REGIME SENSES SYRIA POLICY AT IMPASSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001186

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SY LE
SUBJECT: REGIME SENSES SYRIA POLICY AT IMPASSE

REF: DAMASCUS 1158

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings with Syria desk
officer March 13, two key contacts noted that the SARG
believes that U.S. policy towards Syria has reached an
impasse, and that the U.S. is in the process of changing its
approach. That shift will take six months, in their view,
during which the regime will likely continue to crack down
hard on any internal opposition and maintain its
confrontational posture regionally in ways likely to
exacerbate anti-American sentiment. Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and
XXXXXXXXXXXX, mavericks with assorted, sometimes
combative, ties to leadership figures, described the regime
as confident and relaxed. XXXXXXXXXXXX criticized U.S. policy
towards Syria and the region, noting that instead of
isolating the Islamists, the U.S. has created conditions that
have united Islamist nationalists and secular Arab
nationalists. On other issues, XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed the regime
may be considering an opening to the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood and described a new think tank he will head. End
Summary.


2. (C) CONTACTS SEE U.S. POLICY SHIFT COMING: XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX told visiting Syria desk officer
and Emboffs that they believe the U.S. policy shift has
already begun. In coming months, they expect the U.S. to
abandon its Syria policy of "no carrots/only demands," as
well as its larger regional policy of trying to roll back
Arab nationalism by establishing a pro-U.S. regime in Iraq.
During this period, the regime will feel free to crack down
internally and will flex its muscles regionally to
demonstrate its confidence. In this "vacuum between U.S.
policies," the SARG will seek to set in place a variety of
anti-American currents. Both men pointed to an emboldened
regime that, in XXXXXXXXXXXX 's words, "can burn down European
embassies," close the EU-sponsored human rights center, and
then welcome Spanish FM Moratinos to Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX also
pointed to the widely publicized "new redlines" (reftel) as a
troubling sign that the regime is planning for a repressive
period with no reforms.


3. (C) REGIME SEEN AS CONFIDENT, RELAXED: XXXXXXXXXXXX described
the regime as very confident and relaxed, as it savors what
it feels is a string of triumphs: Hamas' electoral victory;
rising influence in Lebanon (for example among the Sunnis in
the Sidon area, where he asserted that Sa'ad Hariri's
influence was waning); containing Brammertz and the UNIIIC
investigation; and successful diplomatic efforts with the
Saudis and Egyptians. On the Hamas victory, XXXXXXXXXXXX
elaborated that Syria will not play a major direct role but
will stay "in the shadows," seeking to benefit from the
rising Islamist influence in the territories and the downfall
of its nemesis, the Fatah-supported PA.


4. (C) U.S POLICY CRITICIZED AS SELF-DEFEATING: Speaking
more critically of U.S. foreign policy than he has in the
past, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed disappointment that the U.S. has
driven Syria in a direction not good for the country, but
very good for the regime. The regime senses that the U.S.
has played its hand very badly, using its war on terror in a
counterproductive way. Instead of isolating the Islamists
and creating the kind of dynamic social ferment and gradual
upheaval that was evident in the USSR and Eastern Europe in
the mid- and late-1980's, the U.S. has created conditions
that have united, in Syria at least, Islamist nationalists
and secular Arab nationalists. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , the
U.S. has succeeded in making Syria a hero in the Islamic
world. U.S. support for the opposition has not been
effective The fact that Ba'ath Party thugs, with some
security services support, could beat up a group of
opposition activists, intellectuals, and cultural figures
peacefully protesting the continuation of Emergency Law was a
far more important signal than the USD five million that the
U.S. set aside to support the opposition, noted XXXXXXXXXXXX .


5. (C) A REGIME OPENING TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD? Touching
on other subjects, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the imposition of
Section 311 sanctions is having no impact and they are not
being taken seriously. He said the regime is wagering "at
much higher levels," placing strategic bets on Hamas,
Hizballah, and Iran. On a much more speculative note, he
said he had picked up signals that the regime may be
considering an opening to the Muslim Brotherhood, as a way to
transform a potential threat to the regime into a tool to
shore it up and encourage greater anti-Americanism. XXXXXXXXXXXX
reported that emissaries from the MB came to Damascus from
London a few weeks ago, including a relative of MB
leader-in-exile Bayanouni. XXXXXXXXXXXX reiterated that U.S.
policies had created ripe conditions for such an opening.
XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that some consideration was being given to
canceling Law 49, the provision making membership in the MB a
capital offense. (Comment: While we have heard occasional
reports of such a SARG initiative in the past, they have not
proceeded very far, primarily because of deep-seated regime
hostility to what it views as its most serious potential
threat.) On a related note, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the
regime, with its carefully modulated policies supporting
Hamas, PIJ, and Sunni groups in Iraq, as well as Hizballah in
Lebanon, has made sure that the Islamists in Syria "have no
case" to make against the regime.


6. (C) A NEW THINK TANK AND MU'ALLIM'S PROSPECTS: XXXXXXXXXXXX
noted that he has launched a new think tank that will include
"all political currents in Syria." He described FM (then
Deputy FM) Walid Mu'allim as the driving force behind the
center. In previous conversations, XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized the
project as designed to counter some of the hard-line advice
being provided to the President by Hisham Ikhtiyar and a
center he launched while head of the General Intelligence
Directorate (and apparently continues to oversee). On a
related note, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Bashar al-Asad has become
much more ideological and less pragmatic in orientation.
Regarding XXXXXXXXXXXX mentor Mu'allim's promotion to Foreign
Minister, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed doubt that it would have much
impact on policy. While Mu'allim is savvy enough to get
control over the MFA bureaucracy relatively soon, he "will be
sandwiched in by the two Hourani spies," VP Farouk a-Shara'a
and DFM Faisal Mikdad. More importantly, the MFA has never
been in charge of key policies, primarily the purview of the
security services. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted the particularly important
role that Mohammed Nassif Khairbek had played in the past
over policies involving Hamas, Hizballah, Lebanon, and Iran,
often shored up by the selective use of money, corrupt
influence, and violence. XXXXXXXXXXXX offered a very ambivalent
view of Nassif's current status, claiming he still wielded
influence but suffered from occasional bouts of "dementia."



7. (C) Comment: Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX are secular
intellectuals with ties of various shadings with the regime.
Both have consistently spoken to us about the need for U.S.
engagement with the SARG. XXXXXXXXXXXX exceptionally critical
view of U.S. foreign policy is new and likely represents a
reaction to the success of hard-line Syrian policies that he
and his friend Mu'allim have consistently struggled to
counter over the past several years. The increasing
sharpness in tone may reflect his frustration that his views
have fallen into disfavor for the time being and that
hard-line advocates seem to be crowing that their views are
paying big dividends for Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX most salient point
is that those hard-line policies could pay dividends for the
regime and still lead Syria down a dead-end path of no
reform, no engagement with the West, and increasingly
dangerous engagement with Islamist political currents likely
to erode further Syria's embattled secular identity. End
Comment.


SECHE