NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR HAPPY WITH GENEVA BUT SEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000338

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM CE NO
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR HAPPY WITH GENEVA BUT SEES
HARD WORK AHEAD

REF: GENEVA 0395

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reason 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary. Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar told
Colombo co-chairs reps March 2 that the Geneva talks had
exceeded his expectations. An initially tense atmosphere
had relaxed over time and made it possible for agreement on
a joint statement. Brattskar is fairly confident the next
round will take place as scheduled in April but cautioned
that both sides, while in his view serious about their
Geneva commitments, will have their work cut out for them,
especially the government. Colombo co-chair reps agreed
that another high-level co-chair meeting is not needed
until after the next round but, in the interim, quiet
conversations and discreet pressure will be frequent. End
Summary


2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar, just back from
the cease-fire implementation talks in Geneva between the
government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) briefed co-chair chiefs of mission in
Colombo March 2. Japanese Ambassador Suda, Dutch
Ambassador van Dyk, EC Ambassador Wilson, Ambassador
Lunstead and DCM (notetaker) attended.

"Successful Outcome . . . .More Than Expected"
-------------- -


3. (C) Brattskar opened by characterizing the results in
Geneva as a "successful outcome" and "more than expected."
He said his government, however, was being very careful not
to "overplay" the success in the media in order not to give
ammunition to any party. Brattskar said preparation had
been the key. The GSL clearly had put much effort into
getting ready for Geneva and it showed. Moreover, he and
former Deputy Foreign Minster Vidar Helgesen had arrived in
Geneva early, before Erik Solheim, and held joint and
separate preliminary meetings with both sides. This had
led to quick agreement on media guidelines which had
largely worked in keeping the media away from the venue
until the press conference at the end of the meeting
(although the Tigers had disregarded the guidelines in
releasing their opening statement to the press, leading the
GSL to do the same). In the preliminary meetings,
Brattskar had told both sides that agreement had been
reached for Sweden to take over the leadership of the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The GSL had suggested it
be announced as an "outcome" of the Geneva talks but had
not insisted when the Norwegians made clear that they
wanted to quietly get the issue out of the way beforehand.


4. (C) Brattskar commented that the large size of the GSL
delegation had been an issue and drawn complaints from LTTE
delegation chief Balasingham (especially when the GSL
changed its "front line" at the table at the last minute to
include lawyer H.L. de Silva). Both delegations were
clearly nervous at the outset and the atmosphere was tense
during the opening statements. Day one, Brattskar
observed, had included "very direct and open exchanges" and
"some drama and theater." But, Brattskar stressed, the
atmosphere relaxed over time, with numerous "informal
coffee break chats." Moreover, there had been quite a few
"smaller meetings" in which a few from each delegation got
together on specific issues with a Norwegian facilitator
sitting in. Brattskar commented that GSL delegation member
Nivard Cabraal, while silent in the main meeting, had
played a very productive role in the breakout sessions.

Cease-fire Agreement Brass Tacks
--------------


5. (C) Brattskar said that, despite numerous press stories
to the contrary, the GSL delegation had never, in his view,
made a serious effort to amend the cease-fire agreement

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(CFA) during the talks. That said, the two most difficult
issues clearly had been paramilitaries (aka "armed groups")
and political violence/killings. The fact that the parties
had been able to reach a point that they could agree on
language on both of these issues in the joint statement had
been a significant accomplishment and the basis for
Norwegian lead facilitator Erik Solheim's public statement
that the talks had "exceeded" his expectations. The most
serious stumbling block had arisen during the joint
statement negotiations with the Tigers insisting on "cease-
fire agreement" and the GSL wanting "cease-fire." In the
end, the GSL had back down after talking to President
Rajapaksa.

Now To Make It Work
--------------


6. (C) Brattskar said the key to getting to the next
round, agreed for April 19-21 in Geneva (with preliminary
meetings on April 18),will be whether the "relative quiet"
that has prevailed since late January can continue. He
said both sides in Geneva had clearly recognized the
"challenge" of implementation and had struck him as serious
about their obligations: the Tigers to stop political
killings and attacks on the military, the GSL to not allow
"armed groups" in government-controlled territory.
Brattskar opined that it will be more difficult for the GSL
to fulfill its Geneva undertakings than for the LTTE and
that it will be revelatory to see how the Tigers react
when, inevitably, "somebody gets shot in Batticaloa."
Brattskar said his Foreign Minister will urge the LTTE to
fulfill its commitments when he meets with the Tiger Geneva
delegation (minus Balasingham) in Oslo March 3.


7. (C) Brattskar said he found the post-Geneva dustup over
comments by GSL delegation member H.L. de Silva that the
Geneva joint statement constituted an amendment to the CFA
"very uninteresting." De Silva has had a contentious
relationship with Balasingham since he participated in the
1987 Thimpu talks . That said, Brattskar conceded, the
statement had angered the Tigers. Indeed, Balasingham had
called earlier in the day from London to complain about the
statement. Brattskar said he had told Balasingham he
understood his frustration but urged him to remember that
the GSL needs to position itself domestically for March 30
local government elections and to keep in mind the
"ideological spread" in the GSL delegation from "moderate
to hardcore." Nonetheless, Brattskar said, he had shared
Balasingham's comments with GSL delegation leader Nimal
Sirimal de Silva and noted that such statements could only
undercut the progress reached in Geneva. Brattskar said the
political members of the GSL delegation had been flexible;
it was the technical members who caused the most problems.

April in Geneva
--------------


8. (C) Brattskar said he was confident the next round will
take place as scheduled. The Norwegians will work with
both sides to try to develop an agenda for discussion
beyond CFA implementation. Clearly, he predicted, the LTTE
will want to discuss high-security zones (HSZs) in Jaffna
and the plight of fishermen who are impeded by GSL coastal
security restrictions in the North and East. For its part,
the GSL will want to introduce human rights, democracy and
economic growth issues.

Time for Quiet Co-Chair Work
--------------


9. (C) As the discussion turned to when the co-chairs
should next meet at the capital level, Japanese Ambassador
Suda noted that there had been discussion of Solheim
visiting Tokyo around the end of March, leading the
Japanese to wonder if a co-chairs meeting should be part of

COLOMBO 00000338 003 OF 003


his Japan agenda. But, the visit had fallen through and
thus a co-chairs meeting in Japan in that time frame was no
longer in play. General agreement developed that there was
no need for a high-level co-chairs meeting until after the
next round of GSL/LTTE talks in April. In the meantime,
the co-chairs should, as appropriate, lobby both sides to
fulfill their Geneva commitments (as stated in the post-
Geneva co-chairs statement) and have "quiet discussions"
and "apply pressure" as needed between now and round two in
Geneva.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) This round did go well. President Rajapaksa's
tactic of including hardliners in his team to force them to
grudgingly go along with his strategy has worked well so
far, but it means he is always walking on a thin edge. His
greatest challenge now, however, will be to get the
military to really enforce the ban on armed elements. We
will seek opportunities to reinforce with the President and
other GSL officials the need for the Government to live up
to its commitments to keep the process going.
LUNSTEAD