Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS1262
2006-03-22 11:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

ENSURING EXPORT CONTROL ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE SAA

Tags:  ECON ETRD ETTC SY 
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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7847
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 001262 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA/ELA
NSC - EABRAMS/MSINGH
TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON
EB/ESC/TSF FOR SALOOM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016
TAGS: ECON ETRD ETTC SY
SUBJECT: ENSURING EXPORT CONTROL ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE SAA

REF: A. 05 DAMASCUS 6384

B. DAMASCUS 1083

Classified By: CDA Stephen Seche, Reasons 1.4 b/d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 001262

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA/ELA
NSC - EABRAMS/MSINGH
TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON
EB/ESC/TSF FOR SALOOM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016
TAGS: ECON ETRD ETTC SY
SUBJECT: ENSURING EXPORT CONTROL ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE SAA

REF: A. 05 DAMASCUS 6384

B. DAMASCUS 1083

Classified By: CDA Stephen Seche, Reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (SBU) Summary: Syrian businessmen regularly report
on the ease with which their fellow businessmen
illegally import U.S. commodities with seeming
impunity, as well as express concerns that the USG's
lack of enforcement of the economic sanctions imposed
under the SAA are hurting those that choose to play by
the rules. Syrian business contacts assert that if
the USG is going to declare exports to Syria illegal,
it should enforce its law. By not doing so, contacts
contend, the USG is playing into the SARG's hand
because the SARG routinely forces businesses to
operate outside the law in order to gain leverage over
them. To promote greater receptivity to existing USG
sanctions on the part of the Syrian business
community, contacts urge a two-pronged approach to
ensure export-control enforcement. First, the USG
should demonstrate that it investigates and prosecutes
known instances of sanctions violations. In the same
vein, it should make Syrian business contacts who
legitimately import U.S. products aware that evidence
they provide on sanctions-busting activities will
assist in the creation of a body of evidence that can
be used against violators and deter illegal
competition. Second, to ensure compliance with U.S.
export regulations and prevent unlawful use of
commodities, especially potential dual-use technology,
timely and effective post-shipment verifications of
legally imported commodities should be conducted. End
summary.


2. (C) Syrian businessmen continue to regularly report
on the relative ease of circumventing trade sanctions
imposed under the Syria Accountability Act (SAA),as
well as express their concerns about the USG,s
willingness and ability to enforce its law. The
constant refrain heard from the business community is
that U.S. sanctions are ineffective and are not
impacting the SARG, but rather are most directly
impacting legitimate business transactions.
Businessmen legally importing U.S. products contend

that they are left with only two options to maintain
the financial viability of their companies: look to
other markets in Asia and Europe to acquire goods of
poorer quality than their U.S. counterparts, or resort
to importing U.S. products from third countries in
order to fulfill contractual obligations, avoid
performance bond penalties, and prevent being included
on the SARG's tendering black list, (ref A).
Furthermore, business contacts have expressed concern
that second- and third-tier companies have continued
to gain a stronger foothold in the Syrian market since
the Syrian law protecting the exclusivitiy of agents
was abolished when the SAA was imposed.

--------------
Violation of Trade Sanctions 101
--------------


5. (C) Post contacts have continually offered
anecdotal evidence on means by which U.S. trade
sanctions are circumvented. Abdul Ghani Attar,
Executive Director of Attar Brothers Trading and
Marketing and exclusive agent for IBM, told us that
&low tech8 U.S.-origin (or U.S. component) equipment -
x-ray tubes, personal computers, defibrillators, and
consumable supplies ) are flowing into Syria from a
number of third countries, most notably Dubai. He
admits that it is impossible for the USG to fully
enforce the SAA trade sanctions, but believes that the
USG should focus its enforcement energies on more
technologically-sophisticated items, such as mid-range
computer servers with U.S. components, that are
entering Syria without an export license. While other
sources have previously told us that the items that
are difficult to illegally import are &complex8
technologies, specifically machines with traceable
serial numbers, Attar stated that one common tactic
for companies wanting to export these items is to
'lose the market trace' on the commodities, that is,

DAMASCUS 00001262 002 OF 003


not track the products with serial numbers to the
final end-user.

6.(C) A. Safouh Hosch, the exclusive agent for Boston
Scientific products, said that it is common for Syrian
hospitals to obtain more products than needed under
their export licenses and sell the remainder to other
hospitals, including banned military hospitals.
Additionally, he told us that hospitals in Eastern
Europe are selling off overstock of U.S. medical
supplies to Syria as well. Hosch says that hospitals
like Tishreen military hospital sometimes require
patients to obtain U.S. medical supplies from local
suppliers before medical treatment is authorized.
Hosch believes this practice puts businessmen who want
to comply with U.S. sanctions law in the morally
compromising position of breaking U.S. law or refusing
to assist ill patients needing supplies.


7. (SBU) Importers from a variety of sectors have
stated that distributors in other regions such as
Europe or South Africa are often solicited to sell
U.S. products to Syria on a cash-only basis. One
source told us that he can easily purchase U.S.
commodities, specifically medical spare parts, from
the Internet and have them shipped to Syria through a
third country.


8. (C) Contacts emphasize repeatedly that given how
the trade sanctions under the SAA are currently
implemented and enforced, the SARG has not and will
not be impacted by them. Additionally, they comment
that the SARG itself continues to obtain illegally
imported U.S. products. Attar told us that after SAA
sanctions were imposed, his company withdrew its bid
to supply the Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS) with IBM
computers, yet the CBS easily procured U.S. computers
from another supplier. Tamer Khirdaji, Sales Manager
for a U.S. medical supplies company, stated that a
local supplier ( Ematic Company ) bid on a tender that
would supply a military hospital with a Varian linear
accelerator, a dual-use item. He further admitted
that a Syrian agent for GE products recently bid on a
SARG contract to provide two MRI systems, at least one
of which would be used by a military hospital in
Aleppo. Allegedly the MRI systems would be shipped
from the GE distributor in France without an export
license. Lastly, Hosch, exclusive agent for Boston
Scientific, told us that within the past month he was
out-bid on a SARG Ministry of Health tender for
medical equipment for the al-Basel Heart Institute by
a competitor offering the latest models of the same
equipment. The competitor was able to offer the
products at a substantially cheaper price because he
did not invest the necessary time and money into
pursuing an export license. Hosch says the illegal
import of Boston Scientific products not only is a
threat to his market share, but also a threat to the
consumer because Boston Scientific cannot guarantee,
recall, or trace the products.

--------------
Ensuring Export Control Enforcement Under the SAA: A
Two-Pronged Approach
--------------


9. (SBU) One of the mechanisms by which the USG can
ensure export enforcment control is by taking action
against and publicly naming some of the most egregious
violators of sanctions. Syrian business contacts,
though able to supply ample anecdotal evidence of
sanctions violations by competitors, are often
hesitant to provide us with more concrete evidence
needed for prosecution because they fear retribution
and are not convinced that reporting known U.S.
sanctions violations will actually result in penalties
for violators. By demonstrating to Syrian business
contacts who want to legitimately import U.S. products
that their assistance in enforcing sanctions would
deter competing illegal imports, it would affirm that
the U.S. both encourages legitimate trade and takes
seriously the sanctions it imposes.


10. (SBU) The second mechanism by which the USG can

DAMASCUS 00001262 003 OF 003


ensure compliance with its export regulations toward
Syria is through timely and effective post-shipment
verifications (PSV) of legally imported U.S. products.
In the past six months, Post has been asked to conduct
verifications solely for commodities shipped in 2002
or 2003, well before SAA sanctions were imposed. In
many instances, the commodities ) such as computer or
telecommunications equipment - have either become
technologically obsolete or have been consumed (e.g.
medical supplies). As a recent example, Post was
asked to conduct a PSV of a consumable product,
potassium cyanide, shipped to a public pediatric
hospital in October 2003. Due to the time-gap between
the initial shipment and the PSV request, the hospital
completely utilized the commodity and Post was unable
to verify that it had been used legitimately.
Additionally, Post learned that the supplier had sold
potassium cyanide, a precursor for chemical agents, to
other end-users not permitted in his export license
and that he still maintains 30 unsold containers of
the chemical agent in his warehouse (ref B).


11. (SBU) Post is aware that there is a backlog of
outstanding PSV's for Syria which were intended to be
completed by a Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
Sentinel Team from USDOC. According to contacts at
BIS, three separate BIS Sentinel visits have been
planned in recent years to complete the outstanding
PSV's, however all of the trips were ultimately
cancelled. As a result, since SAA sanctions were
imposed, trained BIS criminal investigators have not
traveled to Syria to assess whether the end-use of
allowable commodities is legitimate, evaluate whether
commodities have been diverted to other end-users, or
collect evidence on potential sanctions violations.
While BIS hopes to send a Sentinel Team in the middle
of this year, the trip has not yet been approved.


12. (C) Comment: Without enforcement of the SAA trade
sanctions, Syrian businessmen who play by the rules
are being run out of business by those that openly
circumvent them. For sanctions to be most effective,
they should send the opposite message: that sanctions
will be enforced and violators will pay a price for
their actions. Additionally, a reduction in the
backlog of outstanding PSV's would discourage what we
suspect to be an increasing trend of false end-users
and tighten our counter-proliferation efforts in a
designated state sponsor of terrorism. Post strongly
encourages the visit of a BIS Sentinel Team with
investigative capabilities that could follow-up on
some of the anecdotal evidence that we have received.
End comment.
SECHE