Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS1014
2006-03-08 11:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

IN THE FACE OF SECTION 311 SANCTIONS, SYRIA

Tags:  ECON EFIN EINV PTER SANC SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0064
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 001014 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA/ELA
TREASURY FOR GLASER/SZUBIN/LEBENSON
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV PTER SANC SY
SUBJECT: IN THE FACE OF SECTION 311 SANCTIONS, SYRIA
FEELING THE SQUEEZE

REF: DMS 6224

Classified By: CDA Kathy Johnson-Casares, reasons 1.4 b/d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 001014

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA/ELA
TREASURY FOR GLASER/SZUBIN/LEBENSON
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV PTER SANC SY
SUBJECT: IN THE FACE OF SECTION 311 SANCTIONS, SYRIA
FEELING THE SQUEEZE

REF: DMS 6224

Classified By: CDA Kathy Johnson-Casares, reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) Summary: As we move to impose sanctions against the
Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS) under USAPATRIOT Act Section
311, it has become increasingly clear that the threat of
sanctions succeeded in making it difficult for Syrian public
financial institutions to conduct business with foreign
banks. Most of the established European banks are decreasing
their business with Syria in anticipation of sanctions, and
the CBS increasingly is using smaller banks to handle its
transactions and foreign reserves. Most contacts state that
the SARG's decision to conduct all public transactions in
euros is an inadequate defense against sanctions because most
European banks do not want to assume the risk of doing
business with the CBS in any currency. Contacts do warn,
however, that the threat of sanctions also has made it
difficult for Syria's private banks to operate, and that
imposition of the final rule against the CBS for money
laundering under Section 311 may result in further isolating
them from European markets. Further, it may actually
increase the flow of funds through the informal sector as
people choose hawaladars (moneychangers) to circumvent
barriers in formal channels. End summary.

--------------
European Banks Hedge Their Bets
--------------


2. (C) Under the threat of Section 311 sanctions, banking
sector contacts suggest that European banks are being much
more cautious in their business dealings with Syria to avoid
jeopardizing their more lucrative business with US financial
institutions. A diplomat at the French Embassy stated that
over the past six months, several French companies have
complained that French banks are refusing to confirm letters
of credit (LC) issued by the CBS. Fabrice Ferandes, an
economist at the EC Mission in Damascus, stated that the
requirement under 311 for banks that do business with US

financial institutions to increase due diligence on
transactions involving the CBS has dampened European banks'
enthusiasm for maintaining a high profile in Syria or taking
on new Syrian business. Although Syria now has six private
banks, the CBS still dominates the Syrian market. According
to SARG statistics from 2005, the CBS issued $1.5 billion in
LCs, and handled $8 billion in deposits, dwarfing Syria's
nascent private banking sector, which has a total
capitalization of just over $300 million.


3. (C) Swiss bank UBS AG's January 22 announcement that it
was stopping all present and future business with the CBS has
been the most public manifestation of this unease. However,
after the Director General of the CBS, Duraid Durgham,
publicly refuted the announcement, claiming that the CBS
still maintains correspondent relations with the Swiss bank,
contacts suggest that the UBS move was more of a hedge than a
dramatic new development. A Swiss diplomat stated that UBS
has not necessarily changed its official stance, commenting
that the Swiss bank had decided to stop doing business with
the CBS and Syrian politically exposed persons (PEP) almost
two years ago. He further said that he was informed that UBS
may have shifted its Syrian accounts to Julius Baer, another
large Swiss bank in which UBS is a primary shareholder. He
postulated that UBS may not have terminated the relationship
with CBS altogether, but instead may have moved its CBS and
PEP accounts to Baer, although he emphasized that he does not
know the amount or type of business that was transferred.


4. (C) However, contacts do say that UBS has become more
cautious about engaging in Syrian business, public or
private. George Sayegh, General Manager of Bank of Syria and
Overseas (BSO),one of six private banks in Syria, informed
Post that the UBS agent in Beirut recently refused to take
his dollar-denominated transaction, telling Sayegh that he
would have to check with the head office for clearance on
this and future transactions. The same Swiss diplomat
mentioned above stated that the bank's head office recently
waited until the last minute to confirm sponsorship of a
cultural event presented by the Swiss Embassy and the SARG,

DAMASCUS 00001014 002 OF 003


even though it had agreed in principle months in advance.
The diplomat stated that it was clear from his correspondence
with bank officials that UBS wanted to avoid too close an
association with Syria.


5. (C) Sayegh stated that other large, well-established
European banks are refusing to accept dollar-denominated fund
transfers from Syria, or from accounts that BSO holds in
other European banks, unless the transfer first runs through
New York. Sayegh, whose bank holds 95% of its foreign
currency in dollars, said that European bankers have told him
that they do not want to assume the risk and cost of delays
associated with having to run the dollars through New York
themselves. Sayegh said, however, that he still can do
business in Europe although the ease of the transactions
often depends upon the bank and the country. He said, for
example, that London banks tend to refuse his business more
often than banks in Paris, Milan or Frankfurt. Nabil
Hchaime, General Manager of Bank BEMO Saudi Fransi, the
second private bank to open in Syria, admitted that BEMO
often uses its parent bank in Lebanon as a bridge to foreign
financial institutions in order to avoid the problems that
BSO described. Hchaime stated that the bank has run
transactions through BEMO in Lebanon at the request of his
Syrian customers.

--------------
Switch to Euros- Too Little, Too Late
--------------


6. (C) In order to avoid problems of moving dollars in the
international financial system, the SARG announced in
February that it would conduct all future public entity
transactions in euros instead of dollars. Contacts in the
private banking and financial sector were immediately
dismissive of the announcement, and scoffed that switching to
euros would not protect the Syrian economy or banking system,
but instead further complicate SARG transactions. Dr. Aymen
Midani, an independent Syrian economist, stated that even if
future contracts and payments are denominated in euros, the
dollar remains the Syrian economy's main point of reference.
The SARG still receives significant numbers of dollars from
the sale of commodities like cotton and oil that are priced
in dollars on the world market. Other contacts contend that
Syria still holds the majority of its reserves in dollars,
and that a previous plan to convert to a basket of currencies
has not been implemented. Therefore, contacts say, the SARG
first will have to buy euros with its accumulated dollars,
taking on an additional exchange risk while at the same time
not avoiding a dollar transaction.


7. (C) Contacts suggest that the CBS could have trouble
establishing correspondent relationships with foreign banks,
even using euros. Hchaime claimed that BEMO's European
headquarters has refused to handle Syrian public accounts,
and that other established European banks are following suit.
As a result, the SARG increasingly is conducting its
transactions and placing its reserves with less established,
higher risk banks in secondary markets. Highlighting this
trend, Hchaime related how an official with the Central Bank
recently requested that BEMO disburse $1 million in euros to
pay the first capital installment for three newly licensed
cement factories. Though Hchaime agreed, the official
initially was unable to provide Hchaime with the name of a
correspondent bank to which BEMO should transfer the funds.
The official called back three hours later, Hchaime claimed,
requesting that BEMO transfer the Euros to a small Italian
bank in Rome that Hchaime had not heard of previously and
declined to name.

--------------
Possible Implications of 311
--------------


8. (C) Contacts have alluded to two potential negative
outcomes from the imposition of Section 311 sanctions. One,
Syria's private banks, like the state-owned CBS, may be
forced to switch their business from the old, established
banks in Europe to less reliable ones if US action motivates
European banks to decrease their Syrian business further.

DAMASCUS 00001014 003 OF 003


Sayegh pointed out that he plans to turn east toward Gulf
banks if Section 311 sanctions further degrade his bank's
access to the European market. Like BSO, the SARG reportedly
feels it has other options as well. In addition to potential
financial partners in the Gulf, the recent announcement that
Iran and Syria plan to develop a joint public sector bank to
finance investment in Syria may indicate a first step in this
trend away from Western financial institutions.


9. (C) Two, the imposition of 311 may drive financial
transactions underground, reversing a gradual trend toward
the formal sector that started with the establishment of
private banks at the end of 2003. Sayegh stated that Iraqi
banks, for instance, are having difficulty paying Syrian
traders for exports because US financial institutions are
refusing to transfer funds to Syria. Sayegh commented that
more and more business deals between Syria and Iraq are being
conducted in cash, and that he has heard of attempts to
smuggle large sums of cash money across the border to finance
legitimate trade deals.


10. (C) Mazen Tabaa, the agent for Western Union in Syria,
complained that the threat of 311 sanctions so far has made
his business unprofitable. He stated that the Western Union
regional headquarters in Dubai is not allowing him to access
the company's fund transfer software for fear of OFAC action,
and he spends more on faxes and paperwork than he earns in
fees. He added that he has witnessed an increase in business
for the unregulated hawaladars in Syria, as bankers and
traders seek alternative ways to move money. He alleged that
the black market moneychanger and hawaladar Sahloul, aka abu
Shafiq, who is the preferred moneychanger for regime
insiders, is one of the primary beneficiaries of this trend
(ref). Tabaa claims that Sahloul, as a sub-agent for Western
Union in Jordan, is in effect &smuggling8 business out of
Syria by taking fund transfer requests in Damascus and
disbursing funds from Amman.


11. (C) Comment: Post expects that the imposition of Section
311 sanctions will strengthen the trends mentioned above: (1)
the continued disengagement of European banks from Syria; and
(2) an increase in transactions through the informal
financial sector as formal channels are restricted. However,
it is unlikely that these developments will cause the SARG to
reevaluate its present course. The SARG's recent adoption of
the euro for public sector transactions was widely perceived
as more of a political jab at the US than an economic act.
Therefore, the SARG likely will view the imposition of
Section 311 sanctions at this time as a further hardening of
the US position, especially given the SARG's perception that
it made a good faith effort to meet our 16 demands and avoid
sanctions.
JOHNSON-CASARES