CO-CHAIRS DISCUSSION: STILL SLIM CHANCE FOR GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000613

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS, USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV CE
SUBJECT: CO-CHAIRS DISCUSSION: STILL SLIM CHANCE FOR GENEVA
TALKS ON APR 24, CO-CHAIRS MEETING IN TOKYO ON 24TH
POSSIBLE IF GENEVA FALLS THROUGH BUT DIFFICULT; EU LISTING
DECISION ON LTTE LIKELY SOON


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Co-Chair reps met in Colombo April 17.
Problems on both sides led to failure of transport of Tiger
leaders on April 15, but Tigers bear most blame. There is one
last chance to arrange transportation by civilian helicopter,
which could allow Geneva to take place April 24-25 as
planned. Co-Chairs Senior-level meeting in Tokyo planned for
April 24 will be difficult to hold even if Geneva is
cancelled. Japanese Special Envoy Akashi plans to visit Sri
Lanka beginning May 6. EU may decide on a terrorist listing
for LTTE at COADSI meeting mid-May. If Geneva II does not
take place, local reps predict a listing is inevitable. Legal
implications of a listing for SLMM--now headed by a
Swede--are not clear, but could be troublesome. SLMM will
present its report on events since Geneva I to Norway on
April 18--the report will likely anger both sides. Key
government figure expresses frustration and fears greater
violence to come. END SUMMARY.

One Last Try on Transport
--------------


2. (C) In the face of escalating violence in the North over
the past week, local Co-Chair representatives (Chiefs of
Mission of US, EC, Netherlands representing EU Presidency,
Japan and Norway) met April 17 to discuss events over the
preceding long holiday weekend and implications for the
future. Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar said that breakdown
on April 15 of arrangements for sea transport of LTTE leaders
from East to North (septel) was because "things happened on
both sides." Nonetheless, he admitted, the Tigers reneged on
an agreed procedure, which he attributed to their "lack of
confidence" in the GSL. Brattskar is working on one more
option--transport of some LTTE cadres by commercial
helicopter. This is possible, he said, if the GSL wants it to
happen. He added that at least some people in the GSL were
trying to make this work. If this could be arranged quickly,
it might still be possible to hold Geneva II as scheduled on
April 24. Brattskar continued that Norway has decided to
bring Special Envoy Jon Han
ssen-Bauer back to Sri Lanka beginning April 18 through the
end of the week.

High-Level Meeting Still Possible
--------------


3. (C) Brattskar said that Norway still wants to have a
high-level Co-Chairs meeting. Japanese Ambassador Suda said
that even if Geneva II did not take place as scheduled, it
was not possible to have the meeting scheduled for Tokyo on
April 24, as it would be "impossible to prepare" on such
short notice. (NOTE: Ambassador Brattskar told Ambassador
Lunstead April 16 that Eric Solheim wanted to continue with
the Co-Chairs meeting as planned if Geneva II did not take
place as scheduled.) Suda added that Japanese Special Envoy
Akashi now planned to visit Sri Lanka on May 6 for about a
week; perhaps the high-level meeting could take place after
that. When Ambassador Lunstead pressed if April 24 were
definitively off the table, Suda backed up, saying that he
had nothing formal from Tokyo and that it was his opinion
that the meeting should not take place then. He thought that
if Geneva II did not occur, the Co-Chairs would need to take
some serious policy decisions, and this would require more
preparation time. Suda made clear that the Japanese expected
the next co-chairs meeting, whenever it is held, to be in
Tokyo.


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EU to Designate LTTE?
--------------


4. (C) EU Ambassador Wilson said that if Geneva II did not
take place, there would be strong momentum within the EU to
designate the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Netherlands
Ambassador van Dijk confirmed that the EU had already decided
that the LTTE deserved to be listed. The EU was only holding
off because of the ongoing peace process. EU Missions in Sri
Lanka would need to make recommendations shortly, and the
issue would then be taken up at a COASI meeting in mid-May.
Van Dijk made it clear he thought the EU should and would
list the Tigers.


5. (C) EU reps said implications of a listing were not all
clear. The main legal impact would be to make funding or
other assistance to Tigers illegal. While not legally
required, from a political perspective a listing would make
continued contact with the LTTE difficult. One possible
complication would be with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
(SLMM),whose Head and Deputy are now Swedes, and whose staff
comes from Iceland, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, in addition
to non-EU member Norway. The SLMM certainly provides certain
types of assistance to the LTTE, such as arranging, and
sometimes paying for, transport. These actions are in support
of the peace process, but technically might be illegal after
a listing. Brattskar said that this could cause huge problems
for Norway. (Norway just recently gave up leadership of SLMM
to a Swede to counter arguments that its dual role as peace
process facilitator and head of SLMM was a conflict of
interest.)

SLMM Report Coming
--------------


6. (C) Brattskar said that the SLMM report on how the LTTE
and the GSL had adhered to their commitments at Geneva I
would be given to Norway April 18. The original plan was to
present the report to both parties at Geneva II. If that
meeting did not take place, Brattskar was unsure what would
happen. He believed it would be useful to make the report
public. While he had not seen the report, he was sure that it
would "go far on every issue," and would likely displease
both sides for its criticism of their failures to follow
through on their commitments.

GSL Frustrated, Restraint Being Challenged
--------------


7. (C) After Co-Chairs meeting, Ambassador spoke with Peace
Secretariat Head Palitha Kohone. Palitha said that he had met

SIPDIS
with the Navy Commander and SLMM Head that morning to discuss
the events of Saturday, but still could not understand why
the LTTE pulled out of the sea transport. With claymore mine
attacks continuing, he said, a point will arrive where the
GSL will no longer be able to exercise restraint. "The LTTE
is trying to create a situation like 1983," he said. (A
reference to the anti-Tamil riots of July 1983 in which
thousands of Tamils died.) "Then they will blame the
government." Kohone continued that he had managed to convince
the military to agree to the idea of LTTE transport in a
civilian helicopter, and had talked to the private operator
to tell them that the GSL agreed with this proposal.
Lamenting the continuous string of mine attacks, an obviously
frustrated Kohone said that "it is getting to the point where
people like me will be ignored," and the military will not be
restrained.


8. (C) COMMENT: Brattskar did not say so explicitly at the

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meeting, but it is clear Norway thinks a Co-Chairs high-level
meeting should be held soon if Geneva II falls through. All
other local representatives, except Japanese Ambassador, were
clear that a delay until mid-May after an Akashi visit was
too long to wait. Our own view is that the Tigers simply do
not want to go to Geneva, and will find some other excuse if
necessary. In that case, our view is that an early Co-Chairs
meeting, which would make clear that the LTTE bears the brunt
of the blame for the breakdown in the peace talks, is
desirable. April 24 is tight but still doable--if senior
officials make it clear this needs to happen. Kohone's lament
illustrates a dangerous trend: while the military remains
firmly under civilian control here, they will push for more
robust retaliation, and in the absence of some change in the
situation, will get that approval sooner or later. The
result, however, will not be a diminution of the
bloodletting, but a w
idened conflict with tragic consequences for the civilian
population. That might be just what the Tigers, in their
callous and cold-blooded calculations, want.
LUNSTEAD