ASAD VISITS JEDDAH, SHARM, AFTER QUICK SAUDI FM

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000145

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ASAD VISITS JEDDAH, SHARM, AFTER QUICK SAUDI FM
VISIT TO DAMASCUS


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: In a rapid, somewhat strangely
choreographed set of visits January 8, President Bashar
al-Asad met with Saudi King Abdullah in Jeddah and Egyptian
President Mubarak in Sharm as-Sheikh, following a quick visit
to Damascus by Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal the same day. The two
sides issued a relatively anodyne joint communiqu following
the Jeddah visit, calling for activating the joint
Saudi-Syrian committee. Contacts viewed the Syria-Saudi
meetings as an indication that the Saudis, especially King
Abdullah, had become uncomfortable with the pressure that the
Khaddam media campaign, much of it through Saudi-owned media,
was having on the Syrian regime. The meetings were designed
as a public show of support for the SARG, with some private
arm-twisting urging Bashar al-Asad to cooperate fully with
UNIIIC. The visit to Sharm was thought to have been arranged
at the last minute, possibly in reaction to Syrian
disappointment at not getting the private level of support
sought from the Saudis. End Summary.


2. (C) SAUDIS WORRIED ABOUT KHADDAM? The January 8 meetings
of Syrian President Asad with Saudi FM al-Faisal in Damascus,
followed by visits with King Abdullah in Jeddah and Egyptian
President Mubarak in Sharm as-Sheikh, were thought to have
focused on the ongoing UNIIIC investigation into the
assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafik al-Hariri and
fallout from the recent media campaign by former Syrian VP
Abdul-Halim Khaddam. Contacts suspect that the trip to Sharm
to see Mubarak was tacked on at the last minute, possibly in
reaction to Syrian disappointment at the substantive results
of the discussions with the Saudis.


3. (C) SYRIAN SUSPICIONS OF SAUDI INTENTIONS: Contacts
insisted that the Saudi visit could only be understood in the
context of recent SARG suspicions about the intentions of
some in the Saudi royal family toward the Syrian regime and
Saudi reservations about the media campaign of former Syrian
VP Abdul Halim Khaddam. Long-standing Embassy contact Dr.
Samir al-Taki noted that the Saudis, or at least some group
of royal family, were definitely involved with Khaddam. This
group, angered by the Hariri assassination and the consequent
loss of Saudi influence over events in Lebanon (and involving
Saudi family members like Abdul-Aziz bin Fahd, who are close
friends of Sa'ad al-Hariri) looked favorably on the idea of
regime change in Syria, in favor of a Sunni-led government as
a bulwark against the rise of Shi'ite political power in
Iraq. Iraqi-British businessman Mahdi Sajjad, a confidant of
Asad uncle and advisor Mohammed Makhlouf, told Emboffs
January 8 that the Syrian regime is absolutely convinced that
the Saudis are behind Khaddam and that they have been
plotting secretly for months to oust the Syrian regime.


4. (C) SAUDIS DIVIDED ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH ASAD REGIME?:
Other Saudis, while also hostile to the SARG, are fearful of
the instability and terrorism that might be unleashed in
Syria if the Asad regime is pressured until it collapsed.
Al-Taki speculated that King Abdullah has recently moved
tentatively into the latter camp, possibly with some nudging
from Mubarak. (Note: Al-Taki also noted that the Saudis are
extremely wary of the developing Syria-Iran axis. He said
that that Iranian President Ahmadinejad is scheduled to visit
Damascus just after the Eid holidays. When asked if this was
tentatively set, he said "No, it's definite.") The Saudi
meetings were tied to the UNIIIC investigation, with the
Saudis likely urging Asad that this is his final chance to
take action and cooperate, before "humiliating conditions"
are imposed on him, said al-Taki.


5. (C) Damascus-based al-Hayat bureau chief Ibrahim Hamidi
concurred with this assessment of the Saudi meeting, telling
Polchief January 9 that the hastily arranged Saudi FM visit,
after more than a year since such a high-level Saudi visit
here, followed by the state visit to Jeddah, and the issuance
of joint communiqu, signaled that the Saudis wanted to
temper the impact that Khaddam was having. Hamidi concurred
with al-Taki that there was a division among the Saudi royal
family about how harshly the Syrian regime should be treated.
The visits and the recent Saudi decision not to allow
Khaddam any more access for the time being to Saudi-owned
media like al-Arabiyya TV network or al-Sharq al-Awsat
newspaper indicated that the Saudis, especially King
Abdullah, had become uncomfortable with the level of pressure
the Syrian regime was under and were concerned about a
possible collapse of the regime, and what might come
afterwards, said Hamidi. It is also possible that the Saudis
and the Egyptians decided to take action after Mubarak heard

January 4 in Paris about Chirac's intentions for regime
change in Syria, Hamidi speculated.


6. (C) SAUDI PUBLIC SHOW OF SUPPORT: While the back-to-back
Damascus-Jeddah visits were designed as a public show of
support for the Syrians, the Saudis were likely tougher in
private on Asad, insisting that he cooperate with UNIIIC.
Both Hamidi and civil society activist Amr al-Azm thought
Asad added the Mubarak meeting because of not getting the
full support of the Saudis. The quick visits to Jeddah and
Sharm indicated that the Syrians are "really worried" about
the situation, said Hamidi.


7. (C) SAUDI DOUBLE GAME?: Despite these positive gestures
by the Saudis, Hamidi observed that the Saudi steps to ease
the pressure were limited and mirrored previous interventions
on their part to attenuate -- at least in the short term --
the pressures that the Syrian regime was facing. Hamidi did
not rule out that the Saudis were playing a complicated
double game, allowing the pressure on the SARG to continue,
and to slowly build, as long as it did not imminently
threaten to cause the collapse of the regime.


8. (C) IMPACT OF KHADDAM IN EGYPT: An Egyptian diplomat
told Polchief January 8 that the Khaddam media campaign had
had a huge impact on Egyptian officialdom, converting many
Egyptian officials from nominal agnostics on the question of
whether the Syrians (and Asad) had killed Hariri to reluctant
believers that the SARG had ordered the hit. The diplomat,
who is normally well-informed about Egyptian-Syrian
exchanges, did not have a readout of the Sharm visit (and in
fact seemed to be unaware that it was taking place.)

SECHE