COUNTRY TEAM AID PROPOSALS FOR CASAMANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAKAR 001553

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CHANGE DECLAS DATE)

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, F, PRM/AFR, AF/EPS, DRL/PHO,
INR/AA
ALSO PASS TO AID FOR AFR/WA AND AA/AFR - LPIERSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/16
TAGS: EAID ECON PGOV PINS SG
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM AID PROPOSALS FOR CASAMANCE

REFS: A)1 June 2006 Evaluation of the USAID Peace-

Building Program in Casamance and Sub-Region;
B)Dakar 1204

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JANICE L. JACOBS FOR REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Country Team met June 14 to discuss ways to
move the Casamance peace process forward. We raised two
central questions. First was whether the Senegalese
Government and MFDC rebel movement have sufficient
political will to resolve the conflict. Second was
whether USG money could make a significant positive
difference. We believe President Wade has a genuine
desire and vision for peace. His approach, though, has
been incoherent, hampered by lack of know-how and hidden
agendas among those responsible for executing his orders.


2. (C) We also affirmed that U.S. pressure and
financial aid has earned us a reputation as an engaged,
neutral, knowledgeable and trustworthy intermediary.
Based on this political capital, we concluded that
strategic USG financial assistance could make a positive
impact. To support transformational diplomacy with
implications for Senegal's reintegration, growth and sub-
regional diplomacy, our recommendations for future aid
include resources of USD 3.0 million/year from FY07 to
FY09. END SUMMARY

APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED TO CORE OBJECTIVES

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3. (C) Progress in the Casamance peace process has been
frustratingly slow, but three years of halting movement
toward peace and return of some refugees have provided a
basis to examine which assistance should be reinforced.
We have been able to gauge: 1) the extent of GOS and
MFDC engagement in the peace process; 2) that the Gambian
and Bissau-Guinean governments are now willing to
contribute to rather than hamper peace; 3) Casamancais
acceptance of the U.S. as intermediary, and, 4) thanks to
an internal AID evaluation (REF A),the relative efficacy
with which different forms of assistance have contributed
to the peace process.


4. (SBU) Presidential and legislative elections are to be
held in February 2007, and there are few signs the GOS
will launch major initiatives in the Casamance until then.
This period will provide an excellent opportunity to build
on lessons learned, by fine tuning a practical approach to
address key drivers of conflict and by mapping out a
strategy to persuade the new government to make Casamance
a priority. Our overall objectives are to encourage GOS-
MFDC dialog, build capacities for a transparent peace
process, and intensify civil society's role in resolving
the conflict at community and national levels.

NO WAR/NO PEACE AS OF JUNE 2006
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5. (C) President Wade recently assigned Mbaye Jacques
Diop of the Council of the Republic for Social and
Economic Affairs, officially the number four person within
the GOS, as Casamance advisor. Still, many believe his
predecessor, General Fall, retains dominant influence on
Casamance issues. Some suspect that for a number of
reasons, including financial ones, Fall is hampering
progress toward peace.


6. (C) Diop told the Ambassador May 31 the Casamance is
"evolving." He said an earlier meeting with DCM Jackson,
AID/Senegal Director Carduner and a representative of
PADCO, the USAID-financed consultants who offer training
in interest-based negotiations to the GOS, MFDC and civil
society, had been fruitful. When asked if Guinea-Bissau
armed forces' intervention to suppress MFDC recalcitrant
Salif Sadio had been helpful, Diop replied it had, that
Sadio was weakened and wanted to negotiate. He said the
GOS hopes for a second round of negotiations with the MFDC
after the rainy season, in late September or October.
Diop said the GOS had an action plan for Casamance
reconstruction once peace talks succeed, and had set up
agencies whose mission is economic revitalization.


7. (SBU) Within the MFDC, there appears to be continued
but creakingly slow progress toward unity, though some
increasingly question the competence of aging MFDC
political leader Abbe Diamacoune Senghor. Sadio hard-
liners and the pro-peace factions of the MFDC are
intermittently talking and fighting, while the recent
clashes left thousands more people displaced on both sides
of the Guinea-Bissau and Gambian borders. The
International Committee of the Red Cross described the
situation as "worrisome but not alarming."

SHARPER STRATEGY: CHOOSING WHAT LEADS TO PEACE
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8. (SBU) Both our significant and our modest successes
have provided valuable lessons in what contributes
directly to peace. Ref A indicates AID has gotten most
bang for the buck with conflict resolution programs at the
community level. This has included reconstruction of
housing and village infrastructure, and emphasized
projects implemented by women's groups. It indicates that
rebuilding economic livelihoods, while "very relevant,"
was "too thinly spread and focused on micro-finance."


9. (C) Ref A found that conflict resolution at the
political level, due to personnel turnover in the GOS and
rivalries among rebels, had to date had only moderate
success. Despite this, it concluded the U.S. should
"emphasize more political and cross-border aspects of
conflict dynamics."


10. (C) A sharper U.S. strategy can counter Casamancais'
growing perception, based on dramatically reduced funding,
that the USG is pulling out. We can capitalize on
investments already made, focus limited funding on areas
that show most promise, and build on the unique foundation
the U.S. has established. The World Bank, European Union
and UNDP are ready with funds for humanitarian demining,
economic development and disarmament, demobilization and
reinsertion programs. (The U.S. is also contributing to
demining with FY06 and 07 funding.) This offers excellent
opportunity to maximize U.S. investment by coordinating
with other donors. A sustainable peace accord is
prerequisite, though, and only the U.S. can play the
pivotal role in the peace process.
BUILDING A FLEXIBLE STRATEGIC PLAN
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11. (C) A strategic and sustainable plan must retain
macro and micro level activities and build links between
the two. The Casamance population, most internal MFDC
factions and President Wade want peace, but they have been
unable to move much beyond ceasefire.

-- The first element of our plan would include policy
dialog at the national level, centering on issues such as
demining, setting a joint MFDC/GOS peace talk agenda,
identifying key negotiating parties, and advocating an end
to use of discretionary or "black" funding. This could
include, when needed, services of a special facilitator or
mediator.

-- Second, we will continue to provide technical aid to
GOS and MFDC in conflict resolution and negotiations, and
we would add communications and intra-party strategic
planning. To assure continuity, this would entail full
time engagement of a mediator with Casamance expertise.

-- Mediation and reconciliation by civil society is
essential to establish peace. Our third tack would be to
assist civil society to apply pressure for reaching a
peace accord, and to play an expanded and meaningful role
in the peace process. The U.S. will also contribute to
building trust between the GOS, MFDC and civil society.

-- Offering concrete dividends has proved an especially
effective contribution to the peace process according to
Ref A. We should, as a fourth measure, help to build
small community infrastructure such as wells, classrooms,
health huts and houses. To have an impact on peace, these
projects require a minimum number of beneficiaries and
must be designed with an integrated peace-building
component anchored in community reconciliation. Budgets
for these projects are insufficient, even with small DOD,
Self Help, and HRDF activities redesigned to support
peacebuilding, since there are no AID funds available for
a large-scale program. Finally, we will continue to
support DOS and DOD efforts in humanitarian demining.
This will start with USD 92,000 in FY06 funds for mine
risk education and victims' assistance, and lead
eventually, once a peace agreement has been signed, to
actual humanitarian demining activities in concert with
the Senegalese National Demining Commission and our
international partners.

-- Fifth, to leverage public diplomacy and encourage the
broader Senegalese public to support the peace process, we
will enhance strategic public affairs coverage of our aid
to civil society.

SPECIFIC MEASURES
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12. (C) Seven years of AID technical aid in the
Casamance, heavy Embassy political engagement since at
least 2003 and DOD interaction with the Senegalese
military have made the U.S. one of only two external
actors with extensive knowledge of the conflict's dynamics
and the trust of both GOS and MFDC. (The other is the
International Red Cross.) The Embassy will continue to
actively encourage the peace process, while AID will set
aside funding for possible engagement of a special
mediator.


13. (C) Technical assistance to the peace process is a
core element of our strategy, and will focus on building
capacity to manage and participate in a peace process. A
key element of this is working with each side, and
especially the MFDC, to clarify interests and positions.
This will be achieved via training workshops, facilitated
dialogs and other means of building relationships of
trust. An expert will be engaged to follow the conflict
full-time and manage activities. In FY06, AID has in
place a program to help advance the peace program that is
targeted at the first three areas outlined above. This
will build on a $700,000 project (conducted by PADCO)
focusing solely on capacity building in negotiation and
conflict resolution.


14. (C) To encourage reconciliation, we will provide
seed projects, which are sub-grants with integrated,
stand-alone objectives. They will include advocacy
campaigns by local leaders and organizations to press the
GOS and MFDC to work toward peace. The seed projects may
also encourage specific groups such as women, youth,
locally elected officials or schools and students to
continue building support for peace at community level.
In addition, the Ambassador's Fund for Refugees and DHRF
funding will support, among other projects, a community
radio network reaching out to refugees. ODC plans FY06
school construction in the key town of Sindian.


15. (C) There are insufficient funds to fully implement
the Mission's integrated and comprehensive Casamance
strategy. The Country Team suggests a budget of USD 3.0
million/year for FY07 - 09 to accomplish the five-pronged
strategy outlined above.

JACOBS