SARG NERVOUS OVER BRAMMERTZ, DESPITE POSITIVE BODY

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001368

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM SY
SUBJECT: SARG NERVOUS OVER BRAMMERTZ, DESPITE POSITIVE BODY
LANGUAGE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Despite its continuing efforts to project
calm, the mid-March Brammertz report seems to have provoked
SARG anxiety about where the UNIIIC investigation is headed.
A range of contacts report that the regime's guardedly
positive public reaction to the mid-march UNIIIC report
soured almost immediately into private worries about
potential danger areas the report hinted at. Some contacts
believe that Brammertz may be leaning towards accusing
President Bashar al-Asad of complicity in the killing of
former Lebanese PM Rafik al-Hariri. Former VP Abdul Halim
Khaddam's ongoing efforts to attack and organize opposition
to the regime have also worried SARG leaders. While a few
contacts continue to minimize any potential risk to the
regime posed by Brammertz or Khaddam, regime uncertainty
about their intentions, as well as their capacity to inflict
damage, seem to be the factors provoking the most anxiety.
End Summary.


2. (C) The SARG is nervous about where UNIIIC chief Serge
Brammertz is headed with the investigation into the
assassination of former PM Hariri, despite its sustained
efforts over the past six weeks to paint an image of
confidence and cooperation. Most contacts believe SARG
officials when they insist that relations with Brammertz are
much better than they were with Mehlis. They also take at
face value initial SARG reaction describing Brammertz's
report as careful and professional and highlighting the fact
that the Syria is cooperating with the investigation. Beyond
that, there was little official reaction and only muted
private response to the release of the report.


3. (C) Beneath that relatively placid surface, however,
substantial anxiety has apparently developed. The initial
view that the report was "weak, like the second Mehlis
report," has faded. Syrian foreign policy expert Dr. Imad
Shueibi, who consults regularly with high-level regime
figures, told Polchief that the SARG "cannot relax" because
the March interim report, as is clear from a careful second
reading, is full of potential pitfalls. He and others who
know the regime well express fears that the June report
could be much more "aggressive," with Brammertz even moving
to include accusations that President Asad was involved in
ordering the killing of Hariri. Shueibi expressed the
conviction that the Russians would provide some protection at
the UNSC if the case moved in this direction. (Note:
Shueibi said the Brammertz had asked to meet with him in the
coming days, to be briefed on past relations between the
Syrian security services and the Lebanese. He cited the
request to demonstrate that Brammertz seemed legitimately
interested in investigating the incident and its background,
rather than "merely making accusations like Mehlis.")


4. (C) MP Basil Dahdouh offered one explanation for the
apparent SARG anxiety, noting that the SARG feared the
formation of an international tribunal and did not want to
"appear silly" praising Brammertz in advance of such a
credibility-damaging development. Other contacts thought the
shift denoted a more significant swing in regime opinion,
pointing to several factors that have concerned SARG
officials: Brammertz did not "annul" any of the conclusions
that Mehlis reached in his reports; he included a warning
indicating that Syrian commitments to cooperate would be
tested in the near future; he mentioned the possibility of
two explosions, instead of one; and he referred to possible
new lines of inquiry for the investigation.


5. (C) Opposition figures concurred that the regime is
extremely nervous about Brammertz, but is trying to convey
the opposite impression. "Bashar says he is relaxed. But he
is lying," said senior opposition figure Riad Turk. He
thought the regime was most nervous because Brammertz had
"not revealed his hand," and because he had cornered top
regime officials into pledging to cooperate. Turk repeated
his previous prediction that in the end Asad will not agree
to be questioned by Brammertz because the Syrian leader "is
the killer, he ordered it, and he is trying to escape being
accused of the crime."


6. (C) Other opposition figures agreed about regime
nervousness, saying that state of mind helped explain why the
SARG in the past month had cracked down so hard on opposition
and civil society activists. They also expressed
satisfaction with Brammertz's report. Opposition intellectual
Michel Kilo insisted to PolChief that Brammertz would accuse
Asad in June of issuing the order that Hariri be killed. He
also noted that after an initially positive impression of
Brammertz, the regime had become worried and begun to quietly
spread rumors that he "is a second Mehlis" and not as
objective as he is trying to appear.


7. (C) COMMENT: The coincidence of the Brammertz interim
report and Khaddam's continuing criticism of the regime have
combined to provoke the current unease the regime is
experiencing. While a few contacts continue to minimize any
potential risk to the regime posed by Brammertz or Khaddam,
regime uncertainty about their intentions, as well as their
real capacity for inflicting damage, seem to be the factors
provoking the most anxiety. After a two-month period of
successfully projecting calm and even a sense of momentary
satisfaction with its short-term foreign policy triumphs and
internal successes at stabilizing the currency and
suppressing any wayward signs of dissent or regime stress,
the SARG seems now to sense that rougher waters and trickier
currents may be on the horizon. As it battens down the
hatches, it is becoming more difficult for it to project
convincingly an air of calm. Developments with Brammertz and
Khaddam in the next few months will make clear to the regime
whether the current worries are justified or another false
alarm.


SECHE