SRI LANKA: FOREIGN SECRETARY DISCUSSES OSLO,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000998

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FOREIGN SECRETARY DISCUSSES OSLO,
POSITIVELY RECEIVES AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE ON TERRORISM
WORKING GROUPS

REF: A. COLOMBO 990 AND PREVIOUS


B. STATE 94541

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Lunstead. 1.4(b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met Sri Lankan Foreign Secretary
Palihakkara and Peace Secretariat Chief and head of the Oslo
delegation Kohona on June 13 in the wake of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) refusal to enter talks with
the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) in Oslo on June 8-9 on the
status of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). (Ref A)
Palihakkara and Kohona stated they believed the LTTE's
surprise card at Oslo was meant to assure the Tamil diaspora
that the EU ban of May 30 had not deterred the LTTE, and that
the LTTE wanted a forum to release their Oslo Communiqu that
reaffirmed Tamil rights to self determination and possibly
alluded to military action. The Ambassador briefed both on
the U.S.'s initiative to engage fifteen countries to stem
LTTE financing and weapons procurement, which both GSL
officials accepted with genuine thanks and promise of
cooperation.

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The Tiger Card
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2. (C) Ambassador met with Foreign Secretary Palihakkara on
June 13 to discuss the situation after the LTTE scuttling of
talks with the GSL in Oslo. Palihakkara said he had opted
out of accompanying Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera to
Oslo to meet with the Norwegians June 12 in order to wait for
Oslo delegation head and Peace Secretariat chief Palitha
Kohona's debrief upon the latter's return to Sri Lanka.


3. (C) Taking an evenhanded tone, Palihakkara stated that he
surmised the LTTE's motives for playing a "surprise card" in
Oslo were two fold. First, they wanted to demonstrate to the
Tamil diaspora, which in large part funds the terrorist
organization either willingly or unwillingly, that the E.U.
ban had neither affected their fundraising and recruitment
abilities nor their resolve. Second, Palihakkara contended,
the LTTE wanted a well-publicized platform from which to
release their clearly premeditated "Oslo Communiqu" of June
9: the document may have presaged LTTE military or other
violent action against the GSL.

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Gut Feeling
--------------


4. (C) While Palihakkara admitted the possibility of "nasty"
Tiger violence, he said, "My gut feeling is that the LTTE is
more posturing than substance. I don't think there will be a
major security problem." On the issue of LTTE refusal to
accept EU nationals as members of the SLMM, Palihakkara
recommended patience. "The LTTE needs the SLMM as much as
anyone else." Similarly, Norway is "correctly facing a lot
of criticism by trying to accommodate the LTTE" but "Norway
must be given some space" to facilitate.

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Devolution Think Tank
--------------


5. (C) Palihakkara noted that President Rajapaksa is taking a
proactive approach to the peace process following the failure
of the Oslo talks. Three initiatives include: the
appointment of a bipartisan committee or "think tank" of Sri
Lankan academics to draft a proposal for maximum devolution
of power to the North and East; "humanitarian focal points"
to deal with displaced persons in the East; and increased
political dialog with the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance
(TNA) and other Tamil groups. "The TNA," Palihakkara added,
"is also in an impossible situation. They are afraid."
(Presumably Palihakkara meant that the TNA has little choice

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but to toe the LTTE line.)

-------------- -
Demarche Delivered on Sri Lanka Contact Groups
-------------- -


6. (C) The Ambassador told Palihakkara that the US is
inviting fifteen other governments to form overlapping
contact groups to address Tiger financing and weapons
procurement. Palihakkara agreed to reinforce Sri Lanka's
interest in working with the international community to bring
an end to the conflict by reaching out to these nations'
foreign offices after the US has made initial proposals, but
to "be economical" in discussing the initiative until the USG
wishes to make it known.


7. (C) Ambassador impressed upon Palihakkara the importance
and uniqueness of this initiative, since the LTTE does not
pose a world-wide threat or a terrorist threat to the US. As
the move represents a big step outside of the vital national
interests of the US, the GSL must do everything in its power,
the Ambassador stressed, to make sure that the GSL's human
rights record is clean. Palihakkara said he understood and
would use the Ambassador's message to influence others in the
GSL.


8. (C) Palihakkara was visibly pleased with the US's contact
group initiative, saying "We value your commitment to do
peacemaking in a practical way." The Ambassador stressed the
need not to announce or leak this initiative, and Palihakkara
said he would keep the news in close-hold.

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Peace Secretariat Surprised
--------------


9. (C) Ambassador also met June 13 with Palitha Kohona, head
of the GSL Peace Secretariat, and also head of the
negotiating team which went to Oslo. Palitha said that the
LTTE refusal to meet was a complete surprise. The GSL team
had been waiting in the negotiating room at 9 a.m. on June 8,
when they were told by the Norwegians that the LTTE was
refusing to join them. The GSL team stayed around until 7:30
that evening while the Norwegians worked on the Tigers to
participate. In the interim Palitha had consulted with
President Rajapakse, and when Eric Solheim came to see them
at 7:00 that evening, he told Solheim they were going home.
Solheim was furious at the LTTE, Palitha said.


10. (C) Palitha said there was no doubt in his mind that the
entire drama had been cooked up by the LTTE beforehand. He
surmised that they wanted to show the Tamil diaspora that the
EU listing did not prevent them from traveling and meeting.
He agreed that the Tigers' seven-page "Oslo Communiqu" had
not been written on the spot but prepared beforehand. It was
the work, he said, of New York-based lawyer Rudrakumaran and
Australian resident (and former Attorney General of Sri
Lanka) Pashupati Siva.

11 (C) Palitha said that he had spoken on the phone that
morning to Norwegian Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer, and
that Hanssen-Bauer, despite the setback, was still
optimistic. The Government, Palitha said, would reply soon to
Solheim's five questions, and the answers would all be
affirmative. The Government, he said, would not renege on
previous agreements. President Rajapaksa, he said, had no
intention of going to war. Unfortunately, LTTE behavior at
Oslo would strengthen the hand of hard-liners in the
Government.


12. (C) Ambassador told Palitha that the US had now started
the initiative to form two international groups to work on
the issue of Tiger financing and weapons procurement. As he
had done with Foreign Secretary earlier, Ambassador said that
the US was undertaking a significant effort here, and that it

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was crucial that the Government work to ensure a clean human
rights record. Palitha said that he understood, and that US
emphasis on this point would help him and his like-minded
colleagues, in debates within the Government. Ambassador
asked that Palitha not spread the word of this initiative
yet. Palitha also said that he agreed with US and other
Co-Chairs that the Government had to come up with something
to offer to Tamils to show they had an alternative to armed
struggle. In this regard, he thought the announcement the day
before of a bi-partisan experts committee to come up with
recommendations on a final settlement was a positive step.
The Ranil Wickremasinghe government had some good ideas, but
tried to impose then without building consensus--which had
led to Ranil's downfall. President Rajapaksa, by contrast,
was a careful consensus builder. Progress might be slower
under Rajapaksa, he said, but it would be more likely to last.

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Comment
--------------


13. (C) Comment. Not surprisingly, both Palihakkara and
Kohona picked up quickly on the importance of the Ref B
working group initiative, and that it will give the GSL, if
it is inclined, "grace" to put forward a concrete,
substantive plan for a permanent solution. End comment.
LUNSTEAD