TEN YEARS AFTER MOVING TO THAILAND, KNU RESISTANCE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000065

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL PGOV TH BM
SUBJECT: TEN YEARS AFTER MOVING TO THAILAND, KNU RESISTANCE
CONTINUES

REF: A. A) BANGKOK 01625

B. B) CHIANG MAI 00049

CHIANG MAI 00000065 001.2 OF 002



1. Summary: The Thai-Burma border around Mae Sat in Tak
province hosts up to a million ethnic Karen and a large number
of Karen exile organizations. The most prominent of these
organizations is the Karen National Union (KNU),headquartered
in Mae Sot since 1995. No longer as effective or powerful as in
the past, the KNU nevertheless remains a force to be reckoned
with. A pending USG determination that the KNU is a terrorist
entity would play into the Burmese regime's hand and lead to
more human rights abuses. End summary


2. The KNU, which has resisted the central government in Burma
since 1949, defines itself as a political organization whose
goal is to protect the Karen people. Even after losing much of
its fixed territory inside Burma in 1995, the KNU and its
military arm, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA),
retained a major role in opposition to the ruling State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC) in Rangoon. The Karen is the only
major ethnic insurgency in Burma not to sign a cease-fire
agreement with the Burmese regime. According to Chiang
Mai-based journalist Bertil Lintner, the majority of Karen on
both sides of the border view the KNU as their only hope for
resisting the Burmese regime.


3. At one time the KNU functioned as a de-facto government,
funding basic services in Karen territory through tax collection
and trade. The Karen Education Department, which administered a
network of schools throughout Karen State up to 1995, is now
limited to cooperating with NGOs providing education in the
Thailand-based refugee camps. The Karen Department of Health
and Welfare trained civilian medics and a Mae Sot-based supreme
justice presided over local courts in the Karen State.

Thai Government Policy Mixed


4. The Thai government attitude toward its large and diverse
Karen population - which includes long-time residents of
Thailand, migrant workers, exiles opposed to the Burmese
military regime, and over 100,000 refugees in camps - is mixed.
According to KNU Foreign Secretary David Taw, there is no single
Thai "policy" toward the KNU. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
doesn't know much about the KNU," he said, showing interest only
"when the SPDC complains." Although a coordinated policy by
Burma and Thailand likely could eliminate the KNU, elements of
the Thai military maintain that it is not in their interest to
push the KNU into a corner. Sources within the Thai Special
Forces confirm their cooperation with the KNLA, noting that
policies formulated in Bangkok are often in contradiction with
the reality faced by soldiers on the frontline.


5. This tacit support for the KNU is a legacy of the historical
Thai view of the Karen as long-standing allies who provided a
buffer against both the Burmese army and communist insurgents.
Prime Minister Thaksin's policy of engagement with the SPDC does
not appear to have significantly changed the government's
handling of the KNU and related organizations. In fact, the
Karen retain standing in the business community as important
players in border commerce. A Thai proposal to develop an
industrial zone in Karen territory stalled for want of KNU
agreement, according to David Taw.

Background of the Conflict


6. The roots of the Karen resistance predate an independent
Burma, with years of grievances on both sides. The Karen's
predominantly Christian leadership and World War II allegiance
to the British against the Japanese and their Burman allies
exacerbated ethnic differences. The Karen were the only major
ethnic group to opt out of an agreement that led to Burma's
independence in 1948. Less than a year after independence, the
Karen's uneasy alliance with the first Burmese government fell
apart as communal violence spread.


7. During the early years following independence, the Karen
engaged in open conflict with the Burmese central government.
Prolonged warfare took place throughout Karen State as well as
in ethnic Karen areas throughout southern Burma and in the
vicinity of Rangoon. In the decades after the military seized
power in Rangoon in 1962, however, the Rangoon generals
consolidated their power throughout the country. The Burmese
army attacked the Karen and other ethnic groups using a strategy
known as "Four Cuts:" cutting supply lines, cutting
communication between the population and the military, cutting
income-producing activities, and cutting off access to new
recruits.

Human Rights Issues


CHIANG MAI 00000065 002.2 OF 002



8. This policy caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands
of Karen villagers over the years, creating a large population
of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who are vulnerable to
rape, disease, and starvation. NGOs such as Karen Human Rights
Group and Human Rights Watch have documented systematic abuse
against Karen villagers and IDPs, including extra-judicial
killing, torture, forced labor, forced relocation, extortion,
rape, destruction of property, and land confiscation.


9. The Karen have faced charges of human rights violations as
well; Amnesty International documented the use of child
soldiers, landmines, extra-judicial killings, and torture by the
KNLA. KNU contacts admit that these abuses occur, but say that
the KNU is actively working to improve their human rights record
by educating civilian and military leaders about human rights
issues.

Cease Fire Talks


10. Cease fire talks between the KNU and Rangoon, abandoned
after 1995, resumed in December 2003 when a team led by
long-time KNU leader General Bo Mya went to Rangoon to
negotiate. The resulting "Gentleman's Agreement" - a handshake
to stop fighting - has been repeatedly violated by both sides.
Although a KNU delegation went to Rangoon in October 2004 to
continue the talks, negotiations ended abruptly with the sudden
downfall of Burmese Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and subsequent
purge of his military intelligence apparatus. A later offer by
Rangoon in May 2005 to resume talks was deemed unacceptable by
the KNU.



11. KNU Foreign Secretary David Taw confirmed that the
organization remains interested in a cease fire agreement with
Rangoon, "but after Khin Nyunt's departure we don't know who to
deal with." In the meantime, the KNU considers that the
"Gentlemen's Agreement" achieved with the SPDC in 2004 remains
in force, despite numerous skirmishes in the ensuing years.

The Christian Connection


12. A large number of Karen converted to Christianity in the
19th century due to American missionary efforts, educational
opportunities and a traditional Karen legend that corresponded
to Christian teachings. Among Karen leaders today, many are
Christians, including most of the KNU executive committee and
the Karen Refugee Committee.


13. Christian missionaries and aid workers in northern Thailand
provide various kinds of support to the Karen on both sides of
the border; the Chiang Mai-based Free Burma Rangers (FBR)
assists IDPs in Burma and publicizes their plight through widely
circulated email reports of Burmese atrocities. FBR staff
confirm that these eyewitness accounts go to Congressional
offices and British parliamentarians as well as to journalists,
NGOs, and UN organizations. FBR photos and video footage have
been used in reporting on Burma by international media
organizations such as BBC, VOA, AP, and Swiss, German, and
French TV.


14. Comment: Within Thailand's multi-ethnic border dissident
community, the Karen play an active and highly visible role. By
virtue of their numbers and long resistance to the Burmese
central government, the Karen are central to refugee and exile
issues in Thailand. The KNU in turn is central to most of the
Karen. As with other exile groups, the KNU is struggling with
problems of operating out of Thailand, which makes communication
with villagers and colleagues inside Burma more difficult.
Recent advances by the Burmese army on the small remaining
territory controlled by the KNU in Karen State near the Thai
border, as well as on other areas populated by ethnic Karen, has
led to a surge in Karen IDPs and refugees and put further
pressure on the KNU. A USG determination that the KNU is a
terrorist organization would be used by the Burmese regime to
justify continued and even more severe abuses against the Karen
people.


15. This cable was coordinated with Embassy Rangoon.
CAMP