Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06COLOMBO791
2006-05-16 07:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKAN TRUCE MONITORS TELL SCA PDAS CAMP THEY

Tags:  MOPS PTER CE 
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VZCZCXRO5722
OO RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #0791/01 1360757
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160757Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3369
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9620
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 9182
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 4107
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3002
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6072
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0856
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 3089
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2161
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0226
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 4522
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 6625
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1182
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000791 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2016
TAGS: MOPS PTER CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKAN TRUCE MONITORS TELL SCA PDAS CAMP THEY
DOUBT LTTE TARGETED TROOP CARRIER

REF: A. USDAO COLOMBO IIR 6 186 0081 06


B. COLOMBO 713

Classified By: CDA JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

-------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000791

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2016
TAGS: MOPS PTER CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKAN TRUCE MONITORS TELL SCA PDAS CAMP THEY
DOUBT LTTE TARGETED TROOP CARRIER

REF: A. USDAO COLOMBO IIR 6 186 0081 06


B. COLOMBO 713

Classified By: CDA JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a May 15 meeting with Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Camp and

SIPDIS
Charge', members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
said that the Mission plans to resume naval monitoring as
soon as possible. In SLMM's view, the May 11 Sea Tiger
attack against Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) patrol craft demonstrates
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) efforts to assert
purported rights to (unspecified) territorial waters, rather
than an LTTE plot to target an unarmed troop carrier, as
reported in the local press. End summary.


--------------
LTTE PRESSING CLAIMS TO MARITIME RIGHTS
--------------


2. (C) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and
Central Asian Affairs Donald Camp, accompanied by Charge',
met May 15 with Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Chief of
Staff Tommy Lekenmyr, Chief Operations Officer Mika Sorensen
and SLMM officer Paul Erik Bjerke. PDAS Camp underscored
U.S. support for SLMM efforts to monitor and maintain the
truce under increasingly difficult and dangerous conditions.
Sorensen provided a briefing on the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) May 11 attack on Sri Lanka Navy (SLN)
crafts (Ref A). Sorensen said the SLMM had received a letter
from the Tigers a few weeks previously warning its monitors
to stay off SLN crafts and received a second warning just a
day before the May 11 attack. According to Sorensen, the
Tiger communications complained of SLMM "bias" in its
decision to provide monitoring on board SLN craft alone; to
be truly impartial the monitors should also join Sea Tiger
patrols. The SLMM replied that its mandate clearly warranted
its presence on board SLN craft and not/not LTTE vessels
because the LTTE does not have territorial ights to the sea.
If the LTTE wants the SLMM tochange its mandate to exclude
monitoring on boar SLN vessels, "it must opt out of the
Ceasefire Areement (CFA) because that (exclusion) is not

part of the CFA," Lekenmyr said firmly.


3. (C) Nonetheless, the LTTE continues to press claims To
territorial rights at sea, the monitors said, even though it
has never defined the boundaries of its purported territorial
waters. Throughout the course of the CFA, the SLMM has
observed Sea Tiger vessels, usually near the eastern shores
of Trincomalee, Sorensen reported. Typically, the SLN will
inform the SLMM of any Sea Tiger activity and deploy its own
vessels to deter the LTTE from moving closer. Increasingly
in the past few months, the Sea Tigers have been observed
launching attack formations "just to scare" the SLN, the
monitors reported. For the most part, the monitors said,
these LTTE shows of strength had ended without confrontation.
(Note: Sea Tigers attacked and sank two other SLN Dvoras in
separate incidents on January 7 in the waters off Puttalam
District and on April 25 off Jaffna. End note.) On May 11
the SLN spotted a Sea Tiger flotilla of 16 crafts in waters
farther north (near GSL Forward Defense Lines on the
northeastern shore of Jaffna). The SLN informed the SLMM,
which placed a naval monitor (and SLMM flag) on board an SLN
Dvora, which, along with three other Dvoras, moved four or
five nautical miles out to observe what the Sea Tigers were
doing. Bjerke noted that the Sea Tiger vessels began rapidly
closing in on the Dvoras at a surprisingly fast pace--much
faster than the 35 knots that the SLN and SLMM had believed
to be their maximum achievable speed. The Tiger flotilla
included six suicide boats, one of which rammed an SLN Dvora

COLOMBO 00000791 002 OF 003


(not carrying the SLMM monitor),sinking it.

--------------
TROOP CARRIER NOT LIKELY
TARGET, IN SLMM VIEW
--------------


4. (C) It is "quite clear" to SLMM that a SLN troop carrier
with over 700 soldiers on board that was also at sea at the
same time was not the target of the LTTE attack, Lekenmyr
said. The Government is trying to make out that the Tigers
planned to attack unarmed soldiers on the eve of a sacred
Buddhist holiday, but that scenario seems unlikely, he
argued. "To us, it's more like the LTTE saying they want to
protect their territorial waters." The troop carrier, which
runs daily from Trincomalee to Jaffna, was 30 nautical miles
away from shore and "never that close" to the engagement, the
monitors noted, adding that it would have been easier for the
Sea Tigers, if the troop carrier were indeed its objective,
to attack the larger vessel when it was closer to shore near
Trincomalee. In fact, Lekenmyr reported, an SLMM monitor on
board the troop carrier was never even aware of the Dvora/Sea
Tiger engagement until the larger vessel moved out to open
seas to avoid any possible confrontation. Someone inside the
SLN must be feeding the Tigers information, Bjerke
speculated, since the LTTE has access to information like
individual Dvoras' pennant numbers, which are not displayed
on the vessels and are thus only (presumably) known to those
in the security forces.


5. (C) In the aftermath of the May 11 incident, the SLMM
has requested all of its naval monitors to return to Colombo
for consultations. Lekenmyr emphasized that the suspension
of naval monitoring was temporary only and that the monitors
planned to return to their duties as soon as possible, "maybe
this week."


6. (C) The SLMM monitors confirmed they had received LTTE
complaints that Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) security forces
bombed sites in the LTTE-controlled northern district of
Kilinochchi (including, reportedly, the airstrip at
Iranamaddu). When the SLMM requested the LTTE to arrange a
visit to the sites so that monitors could document the
complaint, however, the LTTE demurred, saying it was "not
ready," Lekenmyr said. (Note: The LTTE said the same thing
when SLMM requested access to all Tiger sites reportedly hit
in GSL aerial strikes April 25-26.)

--------------
KARUNA CHANGING DYNAMIC OF CONFLICT
--------------


7. (C) Besides the Tigers flexing their maritime muscles,
the SLMM has noted other recent changes in the conflict. In
particular, the emergence of the Karuna faction as a military
and potential political counterweight to the Tigers has
altered the dynamic in significant ways, the monitors
indicated. The LTTE is likely resorting to increased
violence because of the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) failure
to restrain the Karuna faction, Sorensen theorized. In
another dramatic departure from its usual practice, the LTTE
took responsibility for its April 30 attacks on Karuna camps
(Ref B),Sorensen noted (although the Defense Secretary
denied SLMM access to the eight Karuna wounded warded at
Polonnaruwa Hospital following the attack). The absence of a
Forward Defense Line in the east makes it easy for Karuna
militants to operate, Bjerke said, adding that members of the
dissident faction were becoming more visible in the east and
may have dislodged the LTTE from some of its territory in
Trincomalee. Karuna might have a lot of supporters in the
east, Bjerke commented. Lekenmyr said that he doubted that
the GSL could disarm the Karuna faction, even if it wanted
to. Recognizing this, the SLMM has told the GSL "at least
don't support him," Lekenmyr said.


COLOMBO 00000791 003 OF 003



8. (U) PDAS Camp has cleared this message.
ENTWISTLE