SYRIA-IRAN RELATIONS FLOURISHING; IS FURTHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001159

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY IR LE IZ
SUBJECT: SYRIA-IRAN RELATIONS FLOURISHING; IS FURTHER
IMPROVEMENT INEVITABLE?

REF: A. DAM 0775

B. MADRID 0568

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for reasons
1.4 b/d


1. (C) Summary: By official Syrian accounts, the country's
relationship with Iran has flourished since the January visit
of Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Damascus. Embassy
contacts largely dismiss the immediate economic benefit of
increased ties, but note that the two countries have formed
several committees to deal with political issues and
strengthen the bilateral relationship. They also underscore
the SARG's success in using Iran to strengthen its political
position in light of increasing U.S. pressure to isolate
Syria. The SARG is also using the relationship with Iran to
heighten Syria's regional influence, contacts assert.
Several contacts insisted that if the U.S. would engage with
Syria, the relationship with Iran would atrophy quickly,
since the SARG would have a much better chance of attaining a
key objective with the return of the Golan via negotiations
sponsored by the U.S. Despite the current flourishing of
relations between Syria and Iran, there may be areas where
Syrian and Iranian interests potentially diverge. End
summary.


2. (U) By official Syrian accounts, the country's
relationship with Iran has flourished since the January 19-20
visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Damascus.
A search of official Syrian media since the Ahmadinejad visit
produced a list of headlines highlighting political, economic
and cultural exchanges, including the Iranian VP's February
visit to Damascus as head of his side's representation of the
Syrian-Iranian Higher Economic Commission and the March visit
to Tehran by Syrian Assistant FM (the number three official
at the Foreign Ministry) Ahmad Arnous.


3. (C) Contacts have also recently told us about the
reported (but unconfirmed) formation of three Syrian-Iranian
committees: one to handle the financing of arms for Syria,
particularly given the SARG's inability to come up with ready
cash for military purchases from governments such as Russia;
the second to train Syrians in the use and refurbishment of
weapons, particularly Russian ones; and the third to handle a
request by the Iranians to inspect Russian-made missiles in
Syria's possession.


4. (C) Embassy contacts have not seen an immediate economic
benefit for Syria in the increasing ties (reftel A),but
analysts underscore political advantages for the regime
domestically and abroad. First, Syria has used its
burgeoning alliance with Iran to undermine the perception of
the international isolation of Syria, contacts say. Second,
Iran has indirectly helped ensure the Syrian regime's No. 1
domestic goal, which is survival, a point made by Al-Hayat
correspondent Ibrahim Hamidi to visiting Syria Desk Officer
Sita Sonty. Iran's long-standing support for Syria's special
ally in Lebanon, Hizballah, has helped Syria reassert its
influence there, after withdrawing its troops in April 2005.
Iran's efforts in Iraq, while more sustained and nuanced than
the SARG's, have mirrored SARG efforts to prevent any quick
realization of an American "project" for Iraqi
democratization and stability. Imagine if Lebanon and Iraq
had already undergone democratic elections and a quick,
smooth transition to Western-style democracy, leaving Syria
in the middle, Hamidi said. The Syrian regime would have
collapsed under the political pressure, he asserted.


5. (C) Domestically, the regime of Syrian President Bashar
al-Asad is stronger than ever, but it is using Iran to
heighten Syria's regional profile and influence, according to
contacts. French DCM Nicholas Suran made a similar point
with Desk Officer Sonty, citing Syria's successful use of
Iran to force Saudi re-engagement, despite Saudi anger over
the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri. When
it became clear that Syria and Iran were getting closer, the
Saudis reached out to the Syrians with an offer to help them
patch up the SARG's relations with Lebanon, the DCM said.
Syrian analyst Samir al-Taki confirmed that Syria would like
to serve as a key intermediary between Shiite Iran and
Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia and Egypt. "In the past, Syria
has served as a release valve at the intersection of
Saudi-Egypt tensions with Iran," he said. Advocates of a
new, pro-Iran policy want Syria to resume that role, he
added. Separately, as reported in Reftel B, strengthened
Syria-Iran ties may have also contributed to increased
Spanish interest in engagement with the SARG.


6. (C) Contacts disagree over the extent to which the
Syria-Iran relationship is tactical or strategic. This is not
just a tactical relationship, but a 20-year marriage that
will last, says an Egyptian diplomat. Others such as foreign
policy analyst Marwan Kabalan disagree, insisting that while
Iran is relying on Syria to expand its long-term strategic
influence in the region, the SARG is using Iran (as it uses
Hizballah) primarily as tactical leverage to achieve U.S.
engagement leading to a Middle East peace agreement, which
would include the return of the Golan Heights to Syria. Once
there is such a deal, Iran's political usefulness to the SARG
diminishes and the two countries' enormous religious and
sectarian differences have room to emerge, Kabalan asserted.
Foreign affairs analyst Imad Shuebi, who speaks regularly
with inner circle members of the regime, made similar points
in his meeting with the Desk Officer. Shuebi maintained
that, if the U.S. made some effort to maintain decent
relations with Syria, offering the opportunity for each side
to calculate rationally and preserve its regional interests,
Syria would not pursue close relations with Iran. As it is,
at the same time that the U.S. ignores any Syrian interests,
issuing instead endless lists of demands for Syrian action,
the U.S. maintains extremely close relations with Syria's No.
1 "enemy" Israel, Shuebi said. The Iranians, on the other
hand, "help us in the main regional struggle against Israel
and help us at a time of great pressure from the U.S., as we
attempt to get back our rights, our land," Shuebi said. He
added that if the U.S. would show more balance and broker
negotiations that could lead to peace between Syria and
Israel, Syria would not need Iran's support and would drift
into a more essentially pro-Western, pro-U.S. orbit. Syria
is also pursuing an enhanced relationship with Iran because
Iran is supportive of Syrian efforts to play an active
regional role, while the U.S. wants to prevent Syria from
having any regional influence, Shuebi said.


7. (C) Despite Egyptian discomfort over strengthened
Syria-Iran ties, the Egyptians do not have a set of "red
lines" specifically linked to that relationship, an Egyptian
diplomat stated. The Egyptians view with dismay what they
see as Iranian control of Iraq and increased influence in
Damascus, but the Egyptian Government's main goal is to avoid
further instability, the diplomat said.


8. (C) Comment: Although relations between the countries
are flourishing at present, there appear to be areas where
Syrian and Iranian interests potentially diverge. The two
sides' attitudes toward Hizballah are a case in point. Syria
approaches the Hizballah relationship tactically, and, if it
obtained a peace deal returning the Golan, it would likely be
willing to cut off its support for Hizballah. Iran has no
such land grievance with Israel that could be addressed by
negotiations and diplomatic give-and-take. Rather, it needs
Hizballah to project its influence in the Arab Middle East
and no confluence of developments is likely to change those
calculations or lead Iran to re-evaluate its support for
Hizballah. Iranian and Syrian interests in Iraq also seem to
diverge in critical ways despite their shared interests in
trying to block any perceived "American success" there. Of
course, as analysts here make clear, there are also interests
that bind the two countries. In the end, those interests may
predominate. It is not, however, at least at this juncture,
a relationship without some inherent internal tensions that
might be exploited to prevent it from emerging as a long-term
strategic threat.

SECHE