SARG'S NEW VP SHAR'A: PROMOTED OR MOVED ASIDE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001055

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY
SUBJECT: SARG'S NEW VP SHAR'A: PROMOTED OR MOVED ASIDE,
AND DOES IT MATTER?

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for
reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) Summary: Observers here express uncertainty about
the degree to which former FM Farouk al-Shara'a received a
promotion when President Bashar al-Asad moved him from the
Foreign Ministry to the Vice Presidency. One contact sees it
as a SARG signal that it is ready to re-engage with the U.S.
and the West when conditions improve. The dominant view is
that Shara'a will continue to exercise strong influence over
the direction of Syria's foreign policy for the foreseeable
future. The manner in which Asad took action seems to
indicate that policy differences between him and Shara'a were
less significant than imagined, especially as opponents to
engagement with the U.S. and the West gained the upper hand
in the regime. End Summary.


2. (C) Observers here express uncertainty about the degree
to which former FM Shara'a received a promotion when
President Asad moved him from the Foreign Ministry to the
Vice Presidency and promoted DFM Walid Mu'allim to FM.
Embassy contact Maan Abdul Salaam speculated that Asad had
two goals with the Shara'a-Mu'allim shuffle. Asad named
Shara'a VP as a reward and as an acknowledgment to the Syrian
public of Shara'a's long-time service to the Asad regime, he
said. Separately, Asad moved Mu'allim to the head of the MFA
as a signal that Syria was ready to re-engage with the U.S.
and the West when conditions for it improve, said Abdul
Salaam. Regime proxy and foreign policy analyst Imad Shueibi
also saw a pro-Western message in Asad's move. In his view,
the promotion of Mu'allim, known to be pragmatic and very
knowledgeable about the U.S., indicates that Asad wants to
re-engage with the U.S. Conversely, Shara'a's "promotion" is
a clear indication that he is being shelved, despite any
window dressing. He called Shara'a "a stupid man" who had
given bad advice to President Asad, including in the period
before the war with Iraq.


3. (C) Several contacts tell us that Shara'a is not going
gently into a pre-retirement sinecure. He is making
strenuous efforts to bulk up the staffing and influence of
the office of Vice President to help him maintain his foreign
policy influence. UNDP legal consultant Ghimar Deeb said on
March 6 that Shara'a "vacuumed" the MFA of direct phone
lines, cars and "80 percent of the best personnel" during the
move to his new post as Vice President. Mu'allim's son, who
works at UNDP with Deeb, has to call his father on his cell
phone because the new FM has no direct line into his office,
Deeb said.


4. (C) Shar'a's success in placing his protg and cousin,
former Syrian PermRep to the UN, Faisal Mikdad, as Deputy
Foreign Minister, also allows Shara'a to stay on top of any
moves by Mu'allim to eliminate his grasp over the MFA, at
least for the short term. (Note: Mikdad, like Shar'a, is
from Dar'a.) Shueibi described Mikdad as a Shara'a clone but
expressed the hope that "he can learn." (Comment: Mu'allim
is at retirement age, heightening the expectation that
Mikdad, a fellow Sunni, is ideally positioned to succeed
elder statesman Mu'allim when he vacates the post in a few
years.)


5. (C) Under Mu'allim, any MFA reform would be aimed at
improving the Ministry's performance and modernizing the
bureaucracy rather than changing key Syrian foreign policies,
contacts tell us. Some contacts assert that Shara'a's
continued influence at the MFA will likely stymie any reform
efforts for another year or so, until his influence and
contacts there wane as Mu'allim asserts himself. UNDP
officials hope that with Mu'allim's promotion they will
eventually be able to revamp the Ministry's structure,
including changes in how Syrian diplomats are selected, Deeb
said. Every two years, the SARG administers a written and
oral exam for the diplomatic service, but the real selection
criteria are candidates' personal connections, Deeb said.
Mu'allim and UNDP officials had spoken in the past about a
joint project to modernize the MFA bureaucracy, but Shara'a
had opposed such a move, said Deeb, noting that the MFA's
convoluted pay and personnel structure also complicated a
reorganization.


6. (C) COMMENT: Internal and external critics have long
singled out Shara'a as the source of failed SARG policies,
particularly in regard to Lebanon after the humiliating
withdrawal of Syrian forces from its long-dominated neighbor.
Criticism of Shara'a's performance from inside Syria reached
a crescendo in the period between October to December of last
year, between the issuance of the two Mehlis reports. Since
January, however, much of that criticism has dissipated as it
became clear that Syria had adopted -- and seemed to be
benefiting from -- a relatively hard-line posture that
reflected Shara'a's long-established positions. Nonetheless,
there remained lingering reservations from inside the regime
about Shara'a's lack of PR skills, as evidenced in the
unnecessary embarrassment he caused the regime in his
mid-December UN dust-up with British FM Jack Straw, over the
second Mehlis report. Asad eventually chose a moment when he
faced the least amount of pressure on the issue to ease
Shara'a out of the MFA, as part of an expected cabinet
reshuffle, and offer him a long, respectful good-bye. The
manner in which Asad took action seems to indicate that
policy differences between the two were less significant than
imagined, or that they diminished as opponents to engagement
with the U.S. and the West gained the upper hand in the
regime. Shara'a's lengthy exit from foreign policy
decision-making via the Vice Presidency also seems to point
to an Asad management style that prizes loyalty and seeks
where possible to make decisions that might be favorably
viewed in the West at a moment of relative strength so as to
avoid the appearance of acting under duress.

SECHE