Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAKAR681
2006-03-16 16:25:00
SECRET
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

A (MERCIFULLY BRIEF) HISTORY OF VIOLENCE

Tags:  PINS PGOV PINR ASEC CASC SG 
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VZCZCXRO6832
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0681/01 0751625
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 161625Z MAR 06 ZDK RUEHPC CTG SVC ONLY
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4602
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0759
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0101
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0622
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 000681 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/W, INR/AA, AND DS/IP/ITA
PARIS FOR D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/16
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PINR, ASEC, CASC, SG
SUBJECT:A (MERCIFULLY BRIEF) HISTORY OF VIOLENCE

REF: DAKAR 1243

DAKAR 00000681 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER, FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 000681

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/W, INR/AA, AND DS/IP/ITA
PARIS FOR D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/16
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PINR, ASEC, CASC, SG
SUBJECT:A (MERCIFULLY BRIEF) HISTORY OF VIOLENCE

REF: DAKAR 1243

DAKAR 00000681 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER, FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Senegal is rightly known as an orderly place of
dialog and consensus, but its elections have not always
been without incident. Concern at possible unrest or
repression in the coming presidential and legislative
campaigns has been sparked by four events: a new book
tracing political violence since Independence; unruly
student protests in Dakar and Saint Louis and a forceful
police reaction; mutual charges of political thuggery
between President Wade and a prominent leftist ex-ally;
and tensions or in one case serious roughhousing between
rival factions of Wade's ruling Democratic Party of
Senegal (PDS). END SUMMARY.

BRINGING THE PRESIDENT TO BOOK
--------------
2. (C) Marcel Mendy, author of two books on Wade's rise
and first years in power (Reftel),has just published "La
Violence Politique au Senegal: de 1960 a 2003." Mendy
works for the Interior Ministry, and his book is written
in carefully measured nuance.

3. (U) Mendy argues that violence has erupted usually
at specific stages in Senegal's electoral process:

-- 1) During "leadership renewal" (renouvellement des
instances de base),when parties sell membership cards
that provide the right to select leaders from
neighborhood to village, borough, department, regional
and national levels. Battles between "tendencies" in the
ruling party tend to be especially fierce;
-- 2) "Investiture" of candidates for parliament,
which gives party factions a last chance to compete for
top jobs;
-- 3) A one-month campaign offers the possibility of
conflict, although in fact Mendy's survey provides few
examples of violence at this stage; and,
-- 4) Election results have been followed either by
an immediate wave of opposition protest violence, as in
the presidential election of 1988; or by a months-long
series of incidents which may or may not have been
directly li
nked to the election outcome, as in 1993-94.

4. (C) We asked Mendy over lunch about his analysis and
prognosis for the coming election and found that in
private he is scathing and pessimistic. He believes
overt violence is inherent in Senegal's personality-based
(or "clientelist") politics, that this campaign or its
aftermath could be violent, but that violence will
probably not come from the opposition. While Socialist
and leftist leaders have warned loudly that they will
"take to the streets" in case they conclude the election
was unfair, he discounts their ability or willingness to
do so. "Socialists," he says, after 40 years in power,
"are all meek accountants or office managers."

5. (S) In contrast, Mendy explains, PDS leaders "have
come in off the street. They have no other careers or
prospects. Losing a government post means losing
everything, and they will not tolerate it." Wade and
the PDS, moreover, have always considered violence
appropriate to their political arsenal, he contends, and
have kept gangs of ruffians to do the rough work.
(Wade's well-known "calots bleus" were largely integrated
into police or gendarmerie after 2000, but some were
recruited as bodyguards by local PDS bosses.) Wade would
probably not order violence, Mendy says, and it remains
to be seen if he would allow or discourage it, but the
problem is that, once PDS violence starts, Wade "will not
be able to stop it even if he wants to."

SOMETHING ROTTEN ON CAMPUS
--------------
6. (SBU) The March 2 cover of "Nouvel Horizon,"
Senegal's main newsmagazine is entitled "Why the
University is Burning." It features a lone, helmeted
gendarme with tear gas grenade launcher, standing tense
and at the ready on a nearly deserted street strewn with
rocks and bricks with fire and billowing smoke in the
distance. In fact, student protest, with heavy rock
throwing, proceeded in two waves. The first provoked

DAKAR 00000681 002.2 OF 004


hardly any police reaction save an attempt to protect
nearby main roads. In the second, however, students were
by most accounts more unuly than they have been in
years. Some antagonied police (dropping boiling water
on them, for eample),and police reacted with an unusual
degreeof force, causing numerous injuries including some
serious ones. Sympathy protests were held in Sant
Louis, and police response there was muscularas well.

7. (U) The immediate cause of the prtests was a
complaint that the campus cafeteria's meat was spoiled
and "covered with worms." Daka's campus, built for
6,000 students, now has 47,500. Campus housing, with
beds for 5,200, now holds over 20,000: there is said to
be "sub-letting of bed or floor space." In large classes
throughout the Faculties of Letters, Law and Management,
students must often stand for lectures. The Faculties of
Medicine and Pharmacy are also said to be deteriorating.

8. (C) In tandem with infrastructure deficiencies,
there is deepening politicization. In the past, student
politics was relatively simple: each party had its
militants. Interior Minister NGom seems to believe the
old model holds true. With the opposition in mind, he
declared: "There is clearly serious reason to believe the
student movement has been infiltrated and taken over.
Clandestine forces have made student movements their
instruments in order to achieve, for undisclosed ends,
the destabilization of authority." Students and others
on campus doubt that NGom understands what is happening.

9. (C) University Ombudsman, Bouba Diop, formerly head
of the CONGAD umbrella group of NGO's, is charged with
reconciling different and competing campus interests.
Yet Diop tells us there is no single association with
authority to negotiate on students' behalf. Politics is
amorphous, disorganized, dispersed... about the only such
word he did not use was chaotic. Student rivalries are
cross-cutting: faculty versus faculty, religious versus
secular, political party versus party, and, extremely
severe, between warring factions of the ruling PDS.
Overall, campus life has degraded into "a culture of
violence." A Diop colleague adds that ruffians are
readily available on campus: protesters, like other
Senegalese, sometimes employ unemployed wrestlers as
bodyguards, he says, while other groups, mostly but not
exclusively enrolled students, study martial arts to use
during protests or competition for campus influence. For
PDS MP and professors' union head Ngokhobaye Diouf,
campus congestion "concentrates violence in the student's
blood."

10. (S) What most Senegalese who know the university
agree on is that the campus PDS is badly splintered, to
some extent reflecting the split between Wade and ex-PM
Idrissa Seck, and that the PDS has lost whatever campus
control it had at the start of Wade's presidency. The
founder and long-time leader of PDS university and youth
movements, ex-Minister of Environment Mamadou Diagne
Fada, lamented to us that PDS students now reflect
national-level factional divides. The university, he
predicted, must and will be aided financially to get
through this school year, because "2007 will be turbulent
on campus, and the government cannot allow two "annees
blanches" (cancelled school years) in a row.

ONE-TIME ALLIES TRADE RECRIMINATIONS
--------------
11. (C) Wade charged that student protests were
inspired by the Opposition in complicity with an unnamed
country that everyone quickly figured out meant Laurent
Gbagbo's Cote d'Ivoire. Almost no one believed the
foreign-hand accusation, and it was clear Wade was
fingering his long-time leftist ally Abdoulaye Bathily.

12. (C) Bathily responded quickly, but to avoid charges
of libeling the Chief of State, he penned an open letter
to "PDS Secretary General Wade." After denying he had
organized current campus protests, Bathily said that in
1988, he opposed PDS booby-trapping of cars and tracts
"calling for armed forces insurrection." In 1989, he
accused Wade, "without consulting (coalition allies),you
called for fighting forces of order with machetes, stones
and bicycle chains." Recalling the 1994 killing of a
constitutional judge and 2003 beating of a young critic,
Bathily concluded, "observations I have made of your road
to power, and notably your way of treating adversaries of

DAKAR 00000681 003.2 OF 004


the moment, lead me to believe that henchmen who have
targeted me for the last two years are ... not acting in
isolation or on their own initiative," but that they are
"orchestrated by a master's hand."

13. (S) Over lunch, Bathily and Wade's long-time Labor
Minister Yero De, emphasized that Wade was accustomed to
using force, and that he would allow or even order
supporters to "do anything necessary" to hold onto power
if the PDS loses the coming presidential election.

EXORCISM IN THE PDS
--------------
14. (C) There are numerous fault lines within the PDS,
including: a) Idrissa Seck's fans versus his enemies; b)
old-line PDS loyalists versus Socialist turn-coats whom
Wade has co-opted with senior government positions or
parliamentary seats; c) local rivalries at the city or
regional level that have little to do with national
loyalties; and, increasingly, d) serious differences
between PM Macky Sall and the machine he is trying to
establish, versus a line-up of old-time Wade intimates.

15. (C) PDS "renewal," or selection of new leaders, is
not going smoothly, but few are surprised by the problems
PM Macky Sall is having bringing local bosses to heel.
He was, for example, blocked by a coalition of powerful
local PDS barons from changing local structures in Saint
Louis. At least Sall has not been chased from the
podium, as happened to Dakar Regional Council President
Abdoulaye Faye when he tried to manage renewal in Thies.
A chair-throwing mano-a-mano between Wade's people and
Seck's hometown fans led to dissolution of the Thies PDS,
a move even Sall had to admit was "extreme." There has
also been some untoward internal PDS scuffling at Dakar's
tony Meridien Hotel, and in Ziguinchor, invasion of a PDS
session by a rival faction's toughs "sent everyone
running in an every-man-for-himself."

16. (S) Ex-Minister Fada told us he was ousted from the
cabinet because "neutrality was not enough" for those who
demanded that he denounce his "good friend Idrissa" Seck.
The press talks of anti-Seck "falcons" around Wade, Fada
said, but there are really only two: PM Sall and Wade's
son Karim. With sophisticated contempt, Fada described
Sall's attempts to renew the PDS as contrary to law and
PDS practice and without regard to those who fought for
so long for Abdoulaye Wade. "Who says," he demanded
rhetorically, "that Macky Sall has the right to head the
party, while Aminata Tall, Assembly President Pape Diop
and I are left outside?" (Tall "resigned" her Ministry
March 14 after bitter exchanges with the PM.) Fada
foresees disappointed PDS loyalists simply staying home
during the elections, and said there is speculation that
a new Liberal party could be formed outside the PDS.

COMMENT
--------------
17. (S) Fortunately for Senegal, predictions or threats
of violence are more frequent than violence itself.
Senegalese, though, are political hypochondriacs who love
to fret about possible post-election violent scenarios
that include: a) Wade wins the presidency but loses
Parliament, leading to a period of government stasis and
opposition attempts to weaken Wade by taking to the
streets; b) Wade wins Parliament and Presidency in what
is perceived to be a rigged election; opposition protests
are reinforced by popular discontent; and Ousmane NGom's
Interior Ministry uses force at its disposal to restore
calm; or, c) in the worse case scenario, Wade loses the
Presidency; PDS hard-line ministers use force to retain
power; and Wade permits them free rein or tries but fails
to restrain them. None of these pessimistic scenarios
reflects or even allows for Wade's long-term commitment
to democratic governance and free elections.

18. (S) What we can expect over the next year are more
bitter disputes within the PDS and possibly some
physicality during current organizational "renewals" or
when parliamentary candidates are chosen toward the end
of the year. In areas where Seck's fans are strong, like
Thies, factional violence is possible but should not
greatly affect community peace. Aminata Tall is a wild
card in the process. Interior Minister Ousmane NGom and
Justice Minister Cheikh Tidjane Sy also have roles to
play. More probable is intensified protest or conflict
at a Dakar university campus increasingly characterized

DAKAR 00000681 004.3 OF 004


by uncontrolled growth, inadequate budgets, an unable-to-
cope management, proliferation of uncoordinated and
competing student political groups, a religious
component, and gestation of a "culture of violence" in a
small confined space.

19. (S) If the government approaches the university as
a social order problem to be resolved, it no doubt has
the capacity and even the funding to start working toward
a solution. There is concern though, that Wade and PM
Sall will instead see virtually everything over the next
year through the prism of elections and the search for
political advantage.
Jackson