SRI LANKA: VIOLENCE, VERBIAGE THREATEN GENEVA TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000592

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: VIOLENCE, VERBIAGE THREATEN GENEVA TALKS

REF: A. COLOMBO 148


B. COLOMBO 543

C. OSLO 467

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (U) Summary: After a brief moratorium on violence
following the late January announcement of the first round of
Geneva talks (Ref A),the all-too-regrettable pattern of
tit-for-tat bloodshed between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) and its armed rivals has resumed with a
vengeance. Following the April 7 assassination of a pro-LTTE
Tamil politician and a reported assault on an LTTE camp in
Trincomalee, the LTTE launched a series of isolated,
small-scale attacks on government security forces, bringing
the death toll to as many as thirty in just five days.
Overshadowing the violence on the ground is an unhelpful war
of words between key members of the government and the
departing head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
that has left Norwegian facilitator and International
Development Minister Erik Solheim "hopping mad," according to
Hans Brattskar, Oslo's envoy in Colombo. The volatile
situation, exacerbated by a stand-off between the LTTE and
the government over transportation of LTTE cadres, puts the
impending second round of talks in Geneva, slated for April
19-21, in increasing jeopardy. End summary.

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VIOLENCE ON BOTH SIDES:
SERIES OF ATTACKS IN NORTH AND EAST
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2. (C) After the January 25 announcement of February 21-23
talks in Geneva between the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),there was a
brief moratorium on the tit-for-tat violence that has made
the four-year-old Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) increasingly
fragile. In the hiatus between the first round of talks-- in
which the LTTE committed to stop attacks on Sri Lankan
Government and military targets and the GSL promised to
constrain "armed groups" in GSL-controlled areas--the
regrettable pattern of attack and counter-attack appears to
have resumed. On April 7 Vanniasingham Vigneswaran, a
pro-LTTE politician nominated by the Tamil National Alliance
(TNA) to fill the parliamentary slot left by the Christmas
eve assassination of Joseph Pararajasigham, was shot and
killed by unidentified gunmen in downtown Trincomalee in
broad daylight. Also on April 7 two Muslim home guards were
shot and killed as they returned home in Welikanda--a
supposed anti-LTTE Karuna faction stronghold--near
Batticaloa. On April 8 a Tiger camp in an LTTE-controlled
part of Trincomalee was attacked by suspected members of the
Karuna faction. While some reports claimed that eight LTTE
cadres were killed, Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
representative Helen Olafsdottir told poloff the LTTE had
reported no/no casualties in the attack.


3. (U) In a style all too reminiscent of the December-January
spike in violence just before the first round of Geneva
talks, the LTTE launched a series of rapid, small-scale
attacks against GSL security forces. On April 8 a claymore
mine explosion in the northern district of Jaffna injured one
Sri Lankan Army (SLA) soldier and one civilian, while another
attack the same day at an army installation in Trincomalee
killed one soldier and injured another. Two days later the
Tigers struck again in Jaffna, this time killing five
soldiers in a second claymore mine explosion. Two local
civilian aid workers who were passing by were also killed.
On April 11 the Tigers detonated another claymore mine as a
bus carrying Navy personnel returning home for the Sri Lankan
New Year holidays traveled along a main road in Trincomalee,
killing 11 sailors, the civilian driver, and wounding two
British citizens who were traveling in another vehicle
nearby. On the morning of April 12, a claymore mine attack
on a police vehicle just north of Trincomalee killed two
policemen and injured two more.


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4. (SBU) Some sources speculated that the April 11 claymore
attack in Trincomalee was "payback" for Vigneswaran's murder.
Eyewitnesses reportedly said that they observed the
assailants fleeing toward a nearby naval base. On April 11, a
gang--reportedly instigated by the Marxist, Sinhalese
nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)--attacked TNA
parliamentarian N. Raviraj's car as he was returning from
Vigneswaran's funeral in Trincomalee. The military spokesman
told us the following day that Raviraj sustained minor
injuries, perhaps due to broken glass from damage to the car,
and that police had arrested some perpetrators of the attack.


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GSL CRITICISM OF NORWAY AND SLMM
--------------


5. (C) The violence in the north and the east has been
accompanied, unfortunately, by a war of words between the GSL
on one hand and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and
Norwegian peace process facilitators on the other. Since the
February talks, the SLMM has delivered in private weekly
progress reports on cease-fire violations to both parties,
and the GSL has bristled at SLMM's assessment that it has
failed to disarm groups operating in areas under its control.
Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa (the younger brother of
President Mahinda Rajapaksa),in a strongly-worded note,
leaked to the press and reported on April 2, all but accused
out-going SLMM head Hagrup Haukland of fabricating reports of
sightings and contacts with "armed groups" in the east.
Rajapaksa also accused Haukland of referring to the Tigers as
"freedom fighters" in a recent meeting and stating that the
GSL could not beat the LTTE in an armed conflict.


6. (U) In response, Haukland wrote a response to the Defense
Secretary, which was likewise leaked and was reported in the

SIPDIS
local press April 9, that denied these allegations,
clarifying that Haukland had said that neither the GSL nor
the LTTE could achieve a military victory. Haukland's letter
criticized the Defense Secretary and asserted that
irresponsible journalism (e.g., the publication of
Rajapaksa's correspondence with him) undermines the peace
process. Determined to have the last word, Rajapaksa
answered with further inflammatory rhetoric.


7. (C) Jumping into the fray, Foreign Minister Mangala
Samaraweera also gave an April 8 news interview criticizing
the SLMM and blaming Norway for "welcoming" the Tigers on a
visit following the first round of Geneva talks. (Note: The
Foreign Minister claims the interviewers cut out remarks he
made supportive of Norway. End note.) In a discussion with
the Ambassador, Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar said
Minister for International Development and peace process
facilitator Erik Solheim was "hopping mad" about the GSL's
public attacks on the SLMM and the Norwegians. Brattskar
also commented that newly named Norwegian special envoy, Jon
Hanssen-Bauer, during his recent visit to Sri Lanka, had had
a "disturbing" meeting with Defense Secretary Rajapaksa, in
which Rajapaksa asserted that a war against the LTTE was
"winnable." (Note: Sri Lankan military briefers have
reportedly made similar assertions recently to local
diplomats and defense attaches.)

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TRANSPORTATION STAND-OFF IN LEAD-UP TO GENEVA TWO
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8. (C) In addition to the escalating violence and the GSL's
ill-advised saber-rattling with the SLMM, a third point of
contention threatens the increasingly dim prospects for the
second round of talks. Co-Chair representatives from Norway,
Japan, and the European Union (EU) traveled to LTTE
headquarters in Kilinochchi on April 10 to press the LTTE to
halt attacks on GSL security targets and uphold the
commitments made in Geneva in February. The representatives
reported that the LTTE demanded the GSL provide
transportation--via GSL military helicopter--to allow cadres
from the north and east to meet prior to Geneva Two. In an

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April 10 meeting, new peace secretariat (SCOPP) deputy head
(and former Tamil paramilitary) Kethesh Loganathan told the
Ambassador that while the Sri Lankan military has provided
such support in the past, even though it is not required to
do so under the CFA, it refuses to do so now, and the
civilian leadership is not ordering the military to provide
the transport. The GSL countered the LTTE's request with an
offer to provide an air-conditioned ferry, but the Tigers
refused. Some observers have commented that the
transportation squabble has become a point of honor for both
sides--with neither side appearing prepared to budge.


9. (C) In an April 12 meeting, Swiss Emboff Martin
Sturzinger told DCM that the Tigers may refuse to attend the
second round of talks in Geneva unless the GSL gives way on
this demand. Sturzinger added that the Swiss had given both
parties an April 12 deadline to confirm their attendance at
the Geneva talks. In reality, however, his government will
continue to be flexible for at least a few more days to avoid
being in a situation in which both sides (finally) decide to
attend only to have the hosts tell them they have RSVP'd too
late. In Sturzinger's view, the talks are "very much in
doubt" since his recent discussions with members of the LTTE
hierarchy indicate that the Tigers are willing to go to the
mat on the transportation issue, while the GSL almost
certainly cannot accede to the "request" after the attacks of
the last few days.

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COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Prospects for the second round of talks beginning on
April 19, always tenuous, look grimmer than ever. The LTTE
wanted one thing to happen in the two months since the first
round: for the GSL to disarm the Karuna faction. The Tigers
can't be surprised that didn't happen--nor can the GSL be
surprised that the SLMM is taking it to task for failing to
do so. The Tigers now seem to be looking for a pretext to
bail out of Geneva. The Tigers' speedy abandonment of their
Geneva commitments--and the rapid descent of the north and
east back to the pre-Geneva level of violence--is a grim
indication of sign of their appetite for re-engaging on the
peace process. The situation is further strained by the
GSL's public posturing against Norway and the SLMM. The GSL
is happy to see the SLMM take a strong stance against LTTE
cease fire violations, but loath to admit its own failure to
disarm factions that, in essence, assist the GSL by attacking
the LTTE. The events of the past week pose a threat, not
only to the prospect of Geneva Two talks, but to greater
efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution to this lengthy
conflict.
LUNSTEAD