U/S BURNS REVIEWS SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000137

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS CE NO
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS REVIEWS SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS WITH
NORWEGIAN FACILITATOR ERIK SOLHEIM


Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4, B AND D


1. (C) Summary. Norwegian peace facilitator Solheim told
U/S Burns that the Sri Lankan peace process is at a
crossroads and that a "major step forward" is essential.
Burns expressed U.S. support for the Norwegian facilitation
effort and compared notes with Solheim on the efficacy and
vision of various Sri Lanka politicians. Solheim will
consider his visit a success if he gets agreement on dates
and locations for several rounds of ceasefire talks but does
not expect a lessening of LTTE violence even if talks begin.
Solheim and Burns agreed a late February/early March
co-chairs meeting in Colombo might make sense if there is
some tangible progress in the peace process before then.
Burns noted that President Bush's early March trip to India
would be an opportunity for a public U.S. statement of
support for the process. Solheim and Burns held a short
"photo op" after their meeting and made joint statements on
the need to avoid a civil war and re-start peace talks. End
Summary


2. (C) U/S Nicholas Burns met with Norwegian Minister of
International Development and peace facilitator Erik Solheim
January 23 at the Ambassador's residence. SA DAS Gastright,
Ambassador Lunstead and DCM (notetaker) sat in. Solheim was
accompanied by Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar and
several Norwegian emboffs/staffers.

Process At a Crossroads
--------------


3. (C) Asked by Burns for his overall sense of the
situation, Solheim said "it is clear we are at a crossroads.
We must make a major step forward or it will go down the
drain." The status quo was no longer tenable. Solheim
continued that his impression is that the GSL needs to
develop a strategy for war or a strategy for peace but right
now it has neither. He hoped to help the GSL develop a
strategy for peace during this visit. Burns commented that
in his meeting with President Rajapaksa (septel) earlier in
the day, the President had expressed concern that his
military was too weak to take on the Tigers (Solheim will see
the President January 24). Burns noted that his message to
the President and other senior Sri Lankans had been
threefold: the U.S. supports Norway and the Sri Lankan
Monitoring Mission (SLMM),the GSL should not rise to LTTE
provocations and the GSL should take and keep the moral high
ground by being flexible on issues such as the venue for
cease-fire talks. As Secretary Rice had noted
to Foreign Minister Samaraweera several weeks ago in
Washington, the GSL should not give the LTTE an excuse to go
back to war by being stubborn on the venue issue.

Both Sides Obsessed with Venue Issue
-------------- -


4. (C) Solheim said the U.S. position as outlined by Burns
was very helpful to Norwegian efforts. On the venue issue,
Solheim said it would have to be Oslo or Geneva in order to
bring the LTTE on board. In his view, however, the venue
issue has assumed too much importance and drawn attention
from the fact that the GSL has no real plan on how to proceed
towards peace once the short-term venue issue is settled.
Solheim confirmed that he will see reclusive LTTE supremo
Prabhakaran when he goes to Kilinochchi January 25 and noted
that it is good that LTTE theoretician Balasingham ("the
heavyweight thinker") will be there as well since Prabhakaran
is completely isolated and has no understanding of "the
South," much less the broader world. Solheim speculated that
Prabhakaran has not spoken to a Sinhalese in ten years.
Solheim's objective is to get Prabhakaran (and Balasingham)
to agree to both the venue and principle of ceasefire talks.
Ideally, he would agree to a series of talks ("since the

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first one will consist of a long recitation of Tamil
grievances!")


5. (C) Burns and Solheim agreed that is it imperative that
the GSL develop a strategy for peace and not leave the
initiative to the LTTE. The GSL right now, Solheim observed,
is focused on "domestic problems, but the LTTE couldn't care
less." Burns agreed with Solheim's observation that
President Rajapaksa means well and wants peace but has a
"shallow understanding" of the ethnic issue. Moreover, the
LTTE had given him absolutely no breathing space after his
inauguration before beginning to take out convoys and
soldiers. Burns observed that both the Foreign Minister and
the opposition leader conveyed a better sense of longterm
strategy and tactics than the President who came across as
"vague and indirect."


6. (C) Asked by Burns what would constitute a successful
result to his visit, Solheim said he would be pleased if he
left with a commitment to several rounds of ceasefire talks
with agreed dates and venues. He estimated that with
willingness and commitment from both sides, the first round
conceivably could be in 2-3 weeks. Solheim cautioned,
however, that even with such an agreement, he would have no
hope that the LTTE would scale back its campaign of violence
until the talks actually started, if then.


7. (C) Turning to the co-chair process, Solheim said it
made sense to hold the next meeting in Sri Lanka if there is
enough progress to justify a meeting. That will depend on
the success of his efforts over the next few days. Late
February or early March could make sense. Burns noted that
he could come to a Colombo co-chairs meeting at that time.
Moreover, if there is progress on the ceasefire talks,
President Bush could make a supportive public statement while
in South Asia.


8. (SBU) After their conversation, Burns and Solheim had a
"photo op" at which Burns made clear U.S. support for the
Norwegian facilitation effort and the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM). Solheim expressed his appreciation for the
support for his efforts by the U.S., the other co-chair
countries and the rest of the international community.
(Burns and Solheim each held individual press conferences
later in the day.)


9. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this message.

LUNSTEAD