Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06COLOMBO792
2006-05-16 08:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: SCA PDAS CAMP URGES DEFENSE SECRETARY

Tags:  PHUM PTER MOPS PREL PGOV CE 
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VZCZCXRO5803
OO RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #0792/01 1360845
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160845Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3372
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9623
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 9185
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 4110
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3005
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 3092
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2164
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6075
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0859
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0229
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 4525
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 6628
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1185
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000792 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2016
TAGS: PHUM PTER MOPS PREL PGOV CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: SCA PDAS CAMP URGES DEFENSE SECRETARY
TO INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS ALLEGATIONS

REF: A. COLOMBO 771


B. USDAO COLOMBO IIR 6 816 0081 06

C. COLOMBO 620

D. COLOMBO 408

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle. Reason: 1
.4 (B,D).

--------
SUMMARY
---------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000792

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2016
TAGS: PHUM PTER MOPS PREL PGOV CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: SCA PDAS CAMP URGES DEFENSE SECRETARY
TO INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS ALLEGATIONS

REF: A. COLOMBO 771


B. USDAO COLOMBO IIR 6 816 0081 06

C. COLOMBO 620

D. COLOMBO 408

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle. Reason: 1
.4 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a May 15 meeting with Defense Secretary Gotabhaya
Rajapaksa, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and
Central Asian Affairs Donald Camp and Charge' underscored
U.S. support for the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) but
stressed the need for the Government to investigate
thoroughly and expeditiously human rights allegations against
security forces. Rajapaksa assured Camp of the GSL's intent
to investigate, but asserted that the GSL often cannot
identify the various "players" operating in GSL-controlled
areas who may be perpetrators. The Karuna faction is easier
for the GSL to "control" than these shadowy "players,"
Rajapaksa said, who may be working at cross-purposes with the
GSL. While it is likely that the GSL finds it difficult to
control all of the various "players" who may be operating in
these areas, the lack of progress on any the high-profile
cases that have occurred since the beginning of this year
will inspire little confidence among the Tamil community that
its government is working hard to safeguard their rights and
interests. End summary.

--------------
DEFENSE SECRETARY ON THE DEFENSIVE
ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS ALLEGATIONS
--------------


2. (C) In a May 15 meeting with Defense Secretary Gotabhaya
Rajapaksa, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and
Central Asian Affairs Donald Camp, accompanied by Charge' and
poloff, reiterated U.S. support for the Government of Sri
Lanka (GSL) in its fight against Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) terror but stressed the need for the GSL to
investigate human rights allegations against its security
forces and publicize better its efforts to address Tamil
grievances. The U.S. is working hard to crack down on LTTE

fundraising and reviewing GSL Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
requests, but perceptions that GSL security forces can act
with impunity undermine U.S. efforts to provide assistance,
Camp warned. To combat that impression, the GSL should make
a "dramatic gesture" that demonstrates its commitment to
safeguarding the rights and ensuring the welfare of all its
citizens, regardless of ethnicity, Camp urged.


3. (C) The main problem is that the GSL's "propaganda"
capabilities are outstripped by the LTTE's, Rajapaksa
replied, so that the many "good things" the security forces
do are not adequately publicized. For example, the security
forces succeeded in keeping the lid on even greater communal
strife (albeit after some initial mob violence) following the
April 12 bombing of a Sinhalese vegetable market in the
ethnically diverse, hyper-volatile eastern district of
Trincomalee, Rajapaksa asserted (Ref C). To quell the
violence, the GSL deployed an additional one thousand
policemen to the district, sacked the home guards in the
communities where Tamil homes and businesses were torched,
sent two Cabinet ministers to address the public, and set up
"peace committees" to defuse further tensions. The newly
appointed Governor of the North East has prepared a
presentation for the diplomatic community outlining all the
GSL assistance provided to Tamils in LTTE-controlled
territory, Rajapaksa noted, but the GSL has not yet arranged
for the briefing.


4. (C) Moreover, Rajapaksa lamented, LTTE allegations of

COLOMBO 00000792 002 OF 003


human rights abuses perpetrated by the security forces wipe
out from public memory whatever good things the security
forces may have done. For example, favorable press coverage
of the Sri Lanka Navy's (SLN) heroic response to the Tigers'
attempted attack on a troop carrier on May 11 (Ref B) had
been quickly forgotten in the negative publicity over a
story, first carried by pro-LTTE website TamilNet, alleging
that SLN sailors, along with members of the anti-LTTE former
paramilitary Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP),killed
nine members of a family in Kayts, an SLN-controlled island
off the coast of Jaffna the night of May 13. (Gruesome
pictures of the bloodied corpses of the victims, which
included a four-month-old baby and a four-year-old child,
were prominently displayed on the website the following day.)
The Defense Secretary reported that his brother President
Rajapaksa was much angered at the report and had demanded an
immediate investigation. (The President's order
notwithstanding, the Defense Secretary confirmed that police
did not reach the site until the following day, reportedly
because they had to wait for the SLN to "clear the road.")
The Defense Secretary told PDAS Camp and the Charge' that he
had directed the SLN to conduct a court of inquiry on the
incident. He added that he was meeting the head of the Navy
and EPDP Leader and Social Services Minister Douglas
Devananda on this matter later in the day.


5. (C) Camp urged the GSL to pursue this investigation and
others expeditiously, noting that all of the good will the
GSL might garner through its development efforts in Tamil
communities will be lost unless it demonstrates that those
guilty of human rights abuses will be held accountable.
Although Kayts lies in GSL-controlled territory, finding the
perpetrators may not be easy, Rajapaksa indicated. Whoever
is committing these abuses is trying to discredit the GSL, he
asserted. "There are a lot of players in the game besides
the security forces. This is a legacy we've inherited from
previous governments. . . We don't even know who's
controlling them," the Defense Secretary said. (Note:
Before the Ceasefire Agreement, Kayts had been an EPDP
stronghold. The SLN and the civilian police are the only
security forces operating on Kayts.) Moreover, Rajapaksa
continued, there are various factions within the security
forces "controlled by different political groups. We are
keen to get control of them." Progress in the investigation
of the killings of five Tamil students in Trincomalee in
January has also stalled, Rajapaksa reported, adding that the
GSL had been unable to amass sufficient evidence to make a
case against the six Special Task Force (STF) policemen still
in custody.

--------------
TO WIN TAMIL HEARTS AND MINDS
(AT LEAST IN THE EAST): KARUNA
--------------


6. (C) In many ways, "controlling (breakaway LTTE faction
leader) Karuna is easier" than controlling these other
groups, Rajapaksa commented. The Karuna faction "is an
advantage to us if we use them correctly" because Karuna
targets the LTTE exclusively, rather than random civilians.
To this end, the GSL is trying to encourage Karuna to enter
politics, Rajapaksa noted, adding, "If we can win (over) the
Batticaloa Tamils, that is a complete advantage for us," as
it will drive a wedge into LTTE claims to represent all
Tamils in the north and east. Karuna's true strength is his
popular appeal (and hence political potential),Rajapaksa
averred; "militarily, the Karuna faction is nothing."


7. (C) PDAS Camp and Charge' re-emphasized the need for the
GSL to reassure Tamils that their safety, security and rights
will be protected in GSL-controlled territory. PDAS Camp
asked if the GSL were contemplating any high-profile gesture
to show it is reaching out to the beleaguered Tamil community
in a significant way. The GSL is constrained from doing so
by the lack of any credible democratic Tamil politician who

COLOMBO 00000792 003 OF 003


could spearhead such an initiative, Rajapaksa said; "the
military and the Sinhalese politicians can't do it."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) The normally reserved Rajapaksa was more voluble and
loquacious in this meeting than we have seen him in the past.
The LTTE's rapid-fire human rights allegations seem to have
him as much on the defensive as the Tigers' continued
assaults on the military. While it is likely that the GSL
finds it difficult to control all of the various "players"
who may be operating in these areas, the lack of progress on
any the high-profile cases that have occurred since the
beginning of this year will inspire little confidence among
the Tamil community that its government is working hard to
safeguard their rights and interests. If the GSL plans to
wait, as Rajapaksa suggested, for a credible democratic Tamil
politician to emerge before making any significant
confidence-building overtures to the Tamil community, we all
may be waiting a very long time. Decisive GSL action now to
address Tamil concerns will do more to encourage potential
democratic alternatives and rebut Tiger claims of GSL bad
faith in the long term than waiting for Karuna, who has been
running guns, extorting funds and killing people since he was
a teenager, to evolve into the populist messiah the GSL
hopes. Rajapaksa's ready admission about the GSL's relative
ability to control the Karuna faction (vice, presumably, the
previously-disarmed EPDP) was a marked departure from his
previous insistence that the GSL maintains no links to Karuna
(Ref D).


9. (U) PDAS Camp has cleared this cable.
ENTWISTLE