SRI LANKA: CLAYMORES, CYANIDE, AND CIVILIANS:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000661

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA, SCA/INS
NSC FOR E.MILLARD
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: CLAYMORES, CYANIDE, AND CIVILIANS:
TIGERS RABBLE ROUSE, GSL OFFERS HELICOPTER TRANSPORT

REF: A. COLOMBO 654

B. COLOMBO 650

C. COLOMBO 646

D. COLOMBO 634

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reason: 1.4(b,d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued
small-scale attacks against military and civilian targets in
the north and east April 21-23, killing eleven members of the
security forces and six Sinhalese villagers in separate
incidents. For the second time in as many weeks, a Sinhalese
mob in Trincomalee responded to LTTE provocation by torching
Tamil homes on April 21, reviving grim memories of the
communal violence that tore through Sri Lanka in the early
1980s. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) attempted to deny
the LTTE any pretext to back out of a second round of talks
in Geneva, issuing several tough statements April 21-23 and
offering a larger helicopter to transport eastern LTTE cadres
to Tiger Headquarters in Kilinochchi. The LTTE has indicated
interest in the helo offer "in principle," according to the
Norwegian Ambassador, but has not confirmed acceptance. The
Norwegians are pressing for an April 28 Co-chairs meeting in
Oslo. Foreign Secretary H.M.G.S. Palihakkara contacted the
Ambassador April 23 to express concern at the escalating
violence and to ask that the international community issue a
"strong warning" to the LTTE. The Government's concession on
a larger helicopter seems to offer the only ray of hope left
for resurrecting talks in Geneva in the near term. It
remains to be seen if the LTTE will find yet another reason
to reject this offer and continue the killing. End summary.


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Claymores and Cyanide Capsules
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2. (SBU) The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
continued small-scale attacks against Sri Lanka security
forces April 21-23. Five police and one Homeguard soldier (a
member of a local militia) died in LTTE claymore mine attacks
on April 21 in the eastern district of Trincomalee. A USAID
contractor in the East confirmed to poloff that a Sinhalese
mob in Trincomalee, in apparent retaliation, burned about 10
Tamil houses in the vicinity later the same day. There were
reports that one Tamil civilian was killed in the ensuing
violence. On April 22, a claymore mine at a checkpoint in
the northern district of Vavuniya killed four Sri Lanka Army
(SLA) soldiers and injured ten others, while a claymore mine
explosion injured two other soldiers in Polonnaruwa District.
At an eastern railway crossing on April 23, security forces
shot and killed two Tiger cadres as they reportedly attempted
to throw a hand grenade at the checkpoint. Three policemen
were injured in Batticaloa on the same evening when suspected
LTTE cadres threw a hand grenade into the police station.


3. (SBU) Security Forces claim to have discovered a large
stock of explosives at the scene of another incident on April
23 in which Air Force personnel shot and killed a suspected
LTTE cadre during a cordon and search operation in
Trincomalee. On April 23, a suspected LTTE cadre,
apprehended by police near Polonnaruwa, swallowed a cyanide
capsule in an apparent suicide attempt, according to military
spokesperson Brigadier Prasad Samarasinghe.


4. (C) Following the market-place bomb in Trincomalee on
April 12, the LTTE launched a second assault on local

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civilians, apparently primed to incite communal violence,
when suspected Tigers murdered six young Sinhalese farmers in
the district on April 23. According to USAID's office there,
Trincomalee remained tense April 24 as the bodies of the dead
farmers were transported to the provincial hospital. A
curfew remains in place since April 12 and security forces
have established additional checkpoints in response to the
violence.

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Foreign Ministry Calls for "Strong Warning"
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5. (C) In an April 23 telephone call to the Ambassador,
Foreign Secretary H.M.G.S. Palihakkara, expressing concern at
the escalating violence, reported that President Rajapaksa,
in a bid to break the deadlock, had authorized the use of a
10-panssenger helicopter to transport eastern LTTE cadres to
Tiger headquarters in Kilinochchi. This showed the
Government was willing to make every effort to keep talks
going, Palihakkara asserted. The Foreign Secretary reported
the President intended to go on TV soon to make an appeal for
calm. (As of COB April 24, he had not yet appeared on
television.) Palihakkara speculated that the Tigers were
attempting to generate a communal backlash in order to
influence the impending elections in Tamil Nadu. He asked
that the international community issue a "strong warning" to
the Tigers. The Ambassador agreed that the Tiger campaign of
violence was deplorable, but wondered that "warning" we would
give. Ambassador responded that the continuing Tiger campaign
of violence was deplorable, but wondered that "warning" we
would give. Ambassador also asked Palihakkara if he thought
the killing of the six Sinhalese civilians might be
retaliation for shooting of five Tamil civilians in Jaffna on
April 17, whose bodies were discovered just outside a Sri
Lankan Army camp.

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Facilitators Respond
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6. (C) Ambassador also spoke April 24 with Norwegian
Ambassador Hans Brattskar, who said that the GSL had agreed
in principle to the provision of a larger helicopter, but had
provided no details. Press stories that morning in which the
GSL complained there had been no response from the LTTE were
incorrect, Brattskar emphasized; the LTTE had communicated
its interest "in principle," but needed further details.
Brattskar said that he was "pretty fed up" with
Government-inspired anti-Norway stories which had been
appearing in the recent local press. (There was a spate of
such stories in the weekend papers, including one which
detailed a conversation between Ambassador Lunstead and the
President's Secretary.) Brattskar added that Norway wanted
to have a Co-Chairs meeting on Friday, April 28 in Oslo. The
GSL, he said, did not want this meeting--perhaps, Brattskar
speculated, because it was afraid of the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM) report on how the parties had fulfilled the
commitments made during the first round of talks in February,
which would be provided to the Co-Chairs at the meeting.


7. (C) Ambassador spoke later that same day with Peace
Secretariat head Palitha Kohona, who said that there was

SIPDIS
"nothing back from Kilinochchi" on the Government offer of a
larger helicopter. He was hoping for a positive response and
had all the details in front of him if the Tigers agreed.
Kohona added that they had one other transport option -- a
Sri Lankan Airlines seaplane to ferry the LTTE cadres north.
"Our objective is to call the LTTE bluff" on Geneva, he said.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) While the LTTE continues to refuse resumed dialogue
until its transportation demands are met, the body toll among
both Sinhalese and Tamils, civilian and military, keeps
climbing. With each new incident of bloodshed comes the grim
possibility of communal mob violence, already unleashed on
hard-pressed Tamil villagers twice in the past two weeks.
Whatever or whoever may be behind the "Sinhalese goons" who
have terrorized Tamil civilians--and regardless of whether
the gangs are organized or a spontaneous outburst of
long-simmering ethnic enmities--the Government has got to get
a handle on it soon or risk a reenactment of the bloody 1983
massacre that helped kick off the 23-year conflict. As the
Ambassador urged the Foreign Minister last week (Ref C),the
President needs to get out ahead of the accelerating cycle of
attack and retaliatory attack with a strong message to all
Sri Lankans that mob rule and ethnic score-settling will not
be tolerated. End comment.
LUNSTEAD