Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06COLOMBO1827
2006-11-03 13:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

MALDIVES: SOME HARD BUMPS ALONG THE ROAD TO

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL MV 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1465
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001827 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MV
SUBJECT: MALDIVES: SOME HARD BUMPS ALONG THE ROAD TO
POLITICAL REFORM

REF: A) COLOMBO 1816 B) COLOMBO 1731

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001827

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MV
SUBJECT: MALDIVES: SOME HARD BUMPS ALONG THE ROAD TO
POLITICAL REFORM

REF: A) COLOMBO 1816 B) COLOMBO 1731

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During his initial trip to the Maldives to
present his credentials (ref a),Ambassador discussed the
political reform process with several ministers and with the
principal opposition figures. Assessments of the state of
reform diverged widely: the government side portrayed the
reform road map as a work in progress and on track, while the
opposition vented its frustration and questioned the
government's good faith. Events may come to a head on
November 10, when an annual opposition rally is to take
place. However, the ministers responsible for law and order
downplayed the potential for violence. Ambassador cautioned
both sides regarding the need to act responsibly to avoid
violent confrontations. End summary.

ROAD MAP FOR REFORM
--------------


2. (C) Foreign Minister Ahmed Shaheed said the President's
road map for reform included three major components: making
governance structures more participatory, ensuring modern,
legal human rights protection, and encouraging a vibrant
civil society sector. Shaheed said that Maldives currently
has nearly 500 NGOs, of which around 4-5 had political aims.
He noted that Maldives has a cacophonous media landscape,
with some papers trying to outdo each other to be outrageous.
"Dissent is new to the Maldives, and some don't understand
the limits yet."


3. (C) Shaheed told Ambassador that he had prevailed on the
Maldives government to adhere to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights despite some cabinet members'
reservations that national legislation was not yet in
compliance. He had turned this argument around, he said, by
noting that was perhaps the best way to speed up changes in
national legislation to bring it into conformity with
international standards. In particular, he hoped to make
progress on making provision for legal aid, changing police
methods, and introducing habeas corpus.


4. (C) Attorney General Hassan Saeed said that his ministry

had met all its self-imposed deadlines for legislative
initiatives but one ) the evidence act, which was technical
in nature. He noted that he would need time to "market" it
to some of the older politicians. He had encountered a
"difference of opinion" on the proposed Public Integrity
Commission. The Home Minister wanted the Commission to be an
ombudsman for citizen complaints that would report to him.
Saeed would push for a robust mandate with "intrusive
functions."


5. (C) Saaed reported that the President had appointed five
"fully independent" members to the Human Rights Commission on
October 29. The Commission would have full investigatory
powers to appear anywhere, anytime, without prior notice to
investigate possible abuses. The Ambassador noted that we
were in the process of trying to set up a similar Commission
in Sri Lanka. It was important to get the framework right,
but beyond that, it was a question of leadership and
political will to have an effective Commission.

NOVEMBER 10 OPPOSITION RALLY ) THE NEXT FLASHPOINT?
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Attorney General Saeed was concerned about plans for
an opposition Republic Day rally on November 10. He was not
expecting a big turnout; nevertheless, if the rally turned
violent, it would only play into the hands of government
anti-reform hardliners. He criticized recent comments of
opposition Maldivian Democratic Party Vice President Ibrahim
Hussain Zaki as tantamount to incitement to overthrow the

COLOMBO 00001827 002 OF 003


government.


7. (C) Home Minister Ahmed Thasmeen Ali did not think the
November 10 rally would attract more than 300-400 people )
but that some of them might be "committed to creating a mob
atmosphere on the street." Some, he said, were openly
calling for the government's overthrow though street
protests. Some government supporters were becoming
impatient, he said, believing that they had already gone far
enough to accommodate opposition views. However, his
strategy was not to have to resort to mass arrests in the
event of a disruption ) this would not be good for the
reform process or the image of the police. The Ambassador
underscored our support for the right of peaceful assembly
and said it was the responsibility of both sides to exercise
restraint.


8. (C) Police Commissioner Adam Zahir concurred that the
threat of violence for the November 10 rally was relatively
low. A few "strong-minded guys" might try to foment trouble.
Ambassador Blake said that the MDP leadership had told him
they would try to control their people. He reminded Zahir
the police had a special responsibility to resist the
temptation to respond with excessive force to provocations.
Zahir replied that training provided by the Australians, U.S.
and others had helped the new police force learn to respond
proportionately and not let situations escalate out of
control.

A CROSSOVER MINISTER TRIES TO BRIDGE THE GAP
--------------


9. (C) Finance Minister Qasim Ibrahim, a founding member of
the Maldives Democratic Party, was jailed by the government
in 2004, but subsequently "crossed over" to join the ruling
party. He expressed gratitude for the role the U.S.
government, particularly former Ambassador Lunstead, played
in obtaining his release. He said the President Gayoom had
recruited him to joint he government after the December 2004
tsunami. He noted that although the government has since

SIPDIS
released most opposition figures from arrest, some hardline
MPs had instituted treason charges against them in
Parliament. He said he did not know what was likely to
happen with these cases.


10. (C) Ibrahim told us that some in the President's party
do not want to change and haven't accepted the President's
agenda embodied in the reform road map. President Gayoom, on
the other hand, wants to leave a legacy of democratic reform,
but not at the cost of the country's stability and economic
growth. Change had to be peaceful and in within controlled
limits, Ibrahim said, but he also called for more
transparency in the government's approach to reform. The
perceived favoritism shown to the President's family and
cronies was a source of popular discontent.

OPPOSITION IN A QUANDARY
--------------


11. (C) MPs from the opposition Maldives Democratic Party
(MDP) we met were upset and demoralized following the
detention for questioning of some of their key party members.
Party chairman and opposition leader Mohamed Nasheed told us
that police had taken in party vice chair and shadow Foreign
Minister Ibrahim Hussain Zaki that morning and arrested about
eight other party members. Zaki was released as we left the
meeting.


12. (C) Nasheed renewed his earlier complaint (ref b) that
the government had reneged on an agreement to publish a joint
statement after his own release, and was dragging its feet on
enacting its own reform program. He said the government had
agreed to set up an informal contact group between the two
parties to work out transitional arrangements leading up to a

COLOMBO 00001827 003 OF 003


new constitution. This working group had never met, however,
because the government representatives simply failed to show
up for meetings.


13. (C) Nasheed insisted that the road map had accomplished
nothing. The MDP parliamentary group could and would control
its members on November 10, but feared that the government
was seeking to provoke a confrontation that it would then use
as a pretext to "smash" the MDP. The MDP was not opposed to
the government's reform plans, he stressed ) but had lost
all confidence in the government's good faith and intent to
implement it.


14. (C) COMMENT: There is no doubt that within the government
ranks are hardliners who prefer to stop the reform process in
its tracks. However, President Gayoom appears committed to
seeing his road map through, and has in the Foreign Minister
and the Attorney General two impressive leaders who share his
commitment. Embassy has in the past intervened when the
government appears to have unjustly detained opposition
figures. That said, we doubt that the situation is as dire
as the opposition portrays it. We will continue to maintain
gentle but steady pressure on the government to fulfill its
reform commitments and refrain from disproportionate
reactions to opposition demonstrations and media statements.
BLAKE