SARG REPORTEDLY SETS OUT THREE NEW RED LINES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001158

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: SARG REPORTEDLY SETS OUT THREE NEW RED LINES FOR
CIVIL SOCIETY

REF: DAMASCUS 01108

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b)/(d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: A recent newspaper article in the
influential regional Arab daily al-Hayat reported what is
described as the SARG's demarcation of three "new" red lines
for civil society activists, reflecting the regime's reaction
to events of the last week. The three lines include: a ban
on connections with foreign powers or participation in
opposition conferences abroad; a ban on street
demonstrations; and a ban on reporters publishing news
relating to security and military operations. In addition,
the decision by an investigatory judge to prosecute Kamal
Labwani on much more severe charges than originally sought,
as well as other recent developments, seems to be a clear
signal that the SARG is hardening its position. This
"re-coloring" of long-standing redlines is already having an
impact, as the SARG has begun to formally clamp down on our
interaction with long-time contacts. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) AL-HAYAT ARTICLE LAYS OUT THREE RED LINES FOR CIVIL
SOCIETY ACTIVISTS: A March 13 al-Hayat article by Ibrahim
Hamidi reports the existence of three new SARG-imposed red
lines for civil society activists: a prohibition on contact
with foreign governments (and a ban on participation in
opposition conferences abroad); a ban on "tangible action" in
the street (understood to mean sit-ins and other
demonstrations); and a ban on reporters publishing news
relating to security and military forces (other than official
statements.) Each reported red line appears linked to sets
of specific recent events: the foreign government
contacts/foreign conference ban seems to be a response to the
Syrian National Congress meeting in Washington, the Aspen
Institute meeting in Paris, and smaller human rights training
sessions recently held in Amman, as well as to the European
Commission-funded Civil Society Training Center (primarily a
human rights center, now closed by the SARG) and the recent
announcement of USD five million in MEPI funding for civil
society projects. The street demonstration ban (which has,
in fact, been in effect and rigorously enforced for years as
part of the Emergency Law's limitations on freedom of
assembly) is meant to serve as a reminder of the prohibition,
in the wake of the demonstrations held March 9 and 12 by
opposition members. The press ban on covering military and
security issues seems to represent a follow-up SARG response
to an an-Nahar article on Syrian Military Intelligence
reorganization. The SARG has already enforced these red
lines in recent weeks in actions ranging from closing the EC
Training Center to violently quelling the two peaceful
demonstrations, to arresting a number of activists, including
the Damascus-based an-Nahar journalist who wrote the SMI
article (ref A).


3. (C) SARG MAKING EXAMPLES OUT OF QURRABI AND LABWANI: The
SARG has also been quick to make examples out of two
activists who have participated in conferences and
discussions abroad. Arab Human Rights Organization spokesman
Ammar Qurrabi was detained by SMI upon his return to Syria,
after attending opposition conferences in the U.S. and Paris,
and was released several days later. Meanwhile, Kamal
Labwani, imprisoned since his November return from a visit to
the U.S. and Europe, now faces new legal charges that are
much more serious than the crimes with which he was
originally charged. Labwani's lawyer, Anwar al-Bunni, told
Poloff that the investigatory judge has decided to charge
Labwani with the offense of having contact with a foreign
power and encouraging the foreign power to invade Syria, a
charge which potentially carries a life sentence. Bunni
added that if the foreign power does indeed invade Syria,
Labwani could face execution. The SARG "wants to use him as
a bargaining chip with the U.S.," commented Bunni. In a
March 14 discussion, Labwani's wife and three children, who
had visited him that same day, told Poloff that Labwani had
been willing to "pay the price" of three or four years in
prison for engaging in discussions with the U.S., but that 20
years to life was a grim prospect and possibly more than he
could bear.


4. (C) The Labwani family now fears that the new charges will
paint Kamal as a traitor in eyes of the Syrian public and
bring to an end to any democratic opening he had created by
challenging the SARG. The Labwanis asked that the USG
"softly but firmly" press the SARG on their father's behalf
via diplomatic channels and attempt to have the charges
reduced. At the same time, they warned that pressing the
government too hard (either in diplomatic discussions or via
public statements) would cause the SARG to overestimate

Labwani's value to the USG and see him as a useful pawn for
bargaining purposes. They also encouraged the USG to
indirectly influence regional Arab media in making clear to
the Syrian public that Labwani had brought a message against
military intervention to the U.S.


5. (C) INDICATIONS OF SARG ENFORCEMENT OF RED LINES
REFLECTED IN POST INTERACTIONS: The enforcement of the new
red lines mirrors new efforts by the SARG to restrict both
travel and interactions with Syrian contacts by mission
staff. For example, MFA protocol officials insisted recently
that visiting Syria Desk Officer Sita Sonty could not meet
with certain Syrian contacts (e.g. Sheikh Salah Kuftaro, the
head of the Abu Noor Institute) until the MFA received a
diplomatic note and formally approved each meeting. In the
end, the MFA did not respond to the submitted dipnote request
for the meeting and informally informed us and Kuftaro that
the meeting was prohibited without such approval.
Subsequently, the MFA informed Kuftaro that he should not
meet with any Embassy officials, without approval from the
MFA.


6. (C) COMMENT: With its aggressive new re-coloring of red
lines and the iron-fisted reactions to recent events, the
SARG has made its new standard clear to any challengers.
This cementing of a clear anti-opposition stance, combined
with what was seen here as a weak UNIIIC interim report, will
only serve to increase the level of fear among civil society
activists and other opposition figures and their reluctance
to deepen their relationships with the USG. While a few
brave souls may still pursue MEPI funding, this new
environment will make the actual implementation of in-country
projects all the more difficult. The public re-assertion of
red lines also sends the message that the SARG feels
emboldened by its confrontational posture regarding Hamas,
Iran, Lebanon, and the "Mohammed caricatures" controversy,
and feels that the sustained spike in violence in Iraq has
distracted the U.S. and provided the regime with an
opportunity to hit back hard at an opposition/civil society
movement encouraged by signals of support from Washington in
order to remind activists of the limits of their foreign
protectors. END COMMENT.
SECHE