SCENESETTER FOR COALITION CONSULTATIONS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 000441

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DEPUTY SENIOR ADVISOR ON IRAQ DEUTSCH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS DA IQ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COALITION CONSULTATIONS WITH
DENMARK - APRIL 7

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES P. CAIN, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. Embassy warmly welcomes S/I Deputy Deutsch
and the interagency team for the April 7 coalition
consultations with the Danish government. Despite flagging
domestic support for the military effort in Iraq, implacable
parliamentary opposition and the shock of Mohammed cartoon
crisis, the government of PM Anders Fogh Rasmussen is
committed to remaining in the multinational coalition in
Iraq. To keep its participation politically viable, the
Danish government must reconfigure and calibrate Denmark's
contributions, which it wants to do in sync with U.S. and UK
adjustments to the evolving security situation on the ground.
The government also needs to be seen by the public as being
a true and full partner in discussing these adjustments. You
will have a real opportunity to shape Danish decision-making
in Iraq for the coming year. Your meetings will help Danish
officials prepare the strongest possible case for continued
and effective engagement in Iraq, and reassure them that
there will be "no surprises" in coalition deployments. In
addition, your media outreach will demonstrate the USG's
continued commitment to coordinate closely with partners in
Iraq. End Summary.

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Commitment at the Top
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2. (C) From PM Anders Fogh Rasmussen on down, the Danish
government remains firmly committed to extending Denmark's
contributions in Iraq. Rasmussen continues to declare that
Danish troops will remain deployed in Iraq as long as the UN
mandate exists, the Iraqi government requests it, and Danish
troops are making a difference. You and your interagency
team will meet with the Danish officials most involved in
securing continued parliamentary support for Denmark's
deployment of 500-plus troops in Iraq from July 1 to the end
of 2006.


3. (C) As they contemplate the composition and duration of
the deployment, these officials want to ensure that the
needs-based evolution of their contributions is in sync with
U.S. and UK adjustments. All your interlocutors welcome this
opportunity for a full and transparent dialogue on the way
ahead in Iraq. After your consultations, a Danish
interagency group will begin drafting a "white paper" that
will frame the upcoming parliamentary and public debate on
renewal.

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Policy Formation and Parliamentary Maneuvering
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4. (C) The Danish government faces a tough political
challenge in securing a broad majority for an extension
through the end of 2006. Following publication of its "white
paper," the government will introduce the extension
resolution to parliament in early May. There will be
committee hearings and two parliamentary readings/debates of
the government's mandate extension proposal in mid and late
May. The readings will be followed by a full parliamentary
vote in late May, prior to the early June summer recess. The
two largest opposition parties, the Social Democrats and
Social Liberals, have declared they will not vote for any
further extensions. With opinion surveys charting
diminishing public support for the Danish role in Iraq, the
opposition parties are playing to their core constituents,
who opposed the initial intervention in Iraq. It appears
unlikely that they can be turned around on this vote, but the
Prime Minister is not going to allow the opposition to
dictate Iraq policy.


5. (C) If the mainstream opposition parties do withdraw their
support, the government will have to rely on a narrow
parliamentary majority to ram through the resolution, a
contentious maneuver in the consensus-oriented Danish
parliamentary tradition. It would depend on the support of
the anti-immigrant Danish People's Party (DPP) to extend the
deployment. DPP leader Pia Kjaersgaard recently told us that,
for now, she will continue to support the Prime Minister's
Iraq policy. However, DPP leaders as well as rank and file
are growing increasingly uncomfortable with the Iraq mission.
At the political level, the maneuvering will be delicate.
At the policy level, there is considerable pressure to shape
Denmark's contributions into a package that can win
parliamentary approval.



6. (C) In this light, Danish officials have said they intend
to emphasize training, assistance, and civilian roles in
Denmark's contributions in Iraq. Denmark will participate in
the British-led PRT in Basrah, including with civilian
advisers. Denmark will continue to support NTM-I and provide
police trainers. Danish military planners will be extremely
interested in U.S. plans for deployments and drawdowns to
ensure that Danish force trends conform to those of its ally.


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Damage Control
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7. (C) The crisis that erupted over the publication of
cartoons depicting Mohammed poses an additional challenge to
keeping Denmark engaged in the world. Denmark's worst
foreign policy crisis since World War II took a psychological
toll on the normally sure-footed Danes. Danish foreign policy
officials are still warily picking up the pieces. With a
self-image based on long-standing international acclaim as a
benevolent, honest broker, Danes were shocked to see
themselves portrayed as the bad guy. Your interlocutors
understand the need for active Danish involvement in
international affairs, but they are likely to confront a more
skeptical, risk-averse public. Your consultations will help
these officials focus over the horizon and remain a steady
international partner.


8. (C) Denmark recently lost its third soldier in Iraq, but
public reaction has been largely muted. Should Denmark
suffer bigger casualty rates, maintaining political support
for Denmark's efforts would be much more difficult, according
to our contacts. Unable to build a solid case for its
arbitrary call for a July 1 withdrawal of Danish troops in
Iraq, the opposition increasingly is focusing its criticism
on alleged cases of U.S. mistreatment of detainees,
Guantanamo, and other human rights issues in an effort to
drive a wedge between Denmark and the U.S. These issues may
not be raised at the consultation table but Danish officials
certainly will have to adddress these concerns in the "white
paper." You will have a chance to speak to these concerns on
the margins of your meetings and they surely will be raised
in your press interview.


9. (U) We look forward to your very timely and useful visit.
CAIN