Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS1433
2006-03-30 14:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

XXXXXXXXXXXX DISCUSSES LONG-TERM COOPERATION WITH

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7183
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #1433/01 0891415
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301415Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8022
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0726
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 001433 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR SY
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX DISCUSSES LONG-TERM COOPERATION WITH
USG, SARG, XXXXXXXXXXXX

REF: A. DAMASCUS 1368

B. DAMASCUS 1357

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b)/(d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 001433

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR SY
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX DISCUSSES LONG-TERM COOPERATION WITH
USG, SARG, XXXXXXXXXXXX

REF: A. DAMASCUS 1368

B. DAMASCUS 1357

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b)/(d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Key opposition figure XXXXXXXXXXXX met with
Poloff on March 26 to discuss a number of issues. XXXXXXXXXXXX
confirmed that he is not applying for MEPI funding during
this application cycle, but remains interested in pursuing
other, "indirect" funding mechanisms from the USG. XXXXXXXXXXXX
detailed XXXXXXXXXXXX most recent interrogation with SARG authorities, during which time XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX. He also commented on recent Syria-related
events, including the Brammertz report and the formation of
the National Salvation Front in Brussels, as well as
discussing his own future political plans. He also called on
the USG to work more closely together with the EU on human
rights issues. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX NOT APPLYING FOR MEPI FUNDING THIS CYCLE, HAS
LONG-TERM INTEREST IN ASSISTANCE: Key opposition figure XXXXXXXXXXXX met with Poloff in his office on March 26. During
discussions, XXXXXXXXXXXX made clear that he was not currently
pursuing MEPI funding, nor is anyone pursuing funding on his
behalf. XXXXXXXXXXXX also made clear that he is still interested in
USG funding in the mid- to long-term, but only indirect
support and at the right time. "We have time to discuss
this," said XXXXXXXXXXXX and went on to make clear that this is not
the right time. XXXXXXXXXXXX also raised again the fact that many of
his fellow opposition figures are in dire financial straits.
XXXXXXXXXXXX. (NOTE: XXXXXXXXXXXX
noted that he himself is receiving approximately $2000
monthly from his relatives, although his extended family has
come under recent security scrutiny regarding this support.)


3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX


4. (C) STATE OF THE SARG: NERVOUS AFTER BRAMMERTZ, BUT
SHOULD NOT BE WORRIED ABOUT NSF: According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the SARG
has been acting very nervous of late "as if they're expecting
something unusual." XXXXXXXXXXXX attributed this nervousness to the
most recent Brammertz report, calling it "clever" for not

revealing everything and "waiting for the right time."
Brammertz is going slowly, and "one statement could explode
everything." XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that President Bashar al-Asad
himself could be accused. (For more reaction on the Brammertz
report, see ref A.)


5. (C) On the other hand, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the SARG should
not be worried about the new National Salvation Front (NSF)
recently formed in Brussels (ref B). Former Vice President
Abdulhalim Khaddam, one of the de facto co-leaders of the NSF
coalition, along with Muslim Brotherhood head Ali Sadreddin
Bayanouni, is hated by a large section of Syrian society,
said XXXXXXXXXXXX. If Khaddam tries to lead the opposition, the
movement will be unsuccessful as it would lack credibility.
The MB, for its part, has more credibility and potential, but
is not at present a major organized political force in Syria.
The MB, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, is also not accepted by the (generally
pro-regime) Syrian Islamist establishment.


6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX FUTURE PLANS: XXXXXXXXXXXX plans to use the next two
months to prepare for the launch of his party and to develop
a party platform. He will be ready to announce it at "the
right time" in about 6-8 weeks. The founding group will be

DAMASCUS 00001433 002 OF 002


more exclusive than originally planned, with a maximum of
12-15 people. When asked about the role of external actors
in opposition politics, XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is important to focus on
the internal opposition until the party is firmly
established. This means no cooperation or partnership with
the foreign opposition or foreign countries. He returned to
his theme of wanting to form a bona fide establishment versus
having a one-man show, noting that his current status as the
central figure in the opposition continues to put him in
danger. Forming a "real party" would provide "real
protection" for himself.


7. (C) COMMENTS ON USG STATEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION:
XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the street is very anti-American at the
moment, but maintained that the recent USG statement on the
human rights situation in Syria was nonetheless a good thing.
He noted that he continues to research and speak about the
positive situation of Muslims in the U.S., trying to
counteract SARG propaganda that the U.S. is anti-Islam.
(NOTE: Post is working with XXXXXXXXXXXX office to provide him with
articles and materials about the Muslim community in the U.S.
END NOTE.) He encouraged the USG to issue joint statements
with the EU, noting that European diplomats told him that
their governments will start pushing the SARG hard on human
rights issues within the next two weeks. He noted that the
SARG still feels it has business connections with the EU, but
with the USG there is "no hope."


8. (C) COMMENT: The relentless pressure and threats on XXXXXXXXXXXX
and his family since his release seem finally to be having
their expected impact for the SARG, forcing XXXXXXXXXXXX to lower his
profile to the point of near-zero visibility. While he seems
relatively confident that the SARG will come forward with a
political parties law in the next two months, we are less
sanguine XXXXXXXXXXXX His point that forming a political party will help shield him
from SARG repression also seems debatable. XXXXXXXXXXXX is more
persuasive when he points to Khaddam's lack of political
support inside Syria, a point many of our contacts make,
although some of the savviest among them refuse to dismiss
Khaddam completely as an embittered has-been with no
political future in Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX case illuminates just how
difficult it is for a potentially influential opposition
figure to make any significant organizational or media move
to increase that influence without arousing immediate
repressive action by the SARG, including threats to do harm
to family members. Given those dynamics, it is hard to see
how the internal (secular) opposition will ever be able to
pose much of a challenge to the regime. Islamist and Kurdish
leaders have potential "street" power behind them that the
secular forces lack. XXXXXXXXXXXX has the potential to make inroads
among these groups, too, which explains why the SARG has
subjected him to such intense pressure since it released him.

SECHE