THE CASAMANCE: A SHRINKING REBELLION PRESENTS REAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 002597

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA AND INR/AA
AID/W FOR AFR/WA
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016
TAGS: PINS PGOV EAID ECON PINR SG
SUBJECT: THE CASAMANCE: A SHRINKING REBELLION PRESENTS REAL
OPPORTUNITIES

REF: A. DAKAR 2479

B. DAKAR 2012

C. DAKAR 1932

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) The Casamance rebellion has shrunk to a limited
geographical area, with less public support, greater logistic
difficulties and more constrained operational capabilities
than at any time since war began. Deprived of a
Guinea-Bissau base and under pressure from animist spiritual
leaders to compromise, Movement of Democratic Forces of the
Casamance (MFDC) recalcitrant Salif Sadio has bullied
conciliatory rivals, enlisted their followers, won access to
Gambian sanctuary, and retains a serious nuisance capacity
for minor armed strikes and banditry. Casamancais
desperately want infrastructure investment, and real
opportunity exists for development outside the receding war
zone. For an election-preoccupied President Wade, though,
redirecting economic resources to the Casamance is not now a
priority. This cable reflects a late September reporting
trip by the Defense Attache, Political Counselor and
Senegalese Political Assistant, as well as more recent
developments, such as Abbe Augustin Diamacoune Senghor,s
evacuation to France for medical treatement. END SUMMARY.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF WAR AND PEACE
--------------

2. (C) MFDC rebel capacity has now retracted to a triangle
roughly defined, at its outermost limits, by the Gambian
border, Route Nationale Five leading from Bignona toward
Banjul, and, for a certain distance, Route Nationale Four
from Bignona toward Farafenni. Zones previously vulnerable
to attack have now been effectively cut off from rebel
activity or from rebel influence. In Sedhiou, the prefect, a
former deputy prefect and others told us the weakened rebels
are now unwilling to risk being outgunned and boxed off on
the Sedhiou peninsula. Throughout the eastern part of
Ziguinchor Region, the largely ethnic-Jola MFDC simply no
longer has popular support in areas dominated by a mix of
other ethnic groups.


3. (C) Even in Jola areas, we heard in varying terms from a
UNHCR sociologist, the Senegalese Defense Attache in Banjul,
and especially Bignona mayor and ex-Defense Minister Youba
Sambou, that rebel loss of prestige has coincided with
reduction in military capacity and loss of territory.
Outsiders may see the Casamance as a geographical unit and
the Jola ethnic group as a single entity, but local views are
different. Ousmane Sane, a sociologist with UNDP, told us
the Jola are broken down into more or less discrete
dialectical, cultural and especially religious zones, and
that many of these zones across the southern and eastern
Casamance have come to reject MFDC armed struggle. We
encountered evidence of such rejection even in the northern
triangle where Sadio continues to operate. The imam of
Bignona says he has pushed the &maquisards8 to seek a
negotiated solution, and that he is now intensely concerned
about his security after recent armed banditry in the town
that he attributes to rebels from the MFDC. Sindian's imam
told us he had been pushing Sadio to compromise just before
Guinea-Bissau launched attacks to destroy him in March, and
fears that Sadio felt betrayed and will try to punish him.

SALIF SADIO: VICTORY FOR THE VANQUISHED
--------------

4. (C) Sadio, the leader of the MFDC,s armed Atika faction,
may have been dislodged militarily by a coalition of
Guinea-Bissau's armed forces with pro-conciliation MFDC
factions headed by Mancane Dieme and Caesar Badiate. In
political terms, though, he recouped masterfully by moving
north, displacing his MFDC rivals and recruiting some of
their fighters, and possibly, though this is disputed, by
assuming their role in cultivation of cannabis and cutting of
timber for export across the border into The Gambia.
Sadio,s announcement that he has split politically from the
MFDC to lead his own Movement for the Liberation of the
Casamance People (MLPC) has created a new political dynamic.
Most importantly, while Sadio had been identified with the
southern Casamance, he appeared to have very quickly reached
an understanding with the Gambians. The military zone
commander of Ziguinichor, Colonel Sow, as well as troops
stationed in the Sindian area, tell us Sadio enjoys ready

DAKAR 00002597 002 OF 003


Gambian sanctuary. Colonel Sow claims the army has the
initiative and that Sadio leads a diminished military force,
though he also concedes Sadio's fighters are well-trained and
battle-hardened. In any case, it is clear the Army will be
hard-pressed to prevent rebel penetration of the border for
small-scale attacks or large-scale banditry.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE REALM OF THE SPIRITS
-------------- ---

5. (C) Bignona mayor and ex-Defense Minister Youba Sambou
tells us resolution of the conflict will be "political,
cultural and 'cultuel.'" Sadio may be bloody-minded and
brutal, he explains, but his willingness to use violence is
buttressed in villagers' eyes by cult or spiritual
legitimacy. While MFDC political leaders such as the Abbe
Diamacoune were Catholic priests and the rebellion included
Muslims, Youba says Sadio's authority stemmed from
traditional spiritual guides, the keepers of sacred forest
glades. These animist forest worshipers, unrecognized
outside their villages and lacking any administrative or
political power, had attributed authority of command to
Sadio. They are now tired of war, feel the people's growing
despair, and therefore, Youba contended, are pushing Sadio
toward reconciliation. If he continues to refuse, he
predicted, these cult leaders will exercise their right and
power to withdraw Sadio's authority and grant it to someone
more flexible. This new leader would chair a unified command
of all armed MFDC factions, and would lead in defining a
common position towards the GOS.

CASAMANCAIS SEEK CONCRETE AND CANNERIES
--------------

6. (C) Casamancais are divided on the wisdom of army return
to northern Casamance villages. Some believe the army
presence creates an opportunity for renewed GOS-MFDC talks.
The Cadres Casamancais, an association of regional
executives, have called for establishment of a "college de
negotiateurs," of prominent Casamancais to speak on the
region's behalf and negotiate a definitive peace accord,
beginning in February 2007 ) two years after the last round
of peace talks.


7. (C) Others call for a more incremental or functional
approach in which economic conditions for peace are built
before negotiating a peace accord. The animated-over-a-beer
historian Nooli Cisse argues "we've had enough of these
damned seminars! No more 'capacity building.' Give us roads
and canneries and a maritime network from Dakar to Ziguinchor
-- that's the kind of capacity we need!" Cisse was unusually
emphatic, but his view is shared by some others, including
Alain Diedhiou, the MFDC-linked Catholic priest who is being
transferred to a parish in Avignon, and ex-Prime Minister and
presidential candidate Idrissa Seck on his tour of the region
(Ref A). (COMMENT: Their views notwithstanding, USAID,s
capacity-building program continues to enjoy broad support in
the MFDC and the Government, which recognize that the MFDC
has lost sight of its agenda and needs to find a face-saving
formula to conclude a lasting peace. END COMMENT.)


8. (C) Sedhiou-based NGO "Enfance et Paix" argues that the
GOS, now that it has reintroduced troops into formerly
demilitarized zones, must state clearly that it wants to
settle the conflict peacefully. Failure to do so will
discourage combatants from abandoning the maquis. Indeed,
there are signs of new recruitment. Women's leader Mame
Kenny told us the maquisards are enlisting decommissioned
soldiers unable to find other jobs. The GOS and donors must
make some real movement toward consolidating the ceasefire
that exists in many zones, these NGO's argue, and the only
way to end violence, forestall crime and assure stability is
to provide infrastructure, job-creating investment and a
modicum of social services.


9. (C) Each zone has special needs. Sedhiou's prefect notes
the city's isolation for want of bridges and roads, while the
ex-subprefect says the entire Department has two doctors for
400,000 people "when they're both here." The imam of Bignona
describes young people's "seething frustration." Oumar
Lamine Badji, Ziguinchor Regional Council President, laments
that joblessness in the north has brought a "scandalous"
overexploitation of forests by both Senegalese and Gambian
businessmen. Beach-blessed Cape Skirring is nowhere near
meeting its tourist potential.

COMMENT
--------------

DAKAR 00002597 003 OF 003



10. (C) Removal of Salif Sadio's hard-line bases from the
Guinea-Bissau border area has brought significant and perhaps
qualitative differences to the Casamance: 1) the conflict is
now geographically limited to the northern areas on the
Gambian border; 2) Sadio, who recouped from his southern
losses by taking over his rivals' territory in the north,
retains considerable nuisance value because of his Gambian
santuary; 3) the MFDC political leadership, even before Abbe
Diamacoune's recent hospitalization and evacuation to France,
had become virtually irrelevant to most Casamancais; 4)
war-tired villagers continue to seek resolution of the
conflict, and, while we cannot confirm it, some believe
animist spiritual leaders are becoming more engaged in the
search for a compromise short of independence; 5) Casamancais
universally demand infrastructural development, and some
think this can and perhaps should precede attempts to reach a
negotiated peace settlement.


11. (C) There has been recent armed but non-violent
banditry, almost certainly linked to current or former
members of the MFDC. The army is making its presence known
even in some areas not threatened by rebels, as on the road
from Ziguinchor to Cape Skirring, and some contend the army
presence exacerbates tension and deepens instability. We are
not convinced, but it is true that military forces now
deployed cannot stamp out armed crime or interdict all
small-scale incursions from the Gambian border area. As long
as The Gambia allows sanctuary for Sadio, armed forays will
continue. Overall, though, new constraints on the MFDC
maquisards offer a real opportunity for the GOS to commit to
peaceful resolution of the conflict and to offer some hope of
economic engagement in the Casamance. With its attention
fully focused on February elections, there is little sign
this will happen for at least several months. END COMMENT.


12. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar,s classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar.
JACOBS