Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06COLOMBO713
2006-05-02 13:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: TIGER TRANSPORT STILL ON TABLE AS

Tags:  PTER MOPS PGOV PHUM CE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0833
OO RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #0713/01 1221340
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021340Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3270
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9574
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 9151
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6040
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 4076
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2979
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 3066
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2138
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0208
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0840
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 4498
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 6595
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1163
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000713 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PHUM CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TIGER TRANSPORT STILL ON TABLE AS
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT CONTINUES

REF: A. COLOMBO 697


B. COLOMBO 686

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

-------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000713

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PHUM CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TIGER TRANSPORT STILL ON TABLE AS
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT CONTINUES

REF: A. COLOMBO 697


B. COLOMBO 686

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Low-intensity conflict between Government of Sri
Lanka (GSL) security forces and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued April 29-May 2, including an
April 30 LTTE attack on camps run by the dissident Karuna
faction on the Batticaloa-Polonnaruwa border. Despite the
violence--and despite the LTTE's April 25 attempt on the life
of the Army Commander--a GSL offer to use Sri Lankan Air
seaplanes to transport eastern LTTE cadres to Tiger
headquarters in the north got a "positive" initial reception
from the LTTE, according to Norwegian Ambassador Hans
Brattskar, although the Tigers may still impose additional
conditions on the proposal. An April 29 statement by the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) faulting the GSL for the
April 25-26 aerial and artillery strikes against Tiger
targets and expressing "fear" that GSL security forces were
involved in extrajudicial killings drew the wrath of Defense
Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. The SLMM issued a

SIPDIS
significantly revised statement on May 2, saying it believed
the Government was "sincere" in denying any knowledge of such
activities. While we have not seen the SLMM "background
note" on extrajudicial killings, if it offers credible
evidence of even one instance of such an abuse, the GSL
should investigate the allegations as quickly as possible.
It is hard to welcome the LTTE's "positive" response to the
seaplane offer if it carries with it additional Tiger
demands, and we remain skeptical that the Tigers really want
to return to the table in Geneva. End summary.

--------------
MORE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION
--------------


2. (SBU) Low-level conflict between Government of Sri Lanka
(GSL) security forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) continued over the May Day holiday weekend
(April 29-May 1) in the north and east. On April 29 the LTTE

fired on a military bunker in a fishing village in the
northern district of Mannar, wounding a civilian. In the
northern district of Vavuniya a police officer was shot and
killed on April 29 by suspected LTTE gunmen. The same night
the LTTE and Sri Lanka Army (SLA) fired on each other's
positions near Vavunithivu (where they are less than half a
kilometer apart) and Paduwankarai in the eastern district of
Batticaloa. Although there were no reports of casualties,
the Dutch NGO ZOA reported that an estimated 700 villagers in
the area had fled their homes for the jungle since April 25.
ZOA, along with French NGO Action Contre le Faim and the
local NGO Sarvodaya, were providing humanitarian assistance
to the displaced, while the Divisional Secretary for
Batticaloa was reportedly visiting the area May 2 to assess
the situation.


3. (SBU) On April 30 the LTTE attacked three camps run by
the dissident Karuna faction east of Welikanda in the
northern district of Polonnaruwa. (The camps' location is in
a densely wooded "no man's land" between the borders of
Polonnaruwa and Batticaloa, a gray area that appears to be
neither under GSL nor Tiger control.) The LTTE claimed that
at least 15 Karuna cadres were killed in the attacks, while
Tamil Net, the pro-LTTE website, claimed that five SLA
soldiers, including a captain, were killed when they
intervened to assist the Karuna cadres in repulsing the
attack. The SLA, however, has officially denied that report.
A claymore mine attack in Kayts in the northern district of
Jaffna the same day wounded two Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) sailors.


COLOMBO 00000713 002 OF 004



4. (C) The local media reported that on April 30 the LTTE
fired on GSL Forward Defense Lines on the
Trincomalee-Mullaithivu border. According to an Army source,
artillery and mortars have been fired on SLA positions at
Kokilai and Kokkuttodvai in the border area intermittently
for the past several days. No casualties have been reported.



5. (SBU) Traditional May Day political rallies and parades
were cancelled throughout the island on May 1 amid fears that
the large crowds and rabble-rousing speeches might prove too
inviting a target for the LTTE. (There may also have been
some concern that the penchant for saber-rattling, incendiary
rhetoric typical on such occasions from parties like the
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna might further inflame ethnic
tensions.) On the same day a claymore mine attached to a
bicycle detonated in Trincomalee town as an Sri Lanka Navy
(SLN) patrol was passing, killing four civilians and two SLN
sailors. An Army soldier wounded in the April 25
assassination attempt on Army Commander Lt. General Sarath
Fonseka died of his injuries May 1, bringing the death toll
in the suicide bombing at Army Headquarters to 11.


6. (C) According to Army sources, five LTTE "Sea Tiger"
vessels fired on SLN naval craft near Trincomalee on May 1,
damaging one SLN Dvora craft and wounding five SLN sailors.
The SLN returned fire, destroying one of the Sea Tiger
vessels. The military was unable to verify Tiger casualties.
(Note: Pro-LTTE Tamil Net offered a different version of
events, reporting that the SLN fired on the Sea Tigers
first--and omitting any mention of damage to LTTE vessels.)


7. (SBU) On May 2 the LTTE and the dissident Karuna faction
reportedly traded fire in "uncleared" territory near Mutur in
the eastern district of Trincomalee. The SLA denied initial
LTTE claims that the Army was firing on LTTE positions. Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Spokesperson Helen
Olafsdottir confirmed to poloff that there had been some
"small skirmishes" in "uncleared" territory in the area
earlier in the day but stressed that neither party "was
expressing concern" about the incident. Media reports had
overblown the encounter, she indicated.

--------------
INVESTIGATION CONTINUES
--------------


8. (U) On April 29 Army Commander Fonseka, who sustained
stomach and lung injuries in the April 25 LTTE suicide bomb,
was reportedly taken off the ventilator. The following day
the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of the Criminal
Investigative Division (CID) announced that only about 35 of
the approximately 300 people taken in for questioning in
connection with the attack remained in custody. According to
local press reports, the female suicide bomber, who was
originally from the northern district of Vavuniya, had
visited the maternity clinic at the Army Hospital several
times before April 25. Information about how the suicide
bomber obtained permission to visit the Army Hospital, which
is supposed to be open only to Army personnel and their
dependents, has not been made public. Eyewitnesses reported
observing her waiting near the entrance of the hospital
before the bombing and, after receiving a call on her cell
phone, rushing forward toward the Army Commander's vehicle.
The attack planners' access to certain key information---that
Fonseka did not use an armored vehicle for transportation
within the Army Headquarters compound; that he usually left
for lunch at home on the compound following a staff meeting
on Tuesday--as well as the cell phone call presumably tipping
the bomber off to Fonseka's movements, has raised speculation
that someone on the Army Headquarters compound may have been
an accomplice in the attack.

--------------
SLMM STATEMENT DRAWS GSL FIRE

COLOMBO 00000713 003 OF 004


--------------


9. (U) On April 29 the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
issued a statement ruling the April 25-26 GSL aerial and
artillery strikes on Tiger targets in the eastern district of
Trincomalee (Ref B) "a clear violation of the Ceasefire
Agreement." The release, which also faulted the LTTE for
positioning military and political targets "amongst the
civilian population close to schools and private houses" and
which called on the Tigers to halt all "military activities
and attacks on Government forces," expressed "fear" that GSL
security forces have "been involved in extrajudicial killings
of civilians" in the north and east. The truce monitoring
organization said that its conclusion "is based on our
observation and inquiries on the ground."


10. (C) The SLMM statement provoked immediate GSL
ire--especially since it omitted any mention of the LTTE
attack on Fonseka. (The April 30 edition of the pro-JVP
Sunday Island ran a front-page story with the title: "SLMM
rules air strikes violation of truce; no word yet on suicide
bombing.") SLMM Spokeswoman Helen Olafsdottir described the
GSL as "really upset with the statement" to emboff. She said
that Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa "nearly physically
laid into" SLMM Head of Mission Ulf Henricsson in an April 30
meeting and accused Olafsdottir of being "a female Tiger
cadre." According to Olafsdottir, GSL Peace Secretariat head
Dr. Palitha Kohona expressed "concern" about her releases in
a separate meeting with Henricsson on May 1 and had to be
reminded that official SLMM statements are cleared by the
Head of Mission. Henricsson was to meet Foreign Minister
Mangala Samaraweera on May 2--presumably on the same subject.
(At a May 1 conference on World Press Freedom in Colombo,
Kohona said that the SLMM had told the GSL it would "revise"
its April 29 statement. Olafsdottir confirmed to Embassy
Information Officer on May 2 that SLMM would issue a
"clarification" of the statement. That said, SLMM "cannot
close our eyes to what is happening on the ground," she
noted; "(Henricsson) wants above all to be honest and reveal
all the truth.")


11. (U) Later on May 2 the SLMM subsequently issued a
release reporting that, after consultations with the GSL, the
truce monitoring organization was "clarifying" its April 29
statement regarding "certain unexplained violent deaths of
civilians," noting that "SLMM monitors on the ground have
expressed some concerns over the last few weeks and months
regarding the behavior of some individuals . . .that might
have been directly or indirectly involved in clandestine
activities against civilians. It was not the SLMM's
intention to generalize or pass judgements on the Sri Lankan
armed forces and police. The Sri Lankan Government has
conveyed to us that they are not aware of any such activities
within their ranks. We believe that the Sri Lankan
Government is sincere in this respect and are committed to
prevent any such clandestine activities from taking place."


12. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar told the
Ambassador on May 1 that he had seen the SLMM's "background
note" on GSL security forces' involvement in some
extrajudicial killings and believed it convincing and well
documented. He added that the background note provided ample
recent evidence of both parties violating the Ceasefire
Agreement.

--------------
SEAPLANES--AND THUS GENEVA--STILL AN OPTION
--------------


13. (C) Brattskar reported to the Ambassador on May 1 that
the SLMM had received a "positive' answer from the LTTE on
the GSL's offer to provide one or two Sri Lankan Air
seaplanes to transport eastern cadres to the north for a
meeting at LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi, which the LTTE
has stipulated as an unofficial precondition to a second

COLOMBO 00000713 004 OF 004


round of talks in Geneva. The Tigers' "positive" response
was tempered, however, by an unspecified additional condition
on the land movement of the cadres to the seaplane(s),
Brattskar advised. If this late-breaking Tiger add-on cannot
be resolved by SLMM soon, Brattskar said, Norwegian
facilitators will have to draw "conclusions" about the
Tigers' sincerity in seeking dialogue. He added that the
Tigers were claiming to have captured some Karuna cadres in
the April 30 attack on the breakaway faction's camps and that
the prisoners had supposedly been brought to Kilinochchi for
"interrogation." The Norwegian envoy summarized the
situation on the ground--as well as the atmospherics on both
sides--as "pretty terrible."


14. (C) In a May 2 telephone conversation, the Peace
Secretariat's Kohona told the Ambassador that the Tigers'

SIPDIS
"positive" reaction to the seaplane offer had been largely
limited to an agreement on the proposed landing sites,
leaving other questions--including whether the Tigers would
ultimately accept the transportation--still unanswered. He
described the April 29 SLMM reference to extrajudicial
killings as exaggerated. The Ambassador stressed the
importance of investigating any report of human rights abuses
by GSL security forces, raising the apparent extrajudicial
killings of five Tamil students in Trincomalee on January 2
as an example. Kohona assured him the investigation was
"proceeding"; the Ambassador urged the GSL to publicize its
efforts in this case.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) There was no attempt to cover up the GSL's April
25-26 aerial and artillery strikes against the LTTE; thus the
SLMM finding that the attacks violated the Ceasefire
Agreement should come as a surprise to no one. The Tigers'
typical refusal to acknowledge responsibility makes an SLMM
ruling of LTTE guilt in the April 25 attempt on Fonseka's
life--no matter how overwhelming the circumstantial
evidence--more difficult. Such nuances are understandably
lost on the GSL, especially when that same SLMM ruling also
refers to a "conviction" and "fear" of GSL security forces'
involvement in extrajudicial killings. While we have not
seen the SLMM "background note" on extrajudicial killings, if
it offers credible evidence of even one instance of such an
abuse, the GSL should look into the allegations as quickly
and dispassionately as possible. Shooting the messenger is
no way to defuse steadily mounting ethnic tensions, and the
GSL reaction (which has been widely publicized in the local
press) only feeds the xenophobic paranoia that prevails in
some quarters of the majority community.


16. (C) Comment (cont.): It is hard to welcome the LTTE's
"positive" response to the seaplane offer if it carries with
it additional Tiger demands. Some observers had speculated
in the immediate aftermath of the Fonseka assassination
attempt that after some residual "show-of-strength"
operations from both sides, dialogue would resume. As the
list of violent "incidents" lengthens with each passing
day--and with the disturbing new addition of LTTE attacks on
the renegade Karuna faction--this prospect seems increasingly
fantastic. We remain skeptical that the Tigers really want
to go to Geneva--but they will provably stretch out the
seaplane talks for as long as they can.
LUNSTEAD