposition figures are already making overtures to
Khaddam. Meanwhile, activists noted new SARG measures
designed to press opposition figures into the anti-Khaddam
camp. END SUMMARY.


2. (C): KHADDAM,S TIES TO OPPOSITION DO EXIST: A number
of civil-society activists noted that Khaddam does indeed
have the connection to the opposition which he has been
touting publicly. Human rights activist XXXXXXXXXXXX noted
that Khaddam had been floating his plans to go public over
the last three months and had contacted opposition figures by
letter, trying to gauge potential support. Sometimes
critical XXXXXXXXXXXX cited his own ties to a
Khaddam family member who had told XXXXXXXXXXXX that many Ba,thists
open to reform had traveled to visit Khaddam in Paris
throughout the fall, utilizing indirect travel routes to
avoid Syrian intelligence scrutiny.


3. (C): According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Khaddam's strongest opposition
tie is to leading opposition figure XXXXXXXXXXXX.
Khaddam and XXXXXXXXXXXX have a long history together, says XXXXXXXXXXXX,
dating back to Khaddam's arrival in Damascus as a student in
the 1950s. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Khaddam had encouraged XXXXXXXXXXXX to
form his own party during the Damascus Spring of 2001 XXXXXXXXXXXX.


4. (C) CIVIL SOCIETY MULLS ITS POSITION TOWARDS KHADDAM
PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY: Civil-society figures are continuing
to evaluate Khaddam's statements. XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff that discussion with Khaddam is in
line with the Damascus Declaration, as the Declaration makes
clear that engagement with the regime is desirable, even with
former senior figures like Khaddam.


5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX praised Khaddam's "change in opinion" and
clear critique of the SARG, but at the same time said that XXXXXXXXXXXX
does not believe that Khaddam should be granted "automatic

forgiveness" for past sins. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX is convinced that
politics will trump human rights concerns within the
opposition, noting that with his recent statements, "Khaddam
has done more for the opposition and has moved for change
more than other opposition members."


6. (C) Not all civil-society activists are willing to
believe Khaddam's new democratic, anti-corruption position.
Human rights activist and Damascus Declaration signatory
XXXXXXXXXXXX called Khaddam's reformist statements "lies"
and considers Khaddam -- despite overwhelming evidence to the
contrary -- to still be part of the regime.


7. (C) Activists are also discussing public statements made
by a number of Syrian opposition figures setting out
conditions for dialogue with Khaddam. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that
senior opposition figure Riad al-Turk had made press
statements in Germany that he would accept Khaddam in the
opposition if he apologizes for his misdeeds. XXXXXXXXXXXX also
alluded to Khaddam's appearance on al-Mustaqil TV with Muslim
Brotherhood leader Ali Sadreddin Bayanouni on January 8 from
two remote locations as a sign of dialogue between the two
camps. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX hinted to Polchief
January 9 that Khaddam met privately with Bayanouni prior to
his December 30 Al-Arabiyya interview to coordinate their
positions.)


8. (C) MEANWHILE, REGIME OFFERS CARROTS TO OPPOSITION
FIGURES: Civil-society activists also noted that the regime
is reaching out to some opposition members, cajoling and
pressuring, to shore up support in the Khaddam crisis.
According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, opposition figure and spokesman for the
National Democratic Front umbrella organization, Hassan Abdul
Azeem, has been approached by the regime (specifically
Regional Command National Security Office head Hisham
Ikhtiyar) to discuss the "opening of a dialogue." According
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the leaders of the five National Democratic Front
member parties will convene in a number of days to take this
suggestion under advisement, indicating a willingness to
entertain the offer.


9. (C) The regime is also reaching out to political
prisoners in order to shore up its anti-Khaddam platform.
According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX has been approached
twice by individuals with regime ties urging him to publicly
come out against Khaddam in exchange for "help" in his case.
XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated that XXXXXXXXXXXX is not willing to make such
statements. (NOTE: XXXXXXXXXXXX also indicated that the SARG is
utilizing sticks against possible Khaddam supporters, citing
a report that 82 Khaddam associates whom XXXXXXXXXXXX described as
'old guard' were detained by security services in and around
Damascus on January 7, including at least one former Syrian
ambassador. Poloff has been unable to confirm this report
with human rights organizations).


10. (C) Civil-society activists are also discussing the
implications of President Bashar al-Asad,s January 3
comments to al-Usbua newspaper regarding the potential for a
human rights ministry. Activists were especially surprised
at Asad's acknowledgment of the existence and unofficial
tolerance of unlicensed civil-society organizations and his
noting that the government is contemplating a "mechanism that
is more legal" for such NGOs. While skeptical that Asad is
seriously contemplating such a move, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX both
noted that the statement was significant and may be an
attempt to signal a willingness for reform in the midst of
renewed pressure.
SECHE