Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06COLOMBO759
2006-05-10 12:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: ICRC NOTES DISTURBING TRENDS SINCE

Tags:  PHUM PTER PGOV CE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9603
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 9166
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RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 6607
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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1170
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000759 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2016
TAGS: PHUM PTER PGOV CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ICRC NOTES DISTURBING TRENDS SINCE
DECEMBER; REPORTS GOOD ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT DETAINEES

REF: COLOMBO 661

Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

----------------------------
THE GOOD NEWS:
ACCESS TO GSL PRISONERS . . .
-----------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000759

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2016
TAGS: PHUM PTER PGOV CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ICRC NOTES DISTURBING TRENDS SINCE
DECEMBER; REPORTS GOOD ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT DETAINEES

REF: COLOMBO 661

Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

--------------
THE GOOD NEWS:
ACCESS TO GSL PRISONERS . . .
--------------


1. (C) In a May 9 meeting with poloff, ICRC Deputy Head of
Mission Peter Krakolinig and Protection Coordinator Christoph
Sutter said that they believed that their access to
Government-held detainees is very good. Sutter estimated the
number of detainees held under Emergency Regulations to whom
ICRC has not been given access as "in the tens," rather than
hundreds, islandwide. (Note: As of May 9, the Human Rights
Commission had recorded 31 complaints of "disappearances"
since the April 25 assassination attempt against Army
Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka.) The day after the GSL
launched aerial and artillery strikes against LTTE targets in
Trincomalee on April 25-26 the government let ICRC into the
affected areas to evacuate wounded, Krakolinig confirmed.


2. (C) ICRC access to detainees held by the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has improved somewhat as well,
Sutter reported. The ICRC has access to three LTTE prisons
and the Tamil Eelam Police Headquarters in Kilinochchi, where
some prisoners are also held. Nonetheless, Sutter
emphasized, the LTTE continues to deny ICRC access to
prisoners held by the intelligence wing. The ICRC has also
established contact with Karuna militants and has made two
visits to detainees held by the breakaway faction, securing
the release of one prisoner.

--------------
. . . AND THE BAD NEWS:
SOME DISTURBING TRENDS
--------------


3. (C) Since December, however, ICRC has noticed some
disturbing trends, Sutter commented. In Jaffna, where 40,000
(primarily) Sinhalese Sri Lanka Army (SLA) soldiers are
regarded as an occupying force by 600,000 local Tamil
civilians, the LTTE operates primarily through civilian front
organizations, and the ICRC observes little direct
involvement of LTTE cadres--and thus few reports of LTTE
casualties and disappearances. Since December ICRC has
received increasing reports of masked armed men in civilian

clothes, driving vehicles with obscured or missing license
plates, making late-night visits to local residents' homes in
Jaffna and Vavuniya. Sometimes these visits have reportedly
ended with the resident being escorted out by these
mysterious men, not to be seen again, and sometimes the
occupants are merely threatened and the armed men leave.
Given the number of GSL security forces in Jaffna--especially
in the town area--the extensive checking of vehicles now
being conducted, and the fact that very few civilians go
anywhere at night in Jaffna these days, a plausible
supposition is that these unwelcome visitors are somehow
connected to, or at least known to, the security forces,
Sutter suggested. Acknowledging that in many cases of
alleged human rights violations the supposed witnesses are
unable to provide sufficiently clear testimony, Sutter noted
that ICRC had nonetheless amassed "strong information" in a
few cases of possible extrajudicial killings by Government of
Sri Lanka (GSL) security forces since December. "Up until
December 1, we had no such issue to discuss" with the GSL,
Sutter remarked. ICRC is alarmed at what it fears may be the
first indications of GSL backsliding toward the bad old days
of the late 1980s (during the JVP insurrection) and the 1990s
when GSL security forces' involvement in disappearances was
more common.


4. (C) In Trincomalee, the proximity of Muslim, Tamil and
Sinhalese communities to one another adds an overlay of
ethnic tension to the mix, Sutter said. ICRC is especially

COLOMBO 00000759 002 OF 002


concerned by reports that the GSL has distributed small arms
to Sinhalese villagers living in areas bordering on Tamil
communities with no clear indication that appropriate
training and Government direction accompanied the arms
distribution. Sutter said ICRC understood that the SLA had
been under pressure to increase protection to local residents
in Trincomalee after the LTTE killed six Sinhalese villagers
on April 23 (Reftel),but noted that all
residents--regardless of ethnicity--felt vulnerable and
needed protection from the GSL. The all-too rapid
materialization of Sinhalese mobs within minutes of the April
12 bombing in the marketplace had fueled suspicion that the
gangs had been pre-positioned, Sutter remarked. Increasing
the number of guns available in such a volatile atmosphere
seems unwise of the GSL, he stressed, adding that the ICRC
had made "oral representations" on the subject to the
military.


5. (C) The situation in Batticaloa is more unpredictable and
more "fluid," Krakolinig said, because of the presence of the
Karuna faction. Since Batticaloa is the "theatre of a
struggle to the death" between the LTTE and its nemesis,
casualties run high on both sides--with Tamil civilians also
frequently being targeted. ICRC's experience and
observations in the field leave little doubt of GSL support
for the Karuna faction, Sutter and Krakolinig indicated.
Karuna is a particularly "painful subject" for the LTTE,
Sutter mused, because it was the first sign of a split in the
Tigers' monolithic structure. Karuna's accessibility to the
general public during his days as a Tiger military commander
had made him especially popular, Sutter said, and the Tigers
may fear that he will be able to capitalize on his past
popularity at their expense. Part of the LTTE's emphasis on
depicting Karuna as a puppet paramilitary of the GSL could be
aimed at undermining his former popularity and sidelining him
as a potential political alternative, Sutter and Krakolinig
speculated.


6. (C) Despite the spike in violence (more conflict-related
fatalities have occurred in April alone than in the three
previous months combined),Krakolinig said the ICRC remains
hopeful (of course) that both parties will agree to meet in
Geneva. That said, the local delegation is now engaged in
contingency planning for how ICRC should respond if conflict
resumes.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) ICRC representatives were careful to stress that the
number of credible disappearances and/or probable cases of
extrajudicial killing is not high. At the same time,
however, they are obviously concerned that old habits die
hard, and that the Sri Lankan military's practices in the
not-too-distant past could quickly resume with a vengeance if
not checked immediately. People--especially Tamil
people--remember those days all too well and are thus only
too ready to believe LTTE claims that the military is up to
its old "disappearing act" once again. Many of the "cases"
reported in pro-LTTE media (and sometimes picked up in
mainstream news reports) often turn out to have little to
back them up, and purported witnesses may be either too
frightened or too suggestible to provide investigating GSL
authorities useful information or actionable evidence. But
if the ICRC has "strong information" on even a few cases, the
GSL needs to investigate as thoroughly and quickly as
possible or risk perpetuating the perception that it just
doesn't care about violations of Tamil civil rights.
LUNSTEAD