AKASHI GETS HARD LINE FROM TIGERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000757

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM CE
SUBJECT: AKASHI GETS HARD LINE FROM TIGERS


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Tigers implied to Akashi they
will not go to Geneva until Government stops all
violence against Tamils. They insisted President
Rajapaksa has the power to do so, but Akashi told
us that the President has admitted some doubts
about his control. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi
traveled to Kilinochchi to meet with Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam leadership on May 9. Akashi
traveled with Government of Sri Lanka approval;
this was in contrast to his last visit to Sri
Lanka, when the GSL refused to let him go to
Kilinochchi. Akashi asked for a meeting with LTTE
chief Prabhakaran, but this request was turned
down and he met instead with LTTE Political Wing
leader Tamilchelvan plus several other officials.


3. (C) Akashi told Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission
evening of May 9 that Tamilchelvan had passed on
Prabhakaran's apology for being unable to meet.
They then had a two-hour discussion followed by
lunch. Akashi said that Tamlichelvan made three
main points regarding the Tigers' thoughts on
whether to go to Geneva for a second round of
peace talks:

--The Tigers were anxious about full adherence by
the GSL to the Ceasefire Agreement, especially
controlling the actions of armed groups and other
violence against Tamil civilians.

--While concerned about the issue of transport for
LTTE leaders to allow them to attend a Central
Committee meeting before any decision on Geneva
II, this was clearly a secondary matter.

-------------- The Tigers were also concerned about the
manner in which they were treated at Colombo
airport when they returned from the first Geneva
meeting.

Akashi confirmed that the question of whether or
not to go to Geneva was most firmly linked to the
first point. The Tigers seemed to imply that
until violence was completely stopped, they would
not go to Geneva.


4. (C) Akashi told the Tigers that there were
ceasefire violations by both sides, including the
recent attack on the Sri Lankan Army chief.
Tamilchelvan did not reply directly, but simply
repeated that the ceasefire agreement is the
cornerstone of the peace process. When Akashi
said that President Rajapaksa might have trouble
controlling all elements of the security forces,
especially at lower levels, Tamilchelvan replied
that Rajapaksa is the Commander-in-Chief. (Akashi
told Co-Chairs that when he had met President
Rajapaksa a day earlier, Rajapaksa told him that
he could not control what happened at every level
of the security services, and added that he did
not trust the Sri Lankan police.)


5. (C) Over lunch Akashi told Tamilchelvan that
the Co-Chairs would meet at the end of May in
Tokyo, and that one item on the agenda would be
how to control Tiger financing and weapons
procurement. Tamilchelvan "pretended not to
attach great importance," Akashi said.


6. (C) COMMENT: Tamilchelvan's remarks to Akashi
appear to confirm what we have suspected all
along: the "logistical" issues regarding Geneva,

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such as transport of cadres, are just a
smokescreen. If the Tigers insist that all
violence must end before the parties return to
Geneva, the second round won't happen. In fact,
continual Tiger provocations bring about the
inevitable Government reprisals. That being said,
the GSL could do more to control actions not only
by its own forces, but also by the Karuna group
and other armed groups. Rajapaksa's comments to
Akashi about his inability to control the
security services parallels his recent remarks
to us and further underline our concerns about
whether the military and the cops are firmly
under civilian control.
LUNSTEAD