SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN FACILITATORS SEE SLIGHT HOPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000634

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN FACILITATORS SEE SLIGHT HOPE
FOR GENEVA TALKS

REF: A. COLOMBO 613


B. COLOMBO 620

C. COLOMBO 601

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In an April 19 meeting with the Ambassador, Norwegian
Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer and Norwegian Ambassador Hans
Brattskar said they still held out some hope that talks in
Geneva between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
and the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) might take place April
24-25 but expressed concern that the LTTE might use vague
"security considerations" as yet another pretext to pull out.
While the LTTE's campaign of violence raises serious
questions about its commitment to the peace process, the
Norwegians also questioned whether President Mahinda
Rajapaksa (who refused to meet Hanssen-Bauer on the eve of
his April 20 trip to LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi) has
the political will to pursue a peace process that may lead
toward a "federal solution." Ambassador Lunstead observed
that while Rajapaksa's intentions about the peace process
seem good, his understanding of what might constitute an
acceptable resolution--and what the political costs of
advancing that proposal might be--seems weak. The Norwegians
agreed that the rapidly deteriorating situation warrants an
early Co-chair meeting--perhaps in Europe on April 28. End
summary.

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ONE "HAPPY MOMENT," SUCCEEDED BY UNCERTAINTY
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2. (C) In an April 19 meeting with the Ambassador, Norwegian
Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer and Norwegian Ambassador Hans
Brattskar said they were seeking advice from him on next
steps, following the postponement of talks between the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of
Sri Lanka (GSL) in Geneva and the continued disagreement
between the two parties on transporting Tiger cadres from the
east to LTTE headquarters in the north for consultations
(Refs A and B). The Norwegians said some slight hope remains
that talks in Geneva could still take place on April 24-25 if
the transportation issue were resolved. Hanssen-Bauer said
he had one "happy moment" April 15 when it appeared that the
Tigers would accept transportation to the north by civilian
ferry, accompanied by the head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM),but these plans fell through when the LTTE
rejected the arrangement at the last minute for "tremendously
complex reasons" (Ref B). The SLMM is now working on another
plan--originally suggested by President Rajapaksa 10 days
ago--to have the eastern LTTE military commanders brought to
the north by private helicopter, Hanssen-Bauer reported.
Although GSL Peace Secretariat head Palitha Kohona has
finally identified a private helicopter operator to ferry the
Tigers, Brattskar noted, two days of valuable time have
already been lost. (Note: The Tigers have stipulated that
they need a seven-day window before talks begin for internal
consultations with their cadres. End note.)


3. (C) The Norwegians have already warned the GSL it may be
too late to proceed with talks on April 24-25, Hanssen-Bauer
said, adding "we have signaled to both sides we have done all
that we could" and it is now up to the parties to decide if
they want to pursue talks. When LTTE Peace Secretariat head
Pulidevan had called him to explain why the Tigers had
rejected the ferry transport at the eleventh hour,
Hanssen-Bauer said, "I told him, 'I'm not interested.'"
Hanssen-Bauer said that he tried to impress on Pulidevan that
the Tigers had hurt themselves by backing out of the talks,
arguing that the Tigers' unreasonable behavior had only made
the GSL look good. He noted that the LTTE had mentioned
vague "security considerations" about accepting the private
helo arrangement. Should the Tigers push that position

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during his April 20 visit to Kilinochchi, Hanssen-Bauer said,
"we would find that argument hard to accept."

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ARE THE TIGERS SINCERE?
EVEN NORWEGIANS BEGINNING TO WONDER
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4. (C) The Tigers' surprise cancellation of the
SLMM-brokered travel arrangements on April 15, coupled with
their campaign of violence against civilian and military
targets (Ref B),raise troubling questions about the Tigers'
sincerity in the peace process, Hanssen-Bauer continued. He
said that he had told the LTTE the violence is detrimental to
its own goals and must stop. The Tigers have long-term goals
but short-term tactics that they adjust when they believe it
suits their purposes, Ambassador Lunstead observed. For the
Tigers, violence is a matter of simple tactics, rather than
principle or ideology; they turn the violence on or off
according to their own internal calculations about what best
serves their purpose at a given time. That said, the April
12 bombing of a vegetable market in Trincomalee (Ref C) was
qualitatively different from other Tiger attacks since the
ceasefire, the Ambassador observed, in that it targeted
civilians and seemed intended to ignite communal tensions.


5. (C) If the LTTE set off the bomb in the market (of which
he said he was not certain),does it mean that the Tigers
view the entire peace process as an exercise in futility,
Hanssen-Bauer asked rhetorically. Unhappy with the prospect
of a terrorist listing by the EU, have they decided to end
any attempt at achieving a peaceful resolution? Or was the
market attack meant as a warning to the GSL that it must
comply with its commitments (to restrain the Karuna faction)
from the first round of talks in February? Any of these
possibilities is disturbing, Ambassador Lunstead replied,
especially since the Tigers have made an obvious decision not
to worry about civilian casualties to achieve their ends. He
noted, however, that sources in military intelligence do not
believe recent small-scale attacks by the LTTE presage a
return to full-scale conflict but speculate instead that the
LTTE may attempt a grab at Jaffna before (re)settling down to
peace talks from a position of enhanced strength. According
to these sources, the attacks in Trincomalee and Vavuniya may
be an attempt by the Tigers to force the military to divert
resources away from Jaffna--which so far the military has not
done.

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ALSO WONDERING IF GSL UNDERSTANDS IMPLICATIONS
OF CONTINUING PEACE TALKS (I.E., FEDERALISM)
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6. (C) Continuing the peace talks implies, at the end of the
road, some kind of federal solution, Hanssen-Bauer commented.
Does the GSL understand that? Ambassador Lunstead replied
that President Rajapaksa seems sincere in wanting peace but
unsure about how to go about achieving it. Rajapaksa does not
seem to understand the depth of Tamil grievances and thus
underestimates the profound changes that will be needed to
address them, the Ambassador said. Rajapaksa's repeated and
simplistic suggestion that the provincial council system
allows adequate provision for Tamil aspirations is an example
of how little he understands the situation. Rajapaksa's
intentions are good, but his understanding of Tamil
grievances and aspirations is weak, the Ambassador said. On
the other hand, the President is willing to listen to
arguments and to change his mind.


7. (C) Another potential problem for the President is that
he wants a southern consensus on a final solution--which
means keeping the Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (JVP) on board, the Ambassador said. Rajapaksa may
be mistaken in his belief that he can eventually bring the
JVP around, the Ambassador noted. However, while Rajapaksa
has an aversion to the term "federalism," he does not seem to
object to its basic premise, the Ambassador observed, and has

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indicated that the Indian "system" (which he does not seem to
consider federalism) might be worth reviewing. Regrettably,
however, the GSL has not developed a single, uniform message
articulating its goals, the Ambassador commented, noting that
various GSL spokesmen and ministers shift back and forth
between calling for a "unified" and "unitary" state.


8. (C) Ambassador Brattskar noted that President Rajapaksa
had turned down a Norwegian request to meet Hanssen-Bauer
before he travels to Kilinochchi on April 20. Brattskar
speculated that the President may be basing his decision on
the fact that the Norwegian facilitator will not be meeting
Tiger supreme leader Prabhakaran on this trip, but stressed
that, even in the worst of times, they had never had any
problem meeting President Kumaratunga. He noted recent press
reports criticizing the Norwegians and the SLMM for "going
the extra mile for the Tigers" in trying to resolve the
transportation issue--when all they were really doing was
trying to salvage the fast-deteriorating peace process. "We
don't want to lose our relationship with the LTTE, but the
public perception is that we're biased," Hanssen-Bauer said.
Now is the time for the GSL to signal flexibility to move the
peace process ahead, he added, rather than sticking on points
of protocol. Ambassador Lunstead offered to raise the matter
with Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera and Presidential
Secretary Lalith Weeratunga. (The Ambassador spoke to

SIPDIS
Weeratunga later in the day, and he promised to see if the
President could find time to meet Hanssen-Bauer. Weeratunga
also said there was no protocol or pride issue involved.)


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EU WRITING ON THE WALL?
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9. (C) Ambassador Brattskar said he believes the Tigers may
view an EU listing of the LTTE as a terrorist organization as
inevitable and permanent until a final resolution of the
conflict is achieved. Once the EU designates the LTTE, will
the Japanese follow? It is important that the Tigers know
any designation is linked (as the US has done) to their
behavior, Ambassador Lunstead replied; if their behavior
changes, the designation can be lifted. The Tigers' repeated
and flagrant ceasefire violations have driven the designation
process to this point, he continued; for the EU to continue
to overlook Tiger behavior would be difficult. It would tell
the Tigers that their behavior has no consequences.
Brattskar agreed, but noted the difficulties an EU
designation might raise for the continued participation of
Sweden, Denmark and Finland in the SLMM. "We absolutely need
to know what it means for the SLMM," he said. Ambassador
Lunstead suggested the possibility of an "SLMM set-aside" in
the designation.

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NEXT CO-CHAIRS MEETING
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10. (C) Ambassador Brattskar agreed that shifting the next
Co-chairs meeting until the end of May was inadvisable. He
reported that International Development Minister Erik Solheim
planned to call Japanese facilitator Yasushi Akashi to
propose an earlier, more immediate co-chairs meeting in a
European capital o/a April 28 but would try to sweeten the
message by proposing a Co-chairs meeting in Tokyo at a later
date, perhaps in September. Ambassador Lunstead said that
April 28 in Europe could work and agreed that planning a
later meeting in Tokyo would be a good idea.

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COMMENT
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11. (C) New to Sri Lanka and its bloody history,
Hanssen-Bauer seemed genuinely perplexed by the LTTE's
about-face on the transportation issue and searching for an
explanation of the Tigers' stepped-up violence. While he and

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Brattskar still hold out (faint) hope of salvaging talks in
Geneva, the Norwegians seem increasingly uncertain, absent
clearer evidence of Tiger commitment to the peace process and
GSL willingness to begin serious consideration of a political
settlement, where those talks might lead. Like the
Norwegians, we believe a Co-chairs meeting is needed sooner,
rather than later, to discuss implications of the rapidly
changing situation.
LUNSTEAD