TOKYO CO-CHAIRS PRE-MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000872

SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM CE NO

SUBJECT: TOKYO CO-CHAIRS PRE-MEETINGS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reason 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary: GSL representatives admit that at
least some elements of armed forces may be
cooperating with irregular armed groups.
Government is trying to crack down on this, and is
also trying to develop a proposal for a political
settlement. EU will likely designate LTTE as
terrorist group on May 29 or 30, but there are
still internal divisions on how to handle this
issue, and this may affect discussions in Tokyo.
Norwegian Special Envoy Hanssen-Bauer is pushing
the GSL hard to examine its assumptions and is
looking for new ways to get the parties to talk to
each other. END SUMMARY


2. (U) Ambassador met May 24-25 with Peace
Secretariat Head Palitha Kohona, Defense Secretary
SIPDIS
Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Foreign Secretary
Palihakkara to discuss the upcoming Tokyo Co-
Chairs meeting. In addition, Co-Chairs Chiefs of
Mission met May 24 with visiting Norwegian Special
Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer, and Ambassador had
follow-on meeting next day with Netherlands
Ambassador Van Dijk.


3. (C) In all meetings, Ambassador began by noting
the importance of the Tokyo meeting. The Co-
Chairs had been formed in a different environment
with a specific task--to monitor the parties¥
compliance with the Tokyo Declaration which linked
development assistance with progress on the peace
process. That task no longer existed, and the Co-
Chairs should consider what their role should now
be. They would discuss in Tokyo what their
expectations were from both parties if they were
to continue successfully. He noted that the US
was developing further its proposal for two
international groups to crack down on Tiger
fundraising and weapons procurement.

Kohona: "Some Bad Things Happening"
--------------


4. (C) Peace Secretariat Head Palitha Kohona said
that the GSL strongly supported the proposed
initiatives on fundraising and weapons
procurement, and he believed that Japan did also.
Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi had told him
that Japan wanted to modify the role of Norway as
facilitator. Norway (and by extension the Co-
Chairs) should be "neutral but not impartial."
Ambassador said that in addition to stating that
the Tigers needed to give up violence and enter
the political process, the Co-Chairs would likely
repeat the recent statements by PDAS Camp that the
Government needed to find ways to address long-
term Tamil grievances and to protect the rights of
Tamils in the short-term. Kohona agreed that
"some bad things are happening" which the
Government needed to control. Some elements of the
security forces, he said, might be colluding with
Karuna and others.


5. (C) On the political front, Kohona said, he had
just spent two days in a retreat with Hanssen-
Bauer in Barcelona to go over the basics of the
peace process. Hanssen-Bauer had pushed him hard,
Kohona said, which was good. Regarding the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM),which has been
very forthright recently in its statements, Kohona
said that it was fair for the SLMM to criticize
the GSL when it did something wrong, but it should
not equate the Government and the Tigers.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa: Indians Pushing Hard
--------------


6. (C) Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapajksa
admitted to Ambassador that some elements of the
armed forces might be colluding with Karuna, and
that this had to stop. He said that the President
was adamant on this point and had made it strongly
to the service chiefs at a National Security
Council meeting that same morning. Gotabaya said
that Indian officials had pushed him hard during
his recent visit to New Delhi. National Security
Adviser Narayanan was very familiar with the
issue, since he had spent "over 500 hours" with
LTTE head Prabhakaran when Narayanan was working
in RAW. Naryanan and others had recommended
strongly that Sri Lanka adopt something like the
Indian model of governance, which had defused
India¥s own ethnic crises. The Indians also told
him that the GSL had to curb abuses against
Tamils, and had to offer the Tamils something
positive to work towards.

Palihakkara: GSL Serious about Human Rights
--------------


7. (C) In a May 25 conversation with the
Ambassador and DCM, Foreign Secretary H.G.M.S.
Palihakkara said that President Rajapaksa is "very
keen" in mounting serious investigations into
possible security force human rights violations.
To that end, Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera
and Minister of Disaster Management and Human
Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe would later on May 25
hold the first meeting of a revived inter-
ministerial committee on human rights which would
provide oversight of security force conduct. "We
want to prevent security force misconduct while
investigating any that has already taken place,"
Palihakkara said. There would be a standing
working group under the committee, chaired by
Samarasinghe, which would include the service
commanders, Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa,
the Attorney General and others. At the same
time, the President¥s Secretary, Lalith Wiratunga,
would be meeting with the governor of the
Northeast Province and UNHCR to deal with those
who have been displaced by disturbances in the
Trincomalee area. That situation, Palihakkara
stated, is "still manageable" but needs to be
handled carefully, he said.


8. (C) Looking longer term, Palihakkara agreed
with the Ambassador that the GSL needs to take
steps to spell out a political future for the
country which would give a sense of belonging and
security to Tamils and Muslims. To that end, the
President has initiated a working group to put
flesh on the bones of his presidential campaign
commitment to "maximum devolution." Palihakkara
commented that it would be important to not get
caught up in labels like devolution or federalism.
"We should label it after we¥ve put it together."


9. (C) Palihakkara agreed with the Ambassador that
the May 30 co-chairs meeting in Tokyo would be an
important opportunity for the co-chairs to
determine what useful role they could play given
that their initial raison d¥etre really did not
exist anymore. "New thinking is needed."
Palihakkara commented that the "ancillary ideas"
of forming working groups to crack down on money
and weapons flows were welcomed by the government
which looked forward to feeding information to the
groups once they were formed. He said he hoped
the co-chairs would come out strongly against the
current violence and discuss ways to lessen it,
commenting that the cease-fire agreement is
intended to mean "no violence not regulated
violence."


10. (C) Palihakkara reiterated that the GSL
remains committed, despite the current
difficulties, to getting the Tigers "back to the
table" not just to discuss the cease-fire
agreement but also to talk about long-term
solutions (which made a public presentation on
"maximum devolution" all the more important). He
thanked the Ambassador for Secretary Rice¥s
response to Foreign Minister Samaraweera¥s letter
on the all-party congress and commented that while
it was easy to be dismissive of such exercises,
the congress had been very important in getting
the radical JVP to commit publicly to a number of
steps.

Hanssen-Bauer: Looking for Ways Forward
--------------


11. (C) Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission (US, Japan,
Norway, Netherlands representing EU Presidency,
and EC) met with visiting Norwegian Special Envoy
Jon Hanssen-Bauer evening of May 24. Hanssen-Bauer
said that his Barcelona meeting with Kohona was
intended to help the GSL think through its
strategy, and to push the GSL on what it could
offer for a political deal. Hanssen-Bauer would
see President Rajapaksa on Friday (after visiting
the Tigers in Kilinocchi on Thursday) and would
try to take these ideas further then.


12. (C) Hanssen-Bauer said that as an interim
confidence building measure, he was considering
inviting the parties to come to Oslo to discuss
the role of the SLMM, something they both seemed
interested in. This was especially important in
view of recent Tiger statements that the SLMM sea
wing should no longer ride on Sri Lankan Navy
vessels, and that land travel was now also
dangerous.


13. (C) Hanssen-Bauer asked COMÂ¥s what they
thought should come out of the Tokyo meeting.
There was general consensus that the Co-Chairs
should state that they wanted to help the peace
process but could only do so successfully if the
parties were serious and took certain actions.
The LTTE would need to give up violence and
terrorism and enter the political process. The
Government would need to show that it recognized
Tamil grievances and was willing to take the
dramatic political steps needed to address them.
It would also need to ensure that Tamils were
protected. Unexpectedly, Netherlands Ambassador
Van Dijk said that a Co-Chairs statement should
not mention "terrorism," especially since EU
designation of LTTE as a terrorist group was
liable to be announced simultaneously with Tokyo
meeting on May 29 or 30. Van Dijk¥s position
seemed to surprise everyone, and Ambassador
strongly refuted it.

EU Inside Baseball
--------------


14. (C) Van Dijk called Ambassador May 25 and
asked to get together to talk the issue through.
Van Dijk (please protect) told Ambassador that
there were still deep divisions within EU on this
subject. France and Italy had objected to the
listing on procedural grounds, because they
thought they were being pushed into it by the US.
When that objection was dealt with, the Nordics
still objected on substantive grounds. They
insisted that a listing be accompanied by a
statement which mentioned the failings of both the
Government and the LTTE. He also said that EC
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and her colleague
Herve Jouanjean (who will represent the EC at
Tokyo) had pushed for a lesser action than
listing--some type of targeted sanctions--but had
lost. As a result, Van Dijk predicted, Jouanjean
could be difficult at Tokyo. Ambassador said he
believed there was no way we could accept a Tokyo
statement which did not mention the need for the
Tigers to give up terrorism, and van Dijk
eventually agreed there should be some way to do
that.

COMMENT
--------------


15. Several things strike us from these meetings.
For one, the GSL seems to have gotten the message
that it must do something to prevent abuse of
Tamils, and also to think seriously about what a
long-term solution would look like. We were
particularly struck by the turnaround in Gotabaya
Rajapaksa. Previously he would strenuously deny
any connection between the GSL and the Karuna
group--now he admits it is probably occurring. We
are favorably impressed by Hanssen-Bauer, who is
bringing both imagination and structure to the
peace process and the work of the Co-Chairs. It
seems certain that the EU will designate the LTTE,
but it is still in disarray internally. Van Dijk
is excitable and not always accurate in his
predictions, but we may have to work hard on the
EU in Tokyo to make any statement meaningful. In
the end, Kohona is right: we can and should
criticize both sides, but we should not equate
them.
LUNSTEAD