GOVERNMENT ASKS CO-CHAIRS FOR STRONG RESPONSE AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000600

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS, USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV CE
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT ASKS CO-CHAIRS FOR STRONG RESPONSE AS
TIGER ATTACKS CONTINUE; SECOND ROUND OF GENEVA TALKS IN
JEOPARDY

REF: A) COLOMBO 583 (B) OSLO 467

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Co-Chair ambassadors, minus the U.S., pushed
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) hard in an August
10 meeting to make clear its commitment to "Geneva II" but
the Tigers are focused on the "transportation issue" in which
the GSL has refused to chopper Eastern Tigers to the North
for a pre-Geneva LTTE huddle. The GSL, in a late April 12
briefing of the diplomatic corps, made clear that it remains
committed to going to Geneva, even after a series of bombings
including this afternoon's in a Trincomalee market which
apparently killed civilians and has led to revenge mob
violence there. As of COB April 12, it is not clear if the
Tigers will appear in Geneva. GSL behavior since Geneva I
has not been perfect but the latest LTTE violence, coming
around the co-chairs trip to Kilinochchi, is over the top and
appears to be an intentional slap at the co-chairs. END
SUMMARY

Co-Chairs Meet Tigers
--------------


2. (C) Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission (COM's) minus the US
traveled to Kilinocchi Monday April 10 to meet with LTTE
political head Tamilchelvan and deliver strong message to
LTTE as agreed with GSL President Rajapakse the previous week
(ref A). Immediately after returning to Colombo, COM's
(Netherlands Ambassador van Dijk, Norwegian Ambassador
Brattskar),joined by Ambassador Lunstead, met with Peace
Secretariat (SCOPP) head Palitha Kohona for debriefing.

SIPDIS
(Japanese Ambasador Suda and EC Rep Wilson had traveled to
Kilinocchi, but did not participate in debrief. Meeting took
place shortly after word of LTTE claymore mine attack on Army
vehicle near Jaffna (septel).


3. (C) According to van Dijk,

--Tigers listened somberly to co-chair points about need for
Tigers to do what they said they'd do at Geneva

--Tigers clearly obsessed with "transportation issue" i.e.
their denied request for the GSL to airlift their cadres so
Northern and Eastern elements can meet and coordinate before
Geneva II on April 19. The Tigers are insisting it must be
by helo, rejecting GSL offered of air-conditioned ferry.
This has clearly has become a point of honor between the two
sides. Kohona said that GSL was refusing helo transport for
"security reasons" and anyway, "Why should LTTE get
helicopter transport when Sri Lankan Army generals did not
have such facilities"? Ambassador Lunstead responded
forcefully that this was silly: if Geneva II were agreed to,
the GSL would move LTTE delegates from the Wanni to Colombo
airport by helicopter, not by air-conditioned ferry. Why then
the stress on this now? Kohona looked a bit abashed at this.
(Comment: Newly-installed SCOPP Deputy Kethesh Loganathan had
told us earlier that same morning that it was the military
which was refusing to give the Tigers helo transport, and
that no one on the
civilian side seemed able or willing to overrule them. This
leaves civilians like Kohona in the uncomfortable position of
making lame excuses.)

--Tigers pledged to abstain from attacks. COM's said this was
not enough, they needed to move to a political discussion
with the Government.


4. (C) Van Dijk said that he then told the LTTE, speaking for

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the EU, not the Co-Chairs, that the EU had already decided
that the Tigers qualified for listing as a terrorist
organization. Such a listing had been avoided only because of
the ongoing political process. If the Tigers wished to avert
a listing, they needed to (1) abstain from violence and (2)
engage politically with the GSL. Tamilchelvan's response was
that the Tigers had gone it alone before, they could go it
alone again if necessary. Van Dijk emphasized that the
international community would hate to disengage but it was up
to the Tigers.


5. (C) Van Dijk said the Co-Chairs made three points to the
Tigers regarding the planned Geneva II talks:

--President Rajapakse had asked the Co-Chairs to convey to
the Tigers that he was committed to fulfilling the
commitments the GSL had made at Geneva I.

--The President had also given absolute assurances on the
security of the LTTE delegation while transiting Colombo
airport.

--The President wanted to resolve the "transport" issue, and
the GSL would communicate with the Tigers through the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).

Another LTTE attack
--------------


6. (C) Afternoon of Tuesday, April 11 there was another
claymore attack in Trincomalee which killed 12 Sri Lanka Navy
personnel in a bus traveling for holiday leave. (Details
septel). Peace Secretariat (SCOPP) Secretary General Palitha
Kohona immediately asked Co-Chairs to come for a meeting.
Present at meeting late April 11 afternoon (a local holiday)
were SCOPP head Palitha Kohona, Def Sec Gotabaya Rajapaksa,
Chief of Defense Staff Admiral Sandagiri, Presidential
Adviser Nivard Cabrall, plus staff. Co-Chairs had Ambassador
Lunstead, Netherlands Amb van Dijk, Japanese Amb Suda and
Norwegian PolCouns. Norwegian Amb Brattskar was unable to
come as he was on the phone continuously with Norwegian peace
envoys Eric Solheim and Jon Hanssen-Bauer.


7. (C) Kohona said that he had asked C-Chairs to this meeting
with express authorization of President. The incident near
Trinco with 12 sailors dead, several civilians badly injured,
including at least one UK national, was similar to the
previous day's Jaffna attack. "This type of incident cannot
be allowed to pass." The GSL was busy making preps for Geneva
II. In fact, they had been holding preparatory meetings when
the word of the latest attack came in. "The Tigers continue
to provoke us, we don't know how long the Admiral can hold
his men back." There was a limit to what the GSL could take.
The sailors killed were on a bus, unarmed and on their way
home for the New Years holiday. The President had agreed to
the previous day's Co-Chairs trip to Kilinocchi because a
hard message was to be passed, "but these attacks were not in
the script." Kohona said he had been instructed by the
President to urge the Co-Chairs to take the matter up in the
strongest terms. For the EU, he had a message that it was
time fo
r them to list the LTTE as a terrorist organization.


8. (C) Kohona continued that the President was taking
enormous political risks in maintaining the policy of going
to Geneva to talk to the LTTE, and "this is his reward."
Cabral added that the LTTE has its hand on the "volume knob"
-- it turns up or turns down the violence as it wishes. "For
our part," Kohona said, "it is not an option to go to war. We
want to continue with negotiations." But it was difficult for

COLOMBO 00000600 003 OF 004


the President to keep the momentum in these circumstances.


9. (C) Van Dijk responded that a clear message had been given
to the LTTE the day before, and in particular that unless
there were progress on peace they would likely be listed as a
terrorist organization by the EU. Van Dijk said that he had
called LTTE Peace Secretariat Head Pulidevan earlier that day
after word of the Trinco attack and had "beat the shit out of
him." Van Dijk told Pulidevan the international community
will not be blackmailed, nor will the GSL. Pulidevan said he
would convey the message to his leadership. Norwegian
PolCouns added that Oslo had spoken to LTTE lead negotiator
Balasingham twice that day.


10. (C) Ambassador Lunstead expressed sympathy for the losses
and asked what Kohona meant when he spoke of a limit. What
happened past that limit? A return to war would be disastrous
for the Government. GSL representatives had no clear answer,
except to say that they were committed to peace and to the
Geneva talks, but the past few days' events had made this
more difficult. Van Dijk added that the Swiss Ambassador had
told him that unless there were an answer from the LTTE by
Wednesday, April 12 that they were going to Geneva, there
would not be enough time to make the practical arrangements.
(In an April 12 conversation with DCM, Swiss DCM Sturzinger
confirmed that a deadline had been given to try to force the
issue but said his government will hang on as long as
possible before pulling the plug on the talks for logistical
reasons.) An April 19 session therefore now seemed out of the
question. Kohona added that he and Pulidevan had discussed
the transport issue that morning by phone and that he had
been hoping to resolve it, but that now this was so much more
difficult.

Geneva Still Uncertain, Norway Sending Tough Letter
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Co-Chair COM's met again morning of April 12.
Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar noted there had been 25-30
deaths in the past week, including two policemen killed in
yet another claymore mine attack this morning. New SLMM chief
Henricsson had been in Jaffna and Kilinochchi and would be in
Trincomalee today. Henricsson was being trying to solve the
"transport" question. There were many suggestions, but the
Tigers continued to insist on "established practice" of
helicopter transport.


12. (C) Brattskar continued that both sides were playing a
political game. In fact, he said, the real problem was that
both sides were failing to take any positive steps after
Geneva I to build confidence and move the process forward.
Eric Solheim was sending a letter to both parties which would
make them both unhappy. It would tell them that they had both
missed an opportunity after Geneva I. Both sides needed to
show they wanted to move forward; if they could not do that,
Norway could not do it for them. They also both need to
affirm the role of the SLMM. Brattskar also said that Solheim
had spoken to Foreign Minister Samaraweera following
Samaraweera's April 8 press interview (SEPTEL) in which he
had criticized both Norway and the SLMM. Samaraweera
responded that the positive things he had said about Norway
were omitted by the journalist. Basically, Brattskar said,
Solheim was telling both sides: "shape up or you don't have a
peace process."

Embassy Statement Issued
--------------


13. (U) Embassy issued following statement morning of Aug 12:


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QUOTE: The United States condemns in the strongest possible
terms the recent terrorist attacks carried out by the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against the armed
forces of Sri Lanka. Our sympathies are with the families of
the victims. The U.S. calls upon the LTTE to cease these
violent attacks, to return to the ceasefire implementation
talks and to engage constructively in the search for a
political solution. The U.S. commends the continued restraint
of the Government in the face of these provocations. The
U.S. also condemns other recent incidents of violence, in
particular the April 7 murder of Mr. V. Vigneswaran in
Trincomalee. The U.S. calls upon both the LTTE and the
Government of Sri Lanka to fulfill the commitments they made
at the February talks in Geneva and to take all possible
steps to build a positive atmosphere for future talks. END
QUOTE


14. (C) All Colombo diplomats were summoned to MFA for
briefing by Kohona and Sandagiri afternoon of April 12.
Briefing came just moments after news of a bomb explosion at
a (Sinhalese) market in Trinco. Details of killed/wounded not
known, but we hear that a Sinhalese mob may have formed and
begun looting. Briefing largely presented information we had
already heard, but Kohona stressed that GSL was still ready
to go to Geneva--while emphasizing that attacks were reducing
government flexibility.


15. (C) COMMENT: While GSL actions have not been perfect,
these latest LTTE attacks far surpass any GSL failings.
Moreover, coming on the heels of the Co-Chairs visit to
Kilinocchi, they seem a direct slap at the Co-Chairs. There
is still a very slim chance that the second round of Geneva
talks may take place, but these attacks make it even more
difficult to resolve the transportation issue which seems to
be holding things up. Solheim's letter to both sides is a
tough one, as it should be.
LUNSTEAD