Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAKAR249
2006-02-02 15:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

UPDATE ON AFRICAN-MAURITANIANS IN SENEGAL

Tags:  PREF PGOV PREL PHUM PINR MR SG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0249/01 0331548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021548Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4105
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0047
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0681
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000249 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF, AF/W, AF/RSA, PRM, PRM/AFA AND INR/AA
ABIDJAN FOR REFCOORD
GENEVA FOR RMA
ACCRA FOR REFUGEE OFFICER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/11
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL PHUM PINR MR SG
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON AFRICAN-MAURITANIANS IN SENEGAL

REFS: A) NOUAKCHOTT 087; B) 05 DAKAR 0480

CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRS ROBERT P. JACKSON FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000249

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF, AF/W, AF/RSA, PRM, PRM/AFA AND INR/AA
ABIDJAN FOR REFCOORD
GENEVA FOR RMA
ACCRA FOR REFUGEE OFFICER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/11
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL PHUM PINR MR SG
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON AFRICAN-MAURITANIANS IN SENEGAL

REFS: A) NOUAKCHOTT 087; B) 05 DAKAR 0480

CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRS ROBERT P. JACKSON FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) African-Mauritanian leaders in northern Senegal
told visiting Ambassador Joseph LeBaron and Dakar
Political Counselor January 24 and 25 that they want
organized repatriation as a group under international
auspices, and insist on restoration of Mauritanian
citizenship and full recovery of land and property they
lost in 1989 expulsions. They voiced gratitude to local
villagers, frustration at what they see as neglect of
their plight by the USG and the international community,
ongoing if minor annoyance with the GOS, fears about
returning home and demands for a new UNHCR census and
provision of adequate documentation. A new generation
born, raised and educated in Senegal may be less
committed to repatriation. End Summary.

A CHOICE OF REPRESENTATIVE CAMPS
--------------


2. (SBU) Ambassador LeBaron visited three sites
(Dagana, Dodel and N'Dioum) among what the African-
Mauritanians themselves claim to be 283 locations. These
stretch from Saint Louis, through Diawara, the island in
the middle of the Senegal River where villagers last year
told us the 1989 killings began, to the Malian border and
beyond. The sites range from well-populated and settled
ones on the outskirts of Senegalese villages, like the
ones we visited, to nomads' overnight encampments of a
family or single individual. None that we have seen
could readily be identified as a refugee camp: there are
no fences, no guards, and no UNHCR offices. A handful of
families have opted to live in houses in the middle of
Senegalese villages.


3. (C) We ascertained that the overwhelming majority,
like most River Valley Senegalese from Matam to Richard
Toll, are ethnically and linguistically Toucouleur/Peuhl.

(Some Wolofs and Soninke also sought refuge in 1989.)
There is little intermarriage with Senegalese but, as we
reported last year, many seek and sometimes find work
locally. Interaction with the locals is generally
amicable. Some children attend school, in buildings
provided by the GOS and with Senegalese teachers. A few,
estimated at 30 or more by a student and at about 15 by
an older leader, attend university in either Dakar or
Saint Louis.

THE "REFUGEE" APPELATION
--------------


4. (C) The African-Mauritanians demand the status of
refugees, though one resident of N'Dioum said he felt a
sense of shame at being called a refugee and, like many,
prefers to call himself an exile or deportee. Recalling
that the Mauritanian government had insisted on treating
them as displaced persons, another said the GOM had at
one point allowed returns, but only as individuals,
without organization or leadership and absent
international oversight. Some did return, but were
allegedly ill-treated. Former GOM civil servants, for
example, were not reintegrated, and no land was returned
to rightful owners.


5. (C) We were told that UNHCR aid strategy was
stringent from the start. One leader in Dodel charged
UNHCR with attempts to "destabilize" the refugee
community, refusing aid in 1989 to those in Dakar, and
ceasing food aid and closing support stations in Dagana
and Saint Louis in 1995. They told us other aid
organizations, such as Medecins sans Frontieres, had
followed UNHCR in cutting services. The result, one
claimed, was life in "draconian conditions."

WHAT LIFE IS LIKE

DAKAR 00000249 002 OF 003


--------------


6. (C) In fact, as we were told in Dodel, Mauritanians
and Senegalese in the River Valley live in similar
conditions: most are poor. Yet refugees do face some
special problems, many stemming from lack of official
documentation that would allow them travel or access to
Senegalese government services. The refugees see
themselves as falling into three categories: the
relative few who are UNHCR-registered and receive
assistance; some who initially received "the wrong
identity cards" and were sent back to Mauritania; and the
large majority with no documents at all.


7. (C) Facts are unclear and there are exceptions, but
it appears refugees for the most part do not and cannot
own land locally; they cannot usually gain permanent jobs
either in the Senegalese civil service or the private
sector; and the daily agricultural wage jobs available do
not provide sufficient support for health care or
schooling. Local hospitals demand a valid ID card for
admission. UNHCR aid, we learned last year and on this
trip, is minimal. As a result, we heard, refugees'
"social fabric is falling apart."


8. (C) Refugees are grateful to local villagers who
have allowed them space and provide some help when they
are able, but often feel annoyed by Senegalese police.
When trying to travel, a student complained, they are
often caught at security checkpoints without papers and
police cause them "trouble." When we asked for details,
he explained, "they'll try to get bribes from us, and if
we don't give them, they'll hold us for hours, until they
get tired of us; then they'll tell us either to go on or
go back."

...AND COULD BE
--------------


9. (C) Ambassador LeBaron asked refugees how their
lives would be better in Mauritania. Answers included:
"we will be able to be better organized there," "we want
water, medical care, schools and development projects to
create jobs," and "more space." It is clear, they
believe, that they would live better back home. No
refugees ever cross the narrow and often shallow river
back to Mauritania, one speaker tried hard to convince
us, but relatives from their old home villages do cross
into Senegal to bring supplies from home. Ambassador
LeBaron also asked refugee leaders if they would accept
being returned to land in Mauritania other than that
which they had previously occupied. At first, they
seemed unable even to process the question. Once they
had considered it, though, they adamantly rejected return
to any place other than their old family homes.


10. (C) The problem, many argued, is that Mauritanian
armed forces and police who forced them out in 1989
confiscated or destroyed all proof that they were indeed
Mauritanian citizens. One village chief lamented that,
"without papers, if I go back, someone will slaughter
me!" Opinions varied on whether chances for peaceful and
safe repatriation have improved since the August coup.
In Dagana, we heard, "Taya was responsible for the
killings, but the new leader also played a role as chief
of police." In N'Dioum, though, there was hope for
positive change with the new leadership and hope for a
democratic election. Indeed, refugee leaders ask "don't
we have the right to participate in the transition?" and
declare, "any election we don't take part in will be
unfair."


11. (C) Because of these fears, refugees believe
repatriation can be possible only under five conditions:

-- there must be an accord for repatriation between UNHCR
and the governments of Mauritania and Senegal;

-- refugees must be returned as a group rather than
individually;


DAKAR 00000249 003 OF 003


-- return must be under the sponsorship and supervision
of international organizations including UNHCR and the
African Union, with the close attention of western
countries and especially the U.S.;

-- Mauritanian citizenship must be returned; and,

-- there must be a return of all property lost, or,
failing that, adequate compensation.

IN THE MEANTIME: CENSUS AND ID CARDS
--------------


12. (C) No one really knows how many Mauritanian
refugees are in Senegal. We heard that 68,000 had been
expelled in 1989, but that, after virtual cutoff of UNHCR
aid in 1994 and subsequent return by many individuals and
families, some 20,000 remained. In 1995, we heard, a
census was begun but then suspended. In the intervening
10 years, however, while there have been many deaths
"because of poor health conditions," the birth rate has
been "heavy .. the usual big African families .. on
average seven children." UNHCR continues to use 20,000
as its best guess.


13. (C) Refugee leaders say "we don't want to apply for
Senegalese citizenship," but they do want to be counted
and to receive UNHCR identity cards to allow more
privileges within Senegal and eventual repatriation. The
only oblique reference we heard to any potential solution
other than repatriation was a leader who demanded safety
guarantees from the GOM, but conceded that if that were
not possible, "then we'll wait in Senegal until another
event moves us to another place."


14. (C) In fact, refugee children have been born in
Senegal for 16 years now, and even some young adults have
been largely raised and educated here. While not ready
to question their leaders' disciplined pro-repatriation
message, they would clearly be comfortable continuing to
live in Senegal, though they would prefer adequate
documentation and greater privileges than they now enjoy.

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) Refugee leaders in northern Senegal consider
themselves Mauritanian, want to repatriate, and would
like to participate in the transition from the Taya
government to its successor. Yet demands for full
restitution of all property lost in the 1989 expulsions
mean that they will only be able to return with the full
support of the Mauritanian government. That, in turn,
will depend on political developments in Nouakchott, and
we wonder if the refugees would be easily or quickly
satisfied with the incremental approach which UNHCR
Nouakchott Head of Mission Laye laid out to Ambassador
LeBaron (Ref A).


16. (C) While waiting for a solution, refugees insist
on a new census to count their real numbers, and
documentation which will allow them fuller privileges
while they remain in Senegal. End Comment.

JACKSON