Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06COLOMBO471
2006-03-27 04:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

COLOMBO CO-CHAIRS HUDDLE IN FACE OF POST-GENEVA

Tags:  PGOV PTER PHUM CE NO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2083
OO RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #0471/01 0860431
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270431Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2914
INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 9044
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 5933
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 3969
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2909
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9416
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 2996
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0178
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2068
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 6479
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 4416
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1097
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0363
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000471 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM CE NO
SUBJECT: COLOMBO CO-CHAIRS HUDDLE IN FACE OF POST-GENEVA
DRIFT ON PEACE FRONT

REF: (A) COLOMBO 467 (B) COLOMBO 460

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reason 1
.5 (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000471

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM CE NO
SUBJECT: COLOMBO CO-CHAIRS HUDDLE IN FACE OF POST-GENEVA
DRIFT ON PEACE FRONT

REF: (A) COLOMBO 467 (B) COLOMBO 460

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reason 1
.5 (d).


1. (C) Summary. In the face of tepid
performances by both the GSL and the LTTE in
fulfilling their Geneva commitments, local co-
chair representatives plan to beard each side in
early April, after March 30 local government
elections. That said, violence remains down which
is quite encouraging. The Norwegian facilitators
see little sign of a serious GSL policy process to
get ready for "Geneva Two" April 19-20. Local co-
chair representatives agreed that momentum in
capitals seems to be for a high-level co-chair
meeting in Tokyo on the margins of the April 24 EU
summit there. Local reps also agreed on the merit
of a capital-level public statement on the eve of
the next round in Geneva, although the substance
of that statement will depend on events over the
next few weeks. End Summary


2. (C) Charge' attended March 24 Colombo co-chairs
meeting, hosted by EC Ambassador Wilson. Japanese
Ambassador Suda, Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar
and Dutch Ambassador Van Dijk also participated.

"Not Going Well," but Violence is Down
--------------


3. (C) Brattskar opened with an overview of the
"post-Geneva" situation on the ground, from his
perspective as peace process facilitator. "It is
not going well," Brattskar said. Neither side is
takings its commitments as spelled out in the
joint statement seriously, Brattskar stated,
although he emphasized that it is extremely
important to note that the overall level of
violence is still down significantly. In the
Norwegian view, the government (GSL) is not taking
active steps to rein in armed groups and takes the
position that since violence by those armed groups
is down there is nothing that the GSL needs to do.
For its part, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) continue to abduct children. While there
has been no resurgence of LTTE attacks on GSL
soldiers and sailors, Brattskar noted that when he
met LTTE political chief Thamilchelvan in

Kilinochchi last week, Thamilchelvan told him that
frustration was increasing with the GSL's
"failure" to meet its Geneva obligations and that
the "Tamil people" might begin "spontaneous
attacks" on the Army and Navy as they had done in
the December/January period (Brattskar hastened to
note, correctly, that this was nonsense; any such
attacks had been and would be conducted by the
LTTE). Brattskar said he (and outgoing SLMM head
Haukland who was with him) had a "very heated
exchange" with Thamilchelvan on the child
abduction issue.


4. (C) Brattskar advised the co-chairs that both
sides were involved in a "complaints competition"
with the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM),
trying to increase the number of official reports
of possible violations by the other side. He has
advised the SLMM not to worry about the numbers of
violations ("which could range from raising a flag
to shooting at a ship") but rather on the
substantive nature of the allegations. Brattskar
told the co-chairs ("in strictest confidence")
that the SLMM was delivering weekly "report cards"
on violations to both the GSL and the LTTE.
Moreover, the SLMM will over the next few weeks

COLOMBO 00000471 002 OF 004


issue several "rulings" on violations such as
numerous child abductions, some early March
killings and recent incidents around Muttur near
Trincomalee. The SLMM "rulings" will inevitably
irritate one side or the other.

"No Policy Process"
--------------


5. (C) Brattskar noted that there did not seem to
be much of a GSL policy process under way to get
ready for "Geneva Two." Delegation leader Nimal
Siripala de Silva seemed to be in discussions with
President Rajapaksa and his inner circle about
"Geneva Two" but none of the other Geneva
delegation members had any idea what was going on.
Moreover, a number of unhelpful statements had
been made by GSL officials (in fairness, Brattskar
conceded, in the context of the intensifying
campaign for the March 30 local government
elections). "But, as we've told them many times,
they can't support the process in private and
savage it in public." Brattskar said (shaking his
head wearily) that GSL delegation member H.L.
deSilva (who unhelpfully posited after the first
round that the joint statement constituted an
amendment to the cease-fire agreement (CFA)) had
the night before stated at a public seminar that
the joint statement had not been the product of
GSL-LTTE interaction and negotiation but had been
foisted on the parties by the Norwegians. "Lots
of people will believe him." Wilson observed that
the treatment Foreign Minister Samaraweera had
received in his recent swing through European
capitals probably hadn't helped since his European
interlocutors had tended to "stroke him" for what
the GSL had committed itself to in Geneva rather
than press him about how it would be implemented.
Brattskar and van Dijk agreed.


6. (C) Asked whether he thought "Geneva Two"
would take place, Brattskar said the GSL would
definitely be there. He would not want to attempt
to portray LTTE thinking at the moment although in
his meetings in Kilinochchi last week
"Thamilchelvan didn't say they would not go." If
both sides show up, Brattskar speculated, the LTTE
will want to stick to discussion on the CFA and
the GSL will want to move on to broader peace
issues although each will realize they have to
accommodate the other's agenda to a certain
extent. In conclusion, Brattskar noted, Norway
finds itself in a very difficult position as
facilitator in the run-up to the second round in
Geneva: "We're expected to produce another miracle
with neither side appearing to be committed to
it."

Focusing the Parties on Their Obligations Prior to
"Geneva Two"
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Agreeing that both sides needed to be
asked to account for their tepid implementation of
their Geneva commitments, the co-chairs discussed
a number of scenarios. They agreed on the
following plan, taking into account the realities
that the GSL is currently focused almost
exclusively on the March 30 local government
elections and that posing general questions about
the overall Geneva situation would result in each
side spelling out an encyclopedic list of the
other side's depredations:

-- during the first week of April, local

COLOMBO 00000471 003 OF 004


co-chair representatives will call on
President Rajapaksa and engage him in a
discussion focused around two questions:
what is the GSL doing to implement what it
committed itself to in the Geneva joint
statement? Beyond that, what is the GSL
doing to create a general atmosphere of
mutual confidence in the run-up to "Geneva
Two?"

-- shortly after meeting with the
President, the local co-chair
representatives (minus the U.S.) will
travel to Kilinochchi and attempt to have a
similar discussion with LTTE interlocutors
about its post-Geneva sincerity.

-- after the two meetings, the local co-chairs
representatives would put out a brief public
statement that they had met with both sides to
assess their commitment to the Geneva process
and hear what each side was doing to demonstrate
that commitment. This statement would be
intended, since both meetings would inevitably
leak, to make sure the co-chair effort was
accurately portrayed in the local media.

-- One or two co-chair reps (probably Wilson and
van Dijk) would next week quietly tell Foreign
Secretary Palihakkara that the co-chairs would

SIPDIS
like to call on the President and (minus the
U.S.) go to Kilinochchi the first week of April
in order to help move the Geneva process along.


8. (C) Brattskar noted that new Norwegian
"special envoy" Jon Hanssen-Bauer might be in Sri
Lanka for orientation the first week of April (and
Erik Solheim might come in for one of those days),
which could complicate the plan for local co-chair
reps to beard the two sides that week. But, he
undertook to sort the details out with Oslo. The
other co-chair reps agreed to run the plan by
their capitals.

Next High-Level Co-Chair Meeting in Japan After
Geneva?
-------------- --


9. (C) Comparing notes on various discussions
with and between capitals, local co-chair
representatives agreed that momentum seemed to be
developing for the next capital-level co-chairs
meeting to take place in Tokyo o/a April 24 on the
margins of the EU summit scheduled for Japan at
that time. Wilson said it appeared Ferraro-
Waldner would be available; Brattskar said the
same regarding Solheim (who, according to
Brattskar, had discussed the topic with U/S Burns
the night before). Suda cautioned that an "extra
meeting" in addition to the EU summit might be
difficult and noted that Japanese envoy Akashi did
not plan to be in Japan around April 24 (although
Suda made clear he had no instructions from Tokyo
regarding the next co-chair meeting). Suda
conceded that his government has wanted to host
the next co-chairs meeting for some time and thus
undertook to engage with Tokyo regarding the April
24 timeframe.


10. (C) Colombo co-chair representatives also
agreed that a co-chair statement issued by
capitals shortly before "Geneva Two" probably is a
good idea. Such a statement would presumably call
on both sides to negotiate with good faith and
flexibility, meet their joint statement

COLOMBO 00000471 004 OF 004


commitments, pledge co-chair support for the
process, etc. Final statement language would
depend on the situation on the ground and the
results of the co-chair engagement with the
President and the LTTE outlined above. Co-chair
reps agreed to begin circulating drafts in early
April.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) The Norwegian assessment is, in our view,
on the mark. Both sides are focused on picking
apart the other's post-Geneva performance rather
than demonstrating their seriousness of purpose
about fulfilling their own commitments, although
the overall reduction in violence continues to be
encouraging. The proposal outlined above should
give the co-chairs the opportunity to quietly ask
each side to account for its post-Geneva actions
(or lack thereof) and what they are willing to do
to ensure that a substantive, productive second
round takes place. End Comment.
ENTWISTLE