Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAKAR2979
2006-12-19 14:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

OPPOSITION SEEMS BENT ON SELF-DESTRUCTION

Tags:  PGOV PINS SOCI PINR KDEM SG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8882
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #2979/01 3531407
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191407Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7121
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 002979 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL/AE AND INR/AA
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS SOCI PINR KDEM SG
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION SEEMS BENT ON SELF-DESTRUCTION

REF: A. DAKAR 2940

B. DAKAR 2271

C. DAKAR 2001

D. 05 DAKAR 2311

CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 002979

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL/AE AND INR/AA
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS SOCI PINR KDEM SG
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION SEEMS BENT ON SELF-DESTRUCTION

REF: A. DAKAR 2940

B. DAKAR 2271

C. DAKAR 2001

D. 05 DAKAR 2311

CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) At lunchtime December 18, two opposition leaders told us by
phone they are preparing to announce that the opposition will run
multiple presidential candidates and two separate legislative lists.
The Socialists may coalesce with ex-Prime Minister Idrissa Seck, who
plans to return to Dakar today. Ambition, vanity and stubbornness over
tactics have rent an opposition that had promised to restore "humility
and coherence" to government. Meanwhile, the Government has shown its
understanding of gerrymandering, and there is continued speculation
about possible election violence. END SUMMARY

A GOOD START ...
--------------

2. (C) Socialist Party (PS) leader Tanor Dieng and one-time Socialist
Moustapha Niasse have been discussing a deal on election strategy for
over a year (Ref D). To avoid friction, the two would agree on the
need to reduce presidential power and enhance prime ministerial
authority in a semi-parliamentary system. Niasse would take one of the
jobs, Tanor the other. The question remained open, however, whether
they would unite behind a single candidate for the first round or run
separately and unite only for the second round after determining who
was stronger. Throughout the year, the two worked with Abdoulaye
Bathily, Amath Dansokho and others to strengthen the opposition's
"Popular Coalition for an Alternative? (CPA). In October, the CPA
issued a common program. Marked by compromise language but still
somewhat daring, it proposed 77 measures for change, including a
stronger prime minister and parliament, guarantees of separation of
powers, bolstering the judicial branch and especially the
constitutional court, greater transparency and general audit of state
finances, etc.


3. (C) Serigne MBaye Thiam, the Socialists' drafter in the CPA, told

us the program represented a conviction that Wade had undermined
democratic institutions with his "party-state and personalized state."
Thiam emphasized the pressing need for effective checks and balances,
meaning a parliament with real powers and a constitutional court that
would prevent the President from manipulating law and the constitution.
The problem, Thiam lamented, was that opposition leaders still could
not agree on either a candidate or an electoral strategy; a December 18
meeting would decide whether they would campaign together or separately

THE SOCIALIST BREAK-APART CONTINUES
--------------

4. (C) Khalifa Sall, the inexhaustible and often irascible Socialist
hard-liner, joined us December 12, battle weary from heated
negotiations with would-be allies. Tanor Dieng, he said, faced two
difficult and simultaneous challenges. First, his intra-party rival,
Ziguinchor Mayor Robert Sagna, is running an independent presidential
campaign, and Tanor would need to hold candidate selection caucuses in
key cities to solidify his position as Socialist leader. Meanwhile,
within the CPA, Niasse was "blackmailing" colleagues by demanding that
he be the opposition's sole presidential candidate.


5. (C) Still managing to accentuate the positive, Sall argued that
while "the CPA has a leadership problem in presidential elections, it
has strategic choices in the parliamentary vote." Wade had
miscalculated in raising the National Assembly's size from 120 to 150,
Sall claimed, since that opened the way for the opposition to win up to
75 of 90 seats in 18 of the country's 30 administrative departments.
Add to that seats allotted proportionally, and the CPA could dominate
the Assembly. Even if Wade won re-election, the CPA could live quite
well with cohabitation, seizing more legislative powers and letting
Wade live "the easy life of head of state."


6. (C) Sall warned, though, that Wade had formed a "task force" to
assure he would not lose, with son Karim, Prime Minister Macky Sall,
Dakar Regional Council President Abdoulaye Faye, Agriculture Minister
Farba Senghor, presidential chef de cabinet Pape Samba Diop and
sometimes cabinet director Soulaymane Ndeme Ndiaye. They had formed
two groups of young toughs. The first, "voltigeurs? (acrobats),would
circulate on election day among voting stations to help Wade backers
vote multiple times. If the vote appears to be going badly for Wade,
then at about 5:00 PM other gangs will start disrupting the vote in key
centers such as Dakar, Ziguinchor or Kaolack. To counter Wade's
expected use of tricks and force, the CPA is organizing an "anti-fraud
brigade" and, Sall added with just a hint of bluff, its own armed
gangs. The problem's crux, he stressed, was that Wade's people will
vote multiple times and the confused and incomplete electoral lists
will allow them to. The only way to avert fraud and violence, he
pleaded, is for the U.S. to convince the Interior Ministry to buy and
use indelible ink to mark voters' hands.

DAKAR 00002979 002 OF 003



AT A STRATEGIC IMPASSE
--------------

7. (C) Amath Dansokho, who engineered the strategy that made Wade
president in 2000, broke away from the December 13 opposition coalition
to lunch with us. A cell phone in one hand and fork in the other,
betwixt instructions to allies and appeals to rivals, Dansokho and
labor leader Ibrahima Sene admitted to us they were probably not going
to achieve a unified CPA strategy. Others were blaming Moustapha
Niasse, but the real spoiler was Abdoulaye Bathily, who insisted on
running as president, though he could not win more than three percent
of the vote, in order to enhance his influence in negotiating for the
election second round. This was tragic given the nation's severe
needs. "What Senegalais want above all," Dansokho argued, "was
political and governmental coherence, but if the opposition does not
offer it, they'll stick with Wade because they don't want any
adventures." The way to provide this coherence is to start with the
CPA's common program, but build upon it with a team ready to move into
the presidency, premiership, and the chairs of both National Assembly
and Council of the Republic.

OUR FUTURE HAS NEVER BEEN SO UNREADABLE
--------------

8. (C) After the CPA deadlocked and adjourned ?till the weekend,
Niasse's number two, Madienga Diouf, spent two hours with us without
mentioning his boss's name a single time. Declaring that Senegal's
economic, social and political situation had never been so
"unreadable," he predicted there could be widespread abstention,
violence, or, he hoped, a massive turnout to voice disappointment with
Wade. There was, unfortunately, ongoing chaos in the electoral
machinery. An unknown but significant percentage of voters had not
received electoral cards, and many rural voters had registered but are
not on voter lists. The Interior Ministry, further, "insists we base
registration challenges on the basis of a definitive list of voters,
when in fact the challenges are designed precisely to prepare that
list." As for Socialists' calculation that they could win parliament
and dominate government even if Wade won the presidency, Diouf scoffed:
"Yeah, ok, but Wade will buy off the majority of the opposition
deputies within a week, easy."

REDISTRICTING: "OUNGK" IS THE WOLOF WORD FOR SALAMANDER
-------------- --------------

9. (C) Dansokho and Diouf both underlined that the decree establishing
repartition of seats and allotting the number of deputies to be elected
per constituency is just being publicized. Until the opposition has
this basic information, they cannot complete selection of candidates
for each district or submit a candidate list by December 28 as required
by the electoral code.


10. (SBU) Even as we were meeting with Diouf on December 14, the
government was releasing its decree, dated and signed December 8. The
Socialists and Abdoulaye Bathily immediately announced they would ask
the Conseil d'Etat (High Administrative Court) to nullify the decree.
Bathily declared that Wade had "manifestly violated the Electoral Code.
He is allotting parliamentary seats as a function of who is with him
or who are his most irreducible adversaries," rather than by
demographic criteria. As evidence, Bathily pointed out that his
hometown, Bakel, was allotted one seat, while several smaller towns
were being given two or three and the only slightly larger Saint Louis
would have four. Where the PDS has several leaders competing for an
Assembly seat, such as Linguere, the number of seats has been
increased. Meanwhile, a drier-witted cynic commented that the
last-minute and allegedly skewed repartition of seats was "a curious
procedure by which to reaffirm our nation's unity."

COMMENT
--------------

11. (C) As of December 18, after failing to agree on a coordinated
electoral approach in two formal meetings, the opposition seem stymied.
No one, through midday of the 18th, has been willing to accept the
responsibility of declaring that agreement is impossible, though the
press conference we hear may take place later in the day may clarify
where each party stands. It appears there will be multiple opposition
candidates in the election first round, and two parliamentary lists,
one including Moustapha Niasse and Amath Dansokho, and the other the
Socialists, Abdoulaye Bathily and possibly -- it has not yet been
confirmed -- Idrissa Seck. A few claim this multiplicity of candidates
will mobilize more voters. Most, though, think it will show voters how
disorganized and rivalry-riven Wade's adversaries are, and make them
ask, "if this is how they run elections, how can they run government?"


12. (C) While the opposition experiments with self-destruction, the
Interior Ministry continues to do it no favors and has now engaged in
what some familiar with American politics have called a Senegalese
version of gerrymandering. Not having yet seen all figures for the new
repartition of Assembly seats, we are unable to confirm that Wade has
unfairly advantaged his ruling party. From the few numbers available
to us so far, though, the repartition does seem to increase seats in
areas where Wade is strong and where several ruling party rivals are
competing to become deputies.

DAKAR 00002979 003 OF 003




13. (C) Socialist Khalifa Sall's warnings that Wade is preparing gangs
to rig or disrupt elections should be taken seriously. Sall was a
noted hardliner who opposed the turnover of power to Wade in 2000, and
probably knows a dirty trick when he sees one. His assertion that the
CPA is assembling gangs of toughs to confront ruling party gangs,
though, may have an element of bluff. Wade as oppositionist was a
skilled practitioner of the politics of the streets. The Socialists
over 40 years in power were a party of clerks and bureaucrats, mostly
unused to the really rough stuff, though if they add Seck, they will
have another brawler of the Wade school.


14. (C) For what it is worth, during his December 18 meeting with the
Ambassador, Minister of State and presidential candidate in his own
right Landing Savane predicted that Wade will win a majority on
February 25. END COMMENT.


15. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar's classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar.